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ABSTRACT 
 
From the Tsarist confiscation of the properties of the Armenian Church in 1903 to the 
outbreak of the First World War, relations between Russia and its Armenian subjects 
gradually changed. This thesis scrutinizes how and why this gradual change took place 
between 1903 and 1914 by looking at the interaction between the Russian administration 
and the three political pillars of the Russian Armenians (the Dashnaktsutiun, the 
Armenian Church, and the Armenian bourgeoisie) as well as Russian foreign policy 
considerations.  
The confiscation decree of 1903 triggered an immense reaction by the Russian 
Armenians against the Russian government, which became part of the revolutionary 
unrest in the South Caucasus in 1905. The relations began to improve with the arrival of 
the viceroy of the Caucasus, Illarion I. Vorontsov-Dashkov as a general Tsarist recovery 
was underway. From 1907 to 1912, the Russian authorities reformulated their relations 
with the political pillars of the Russian Armenians. In this period, by eliminating the 
Dashnaktsutiun as a political threat in the South Caucasus and sorting out its differences 
with the Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie, the Russian regime had 
improved its relations with the Russian Armenians.  
By 1912, there were no serious disagreements between the Russian Armenians and the 
Tsarist authorities, for whom other threats, such as the pan-Islamist movement in the 
South Caucasus took precedence. This study also adds the foreign policy dimension to 
the picture as it became the dominant aspect of the relations between the Russian 
administration and the Russian Armenians between 1912 and 1914. The changes in the 
international dynamics, particularly regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire, further 
solidified the improved relations as Russia decided to become the patron and the defender 
of Armenians in late 1912.  
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND USAGE 
 
For the transliteration of Russian-language words and the names in the cited Russian 
documents (with the exception of anglicized names of the Tsars and a few well-
established names), I have employed a simplified Library of Congress system but I have 
omitted the hard and soft signs for the sake of convenience. For place names that are 
located in the Russian Empire, I have preferred the official Russian name (hence Tiflis, 
not Tbilisi) but have kept the English forms of the most common ones (e.g. St. 
Petersburg, Moscow etc.). Although the term Transcaucasus was used in the official 
documents, I have preferred ‘South Caucasus,’ which is geographically more appropriate 
and politically more neutral. The Russian Armenian surnames mostly had three variants 
in the official Russian documentation, (ending in -ian, -iants, and -ov), which were 
sometimes used interchangeably by different Tsarist state institutions. In most cases, I 
have preferred the variant in the cited Russian official document.  
The Julian calendar was in force in Russia until 1918 and was thirteen days behind the 
Gregorian calendar in the twentieth century. For the Russian primary documents cited in 
the thesis, I have given the date on the document, followed by its conversion to the 
Gregorian calendar in brackets. The Ottoman Empire had Rumi and Hijra calendars and I 
have given the Ottoman date on the document followed by its Gregorian equivalent in 
brackets. For the sake of consistency and convenience, I have used Gregorian dates 
throughout the text. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study begins with a hectic period in the history of Russian-Armenian relations, the 
confiscation of Armenian Church properties in 1903, and ends with the outbreak of 
another one, the First World War. In the Russian Empire, the treatment of the Armenians 
underwent a gradual change between 1903 and 1914. This study intends to explain this 
change in the Russian treatment of its own Armenians by analysing domestic and 
international dynamics that caused it.  
It was said that ‘if Siberia and Central Asia were the hells of the Russian functionary, the 
Caucasus was his purgatory.’1 The Russian functionaries had to deal with a gamut of 
nationalities, religions and naturally problems of the warmer part of their purgatory, the 
South Caucasus, which had been under Russian control since 1828. As Layton asserts, 
back in the early days of the Russian conquest, the Caucasus was considered a rich but a 
backward place in the imagination of the Russians, not unlike India in the eyes of the 
British.
2
 If the resources were put into good use, with proper administration, the Russians 
believed that they could entirely change the place. The first attempt was made with Tiflis 
when the first viceroy, Mikhail S. Vorontsov, arrived in 1845. The Russian administrative 
capital of the Caucasus was rebuilt in line with the latest urban tastes of the day. Big 
boulevards, bridges, theatres, and an opera were added to the centre of the city.   
After the defeat at the Crimean War came the tumultuous wars in the North Caucasus, 
which forced the Tsarist regime to put military prerogatives first on the agenda. It took a 
nearly a decade to pacify the place and then the news of the great reforms of the 1860s 
reached the southern corner of the empire. However, the land reforms—officially 
introduced in the South Caucasus in 1870—were an arduous task as much as anywhere in 
                                               
1 Quoted in Luigi Villari, Fire and Sword in the Caucasus (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906), 112. 
2 Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 73-74. 
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the empire. The land hungry peasants, an overwhelming majority, would have to wait for 
serfdom to be effectively stamped out.  
By then, the Armenians were on good terms with their Russian rulers and adapted well 
under the developing Tsarist hold in the place. Integrating well into the Tsarist 
educational and cultural establishment, the Armenians produced several important Tsarist 
functionaries not only for the Caucasus but also for the empire like Mikhail T. Loris-
Melikov, the famous Minister of Interior of Alexander II, and Ivan D. Delianov, the 
Minister of Education under Alexander III. Additionally, because of their commercial 
expertise and vast trade networks, scattered throughout in the South Caucasus, as well as 
into the Ottoman and Persian empires, the Russian Armenians were considered a useful 
element by the Russian administration.
3
  
This became even more so with the oil boom in the region in 1870s, by which Baku soon 
became the world’s largest oil producer and exporter owing to the rising global demand 
for kerosene. The city of Baku was extravagantly rebuilt, with electrical illumination 
earlier than most of the European cities thanks to its oil resources which were said to 
‘produce more wealthy men than America.’4 Apart from foreign and Russian 
entrepreneurs (like the Nobel family), the Armenian bourgeoisie of the South Caucasus 
was also part of this oil boom. Armenian oil tycoons, such as Gukasev, Mirzoev and 
Mantashev, flourished and contributed to the strengthening of Armenian economic might 
in the region, particularly in the cities.
5
 The Armenians also dominated the professional 
jobs because of their higher rates of urbanization and literacy. With the introduction of 
municipal reforms to the region, by virtue of their wealth, the Armenian bourgeoisie 
                                               
3 Ronald G. Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993), 
49. In this period, many members of the Armenian bourgeoisie were awarded with the title of pochetnye 
grazhdane (honourable citizens), particularly in Tiflis. As the highest urban estate, this title was usually 
granted to merchants and industrialists, as well as to the military and civil servants who were not promoted 
to nobility.  
4 James D. Henry, Baku: An Eventful History (London: Archibald Constable and co., 1905), 5-6.  
5 Robert W. Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers: The Saga of the Nobel Family and the Russian Oil Industry 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 132. 
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became a strong political force in the City Duma and uprava (the executive board) of the 
key cities like Tiflis and Baku.
6
  
In the meantime, the Russian administration in the Caucasus had also good relations with 
the Armenian Catholicosate in Echmiadzin, the supreme ecclesiastical seat of the 
Armenian Church.
7
 Shortly after the Russian conquest of the South Caucasus, with the 
introduction of the Polozhenie (Statute) of 1836, the Armenian Church was given a 
degree of autonomy in religious matters, tax exemptions and, most importantly, a 
principal position in Armenian education.
8
 On top of its responsibilities for primary 
schooling, it also ran various Armenian seminaries, which were important institutions for 
higher education in the Caucasus, a periphery without a university.
9
 
In return for these privileges, the head of the Armenian Church, the Catholicos, was 
expected to help the Russian government with its dealings with the Armenians, both at 
home and abroad. Particularly in the earlier phases of the establishment of the Russian 
hold in the Caucasus, this mutually beneficial arrangement enabled the Russians to gain 
Armenian loyalties. However, this began to change with the assassination of Tsar 
Alexander II, after which the Russian government adopted a less accommodating stance 
on the subject nationalities with its measures of Russification. 
In the South Caucasus, this task was assigned to new High-Commissioner of the 
Caucasus, Aleksander M. Dondukov-Korsakov. Not long after he arrived in Tiflis in 
                                               
6 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 19-21; Vartan Gregorian, ‘The Impact of Russia on the Armenians and 
Armenia,’ in Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, ed. Wayne S. 
Vucinich (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 186-89. The members of the uprava and the mayor 
(also the head of the uprava and the City Duma) were elected by the members of the City Duma. These 
local administrative bodies had a wide range of responsibilities. Audrey Altstadt, ‘The Baku City Duma - 
Arena for Elite Conflict,’ Central Asian Survey 5, no. 3-4 (1986): 52-62. 
7 Other sees of the Armenian Church, the Armenian Patriarchates in Istanbul and Jerusalem, and the 
Catholicosates in Sis and Akhtamar were autonomous in their internal political and ecclesiastical affairs. 
However, they all recognized the ecclesiastical primacy of the Catholicosate in Echmiadzin as the supreme 
leader of the Armenian Church. Abel Abrahamian, The Church and Faith of Armenia (London: The Faith 
Press, 1920), 34-7. 
8 In the administration of the Armenian Church, the Echmiadzin Synod played the role of an advisory body 
to the Catholicos.  
9 The most important seminaries were Kevorkian (1874) in Echmiadzin and Nersesian (1825) in Tiflis. 
Although these seminaries were administered by the Armenian Church, their curricula were not that 
different from their secular equivalents. Kevork A. Sarafian, History of Education in Armenia (La Verne: 
La Verne College, 1978), 266-7; Vakhe Erkanian, Armianskaia kultura v 1800-1917 gg. (Erevan: 
Sovetakan grokh, 1985), 15. 
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1882, the tables were completely turned for the Armenians. The Armenian Church was 
suspected of harbouring separatist elements and promoting Armenian nationalism using 
its cultural and religious privileges.
10
 After the opposition of the Armenian Church to the 
law of 1884, which called for the abolition of the autonomies of the schools of the non-
Russian population in the empire and the imposition of new restrictions on them, the 
Armenian parish schools (except for the seminaries) were closed in 1885 by orders of 
Dondukov-Korsakov.
11
 Despite its annulment a year later, these measures were the signs 
of change of the Armenian image in the Russian eyes.  
In 1886, Pobedonostsev informed the Tsar that along with the Georgians, the Armenians 
were entertaining ‘the mad dream of the reestablishment of their national 
independence.’12 Apart from the Armenian Church, there was a more dangerous force 
that disturbed the Tsarist authorities regarding this: the nascent Armenian revolutionary 
movement, which had links with the Russian revolutionary movement.
13
 The strong 
Tsarist reaction after 1881 compelled most of the Russian revolutionaries to go 
underground or to leave for Europe. Under the strict measures of the Tsarist Russification 
measures, some Armenian revolutionaries also found refuge in Europe. The Hnchaks 
were founded by the efforts of such a circle of Russian Armenians in Geneva in 1887.
14
 
As the orthodox Marxist line of the Hnchaks failed to attract a large following among the 
                                               
10 Reports of Dondukov-Korsakov to Alexander III, 1883, doc. no. 10, in The Armenian Question in the 
Caucasus: Russian Archive Documents and Publications, vol. 1, ed. Tale Heydarov (Reading: Ithaca Press, 
2011), 266. 
11 Erkanian, 32; Valentin S. Diakin, Natsionalnyi vopros vo vnutrennei politike tsarizma (XIX-nachalo XX 
vv.) (St. Petersburg: LISS, 1998), 29; Sergei V. Kuleshov, ed., Natsionalnaia politika Rossii: istoriia i 
sovremennost (Moscow: Russkii mir, 1997), 97; Ronald G. Suny, ‘Eastern Armenians under Tsarist Rule,’ 
in Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, vol. 2, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2004), 129-30. 
12 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 45. 
13 Most of the founding members of the Armenian political parties had been influenced by the revolutionary 
tradition in Russia, especially the strategies and ideas of Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will). Gregorian, 208-
13. The founders of the Hnchaks and the Dashnaks had connections with Narodnaia Volia organization. 
For the emergence of these parties, see Louise Z. Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The 
Development of Armenian Political Parties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). 
14 The main leaders of the party were Avetis and Maro Nazarbekian, a couple who were affiliated with 
Russian narodnik circles before 1881. As a tribute to the Russian revolutionary movement, the party was 
named Hnchak (Bell) after Herzen’s Kolokol. Despite its Russian Armenian origins, the party focused on 
the problems of the Ottoman Armenians. 
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Armenians, another revolutionary party, the Dashnaktsutiun (Federation) was founded in 
Tiflis in 1890.
15
  
The founders of the party were typical products of the Russian education system, in 
which they formed their ideas and met each other. After finishing the Aleksandrovskii 
Pedagogical Institute in Tiflis, Kristapor Mikaelian went on to study agronomy at 
Moscow University. Under the combined influence of nascent Armenian nationalism and 
Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will), he and Simon Zavarian were pondering what needed to 
be done for the liberation of the Ottoman Armenians.
16
 After they returned to Tiflis, 
Stepan Zorian, a drop out from Petrovskii Academy of Agriculture, joined their group in 
1889. Like Mikaelian and Zavarian, Zorian was also a lower class Russian Armenian.   
Although the party was founded by Russian Armenians in Tiflis, its priority was the 
liberation of the Ottoman Armenians. The first party program of the Dashnaks (1892) 
aimed at ‘political and economic freedom in Ottoman Armenia through rebellion.’17 In 
principle, the party was opposed to the policies of the Russian government against the 
Russian Armenians but it avoided operating in the Russian Empire because of the 
difficulties it would create and the urgency of the problems of the Ottoman Armenians.
18
 
During the 1890s, the Dashnaks expanded their organization in the Ottoman and Russian 
empires as well as in Europe.
19
 
                                               
15 As the name of the party indicates, it was initially consisted of various small groups, which were not 
effective by themselves.  
16 Eduard Oganesian, Vek borby: ocherk 100-letnei istorii Dashnakskoi partii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoi 
borby Armianskogo naroda (Moscow: Feniks, 1991), 76; Anahide Ter Minassian, ‘Le mouvement 
révolutionnaire arménien, 1890-1903,’ Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 14, no. 4 (1973): 553. 
17 Nalbandian, 166-8. 
18 Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), 17-18. In the words of Mikaelian, ‘the struggle against the ‘surplus blood’ that was 
being extracted from the Ottoman Armenians had priority over the struggle against ‘surplus value’ being 
extracted from Russian Armenians.’ Quoted in Gerard J. Libaridian, ‘Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 
and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaksutiun,’ in Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in 
the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, ed. Ronald G. Suny (T. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1983), 193. This stance of the party was harshly criticized by other Caucasian socialists, such as 
Makharadze and Shaumian. Filipp Makharadze, Ocherki revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Zakavkaze (Tbilisi: 
Gosizdat Gruzii, 1927), 320-1; Artashes B. Karinian, Shaumian i natsionalisticheskie techeniia na Kavkaze 
(Baku: Tipografiia 3-i internatsional, 1928), 22. 
19 The party’s highest organizational bodies were the Western and the Eastern Bureaus. The Western 
Bureau, based in Geneva, was responsible for the party committees in Europe, the US and the provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire that were west of the Giresun-Harput-Diyarbakir line. The Eastern Bureau was located 
in Tiflis and was responsible for the committees in Russia and the provinces of the Ottoman Empire that 
13 
 
In the Ottoman Empire, the Dashnaks soon began to implement most of the techniques 
they borrowed from their Russian tutors. In the first years; they acted as a vanguard party 
and aimed at revolutionizing the masses by propaganda and arming the countryside in 
Eastern Anatolia. To bankroll their operations, the Dashnaks extorted money from the 
wealthy Armenians—a practice the Russian revolutionaries made the Dashnaks familiar 
with their expropriations.
20
 Supported mainly by lower and middle classes, the Dashnaks 
soon surpassed the Hnchaks in efficiency and popularity with their nationalist rhetoric. It 
was certainly a much easier way to appeal to a community whose distinct religious and 
linguistic identity already formed a solid basis for national consciousness.  
In this period, the upward demographic trend in the cities, the expansion of a school 
network, and the improvement of the communications in the Caucasus were contributing 
to further growth of national awareness among the Russian Armenians.
21
 However, as the 
agricultural prices went down and the Baku oil industry began to lose pace in the 1890s, 
the Dashnaks were able to recruit many young people from the ranks of the unemployed 
and immigrants.
22
 Soon thereafter, the Armenian revolutionaries became a real thorn on 
the side of Abdulhamid II. Starting from the rebellions in Sasun and Van in 1894-1896, 
the activities of these Armenian revolutionary parties were aimed at attracting European 
intervention but without much luck. Even after the spectacular Dashnak raid of the 
Ottoman Bank in August 1896, the great powers, including Russia, refrained from 
effective intervention, while the Hamidian response was to tighten the grip over his 
Armenian subjects. 
                                                                                                                                            
were east of the Giresun-Harput-Diyarbakir line. Raymond Kevorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A 
Complete History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 39.  
20 Hratch Dasnabedian, History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1924) 
(Milan: OEMME Edizioni, 1989), 62. 
21 Between 1865 and 1904, the total population of the South Caucasus went up by 150%. Bolshaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, vol. 3 (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1926), 223; Deliara I. Ismail-Zade, 
Naselenie gorodov Zakavkazskogo kraia v XIX-nachale XX v: istoriko-demograficheskii analiz (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1991), 214. More interestingly, as of 1897, the South Caucasus had the youngest population in the 
empire on average (the average age of the region was 23.94). Richard Pipes, ‘Demographic and 
Ethnographic Changes in Transcaucasia, 1897- 1956,’ The Middle East Journal 13, no.1 (Winter 1959): 43. 
This growing young population had now better access to education and all sorts of literature, parallel to the 
trends in the empire. In line with the rising literacy rate, the circulation of newspapers and number of the 
bookshops in the region rose rapidly. Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular 
Literature 1861-1917 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985), 110.  
22 A key source of recruits for the Dashnaks was the Ottoman Armenian immigrants in the Caucasus. Anna 
Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993), 
24. 
14 
 
The Russian authorities feared that an active Russian policy on the subject could risk the 
stability of Russian-Ottoman relations, especially at a time when the Tsar had a certain 
understanding with the Ottoman Sultan.
23
 Moreover, there were already concerns in St. 
Petersburg and Tiflis regarding the separatist aspirations of the Russian Armenians, 
which could be further bolstered by a possible autonomy for the Ottoman Armenians.
24
 
The lack of Russian enthusiasm for a more active policy regarding the Ottoman 
Armenians was best epitomized by the Russian Foreign Minister, Aleksei B. Lobanov-
Rostovskii, who saw ‘an Armenia without Armenians’ as a solution to the Armenian 
question.
25 
Meanwhile, the petitions of the Catholicos for an audience with the Tsar 
regarding the Ottoman Armenians were initially refused.
26
 
 
By 1896, what was happening across the border was confirming the Tsarist fears of a 
full-fledged Armenian national movement. As Suny argues, the typical image of the 
Armenian in the Russian eyes was now of a revolutionary troublemaker with separatist 
                                               
23 Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1974), 229; Selim Deringil, ‘The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: 
Brothers or Rivals?,’ Central Asian Survey 13, no. 3 (1994): 409. 
24 Ervand K. Sarkisian, Politika osmanskogo pravitelstva v zapadnoi Armenii i derzhavy v poslednei 
chetverti XIX i nachale XX vv. (Erevan: Izdatelstvo AN Armianskoi SSR, 1972), 166-69; Manoug J. 
Somakian, Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 
24; Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to 
Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), 74-6; Jeremy Salt, Imperialism, 
Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878-1896 (London; Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), 88-91; Musa 
Şaşmaz, British Policy and the Application of Reform for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, 1877-1897 
(Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2000), 260. 
25 Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 28. Lobanov-Rostovskii’s statement was a 
continuation of the Russian foreign policy on the Ottoman Armenians from early 1890s. For instance, in 
1890, the Russian Foreign Minister, Nikolai K. Girs, explained Russian reluctance to act for the Ottoman 
Armenians by noting that ‘Russia had no reason to wish for a second Bulgaria.’ Robert F. Zeidner, ‘Britain 
and the Launching of the Armenian Question,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 7, no. 4 
(October 1976): 481; Arshag O. Sarkissian, ‘Concert Diplomacy and the Armenians, 1890-97,’ in Studies 
in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honour of G. P. Gooch, ed. Arshag O. Sarkissian (London: 
Longmans, 1961), 62. The Russian line on this question was intact at the turn of the twentieth century. 
After 1896, the situation of the Ottoman Armenians immigrants became a serious item of debate between 
the Ottoman and Russian authorities. These immigrants were considered to be from the ranks of 
revolutionaries and were not wanted. In 1900, in a conversation with the Minister of Agriculture, Aleksei S. 
Ermolov, an Ottoman diplomat suggested him to settle these Ottoman Armenian immigrants to Siberia. 
Refusing the proposal, Ermolov had a different idea as he suggested that the Ottomans put these Armenian 
immigrants to an ‘empty island.’ The dispatch of the undersecretary of the Ottoman Embassy in St. 
Petersburg, Mehmed Bahaeddin, 29 Kanunusani 1315 [10 February 1900], doc. no. 20, in Osmanlı 
Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri, vol. 2 (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2006), 50-1. 
26 The persistent attitude of the Catholicos finally paid off in May 1895, when he was received by the Tsar, 
who ultimately did not act as energetically as the Catholicos wished. Valerii G. Tunian, Patriarshestvo 
Khrimiana 1893-1903 gg. (Erevan: Tunian, 2008), 111-21.  
15 
 
aspirations rather than an urban middle-man.
27
 Not surprisingly, the reports of the top 
Tsarist officials in Tiflis and St. Petersburg portrayed a similar picture during this 
period.
28
 More importantly, the Armenian revolutionaries were increasingly suspected of 
being supported by the Armenian Church, which led to a new wave of restrictions on the 
rights of the Armenian Church on schooling.
29
 Further restrictions on the Armenian press 
and Armenian charitable institutions on the orders of the new High Commissioner, Prince 
Grigorii S. Golitsyn, were the signs of what was to come at the turn of the twentieth 
century.
30
 
Meanwhile, the economic prowess of the Armenians in the region was now seen in a 
different light by the Tsarist authorities and their neighbours. The former praises to their 
industrious character was now replaced with criticism of economic exploitation of the 
Caucasus by the Armenians.
31
 According to the Tsarist officials, the Russian Armenians 
were controlling the most of region’s economy at the expense of their neighbours. This 
was particularly the case with the declining fortunes of the Georgians.
32
 Their traditional 
capital was at the hands of the Armenians, whose dominance in local politics and 
economic prosperity now raised eyebrows.
33
 There was a similar situation in Baku, which 
frustrated the Azeris.
34
  
                                               
27 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 43-46. 
28 Seyit Sertçelik, The Emergence of the Armenian Question in the Light of Russian and Armenian Sources 
1678-1914 (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat Yayınları, 2010), 248; Kuleshov, 98; The report of the Minister 
of Justice to the Tsar on the affairs regarding state crimes in 1897 and a short overview of the anti-
government movement in the empire in the period 1894-1897, in Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 
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The deterioration of relations between the Russian administration and the Russian 
Armenians reached a climax in 1903, when Nicholas II approved the decree allowing the 
confiscation of the properties of the Armenian Church. The heart of religious and 
educational life for the Russian Armenians, the Armenian Church was now deprived of 
its privileges. In no time, this move brought various Armenian elements together for the 
defence of the Armenian Church, headed by the Dashnaks. The Russian Armenians were 
in total rebellion against Russian rule.  
These happened at a time when general unrest was already building up in the empire and 
Tsarist armies were facing a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese. The defeat 
gave the revolutionary movement extra stimulus while the ground was moving beneath 
the feet of the Tsarist establishment in early 1905. The South Caucasus was one of the 
areas in the empire, where the revolutionary movement, organized labour, and ethnic 
conflicts debilitated the Tsarist administration. Soon after, in February 1905, the 
Caucasian viceroyalty was reinstated with wide administrative responsibilities, which 
was expected to facilitate quick restoration of order in the region. The viceroy, Illarion I. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, was a very experienced statesman and he knew that he had to 
address the grievances of the Armenians and stop their antagonism to the Tsarist regime. 
The viceroyalty needed the Armenians as allies not as enemies. Upon the viceroy’s 
recommendation, the confiscation decree was annulled by St. Petersburg in August 1905, 
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which pleased the Russian Armenians. This would be an important step that started a 
process of change in the relations between the Russian administration and the Russian 
Armenians.  
By 1907, Stolypin was concerned about the Dashnaks, whom he saw as the most potent 
revolutionary force in the South Caucasus. The party was recently invited to the Second 
International and it also operated in the Ottoman and Persian empires. With its recently 
adopted socialist program, the Dashnaktsutiun was aspiring to autonomy within a 
federative Russian republic. Despite the viceroy’s preference for a milder approach, the 
response of St. Petersburg against the Dashnaks was a mass trial of the party that started 
in 1908 and decimated the Dashnak party organization in the South Caucasus in four 
years. The Dashnaks had to move their cadres to the neighbouring empires, particularly 
to the Ottoman Empire, where they became the allies of the Committee of Union and 
Progress (the CUP), the main political actor in Ottoman politics after the revolution of 
1908. This would not be an alliance with a happy ending and two parties broke off in 
1912, when the Armenian disillusionment about the policies of the CUP became obvious. 
This break was also the harbinger of change for the relations between the Dashnaks and 
the Russian government as their trial ended in 1912, with unexpectedly light sentences 
and mass acquittals. Soon thereafter, the chief prosecutor of the trial was put under 
criminal investigation while some Dashnaks started to depict Russia as the saviour of the 
Armenians. 
In the post-revolutionary period, one of the reasons for the Tsarist campaign against the 
Dashnaks was about its affiliation with the Armenian Church, the support of which the 
Tsarist administration needed to regain the loyalties of the Russian Armenians. While the 
Dashnak sympathizers within the Armenian clergy were weeded out during the trial, 
Stolypin was formulating another scheme on the Armenian Church. Stolypin’s scheme 
targeted the abolition of the autonomy and privileges of the Armenian Church, which 
would secure the obedience of Echmiadzin to St. Petersburg. However, this move would 
turn the Catholicos into an ordinary head of a non-Orthodox Church and damage his 
ecumenical significance, which was important for the sympathies of the Ottoman 
Armenians. The viceroy was aware of the costs of the previous forceful attempt in 1903 
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and with the support of other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he 
was able to convince Stolypin for a more gradual approach and keep the privileges of the 
Church and its ecumenical significance intact.  
Although the differences between St. Petersburg and Tiflis on the subject surfaced during 
the Catholicosate elections of 1908 and 1911, no substantial changes were made 
regarding the status of the Armenian Church. By 1912, as the only non-Orthodox church 
in the empire to be allowed to administer its parish schools, the Armenian Church 
became an integral part of the stabilization in the South Caucasus. When the Russian 
position on the Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire changed in late 1912, the 
Catholicosate played a critical role to support Russia. In less than a decade, the 
relationship between the Russians and the Armenian Church was reversed. 
For the viceroy, another natural ally of the regime was the Armenian bourgeoisie and the 
annulment of the confiscation decree and the maintenance of order in the region were the 
right steps to win them over. For their economic interests, the viceroy’s stance against 
organized labour in the region and his support for the expansion of banking and 
commercialization of agriculture were also positive signs. On the other hand, the Tsarist 
drive on the Dashnaks meant that they would be the leading political actor among the 
Russian Armenians once again, particularly in local politics. This was particularly the 
case in Tiflis with the influence of the new mayor, Aleksandr Khatisian. 
The relations of the viceroyalty with the other main nationalities of the region were also 
important in the quick restoration of its relations with the Armenian bourgeoisie. The 
Georgian nobility and peasantry were still suffering from the diminishing returns on land 
and seeing the Armenians dominating their beloved Tiflis. The Georgian national 
movement, as part of the Russian Menshevism, was still popular and it was blaming the 
Russian government for the declining fortunes of the Georgians. Their anti-Russian 
attitude was further aggravated by the Tsarist refusal of the demands for the 
reestablishment of the autocephaly of the Georgian Church. By 1912, the viceroy had to 
admit that the structural problems surrounding the Georgians (mainly their feudal social 
composition and the agrarian problems) led to the success of the socialist propaganda 
among them, which prevented better relations between the Georgians and the viceroyalty.  
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Nevertheless, the Azeris were a bigger concern for the viceroyalty. Their growing 
politicization during the three constitutional revolutions in the Russian, Persian and 
Ottoman empires along with other Russian Muslims raised eyebrows in Tiflis and St. 
Petersburg. The Azeris were increasingly becoming better-educated and more conscious 
of the idea of progress and national identity. More importantly, they were more populous 
than their neighbours and resided not far from the neighbouring Muslim empires. 
Although the formation of Azeri revolutionary organizations, such as Himmat and Difai, 
disturbed the Russian administration, it was the pan-Islamist movement that really 
worried them.  
It was feared by the Tsarist authorities that this movement was aiming at uniting all 
Russian Muslims against Russia and the South Caucasus was an important base for pan-
Islamist operations. Toward 1912, from the ministers in the capital to the ordinary 
Okhrana operative in Baku, the Russian officialdom was convinced that the South 
Caucasus was full of pan-Islamist emissaries sent by the CUP, who were busy with anti-
Russian propaganda. As a result, by 1913, the Azeris were now the most immediate 
threat to the stability in the South Caucasus according to the viceroy whereas it was the 
Armenians in 1907.
35
 
From 1903 to 1912, domestic concerns dominated relations between the Russian 
administration and its Armenians. In this period, these internal problems inherited from 
Golitsyn’s tenure were gradually addressed and the relations of the Armenians with the 
Russian authorities considerably improved. Changing international dynamics around 
1912 would further strengthen these relations. Recovering back from the embarrassment 
of the defeat in the Far East and the revolutionary period, Russian foreign policy became 
assertive by then, especially after the assassination of Stolypin in 1911. The Ottoman 
defeats at the Tripolitan War and the First Balkan War gave the Russians a certain 
impetus to revive the question of reforms for the Ottoman Armenians. 
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More importantly, from 1912 on, with their incessant demands for a more active Russian 
policy on the subject, the Russian Armenians played a key role in the Russian initiative. 
From then on, the Russians constantly supported the Armenian reforms, for which an 
agreement was reached in February 1914. For the Russians, apart from expanding their 
foreign policy interests in the Ottoman Empire, this policy was also useful for further 
improving their relations with their own Armenians. As a result, the relations of the 
Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie with the Russian administration became 
even more cordial in this period. Even the Dashnaks decided not to antagonize with the 
Russians and participate in anti-Russian activities since Russia supported the Armenian 
reforms. 
From 1912 to 1914, the Russian fears of pan-Islamist subversion in the South Caucasus 
were still intact and there were signs of increased labour unrest in the region. For these 
domestic concerns and the potential international complications regarding the Ottoman 
Empire, the Russian government and the viceroyalty could count on their good relations 
with the Russian Armenians. This continued even after the start of Russian-Ottoman 
hostilities in October 1914, when Nicholas II instructed the Catholicos to tell his flock 
that ‘a most brilliant future awaited the Armenians,’ which remained a sad and unfulfilled 
prophecy. This picture sharply contrasts with the one in 1903.
36
  
The Armenian state of affairs in Tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century was put into perspective by Ronald G. Suny in his work, Looking toward 
Armenia. Suny explains the evolution of relations between the Russian Armenians and 
the Russian administration by focusing on the shift of the dominant Armenian image in 
the Russian eyes from 1828, when the Russians annexed the South Caucasus. I believe 
that he offers a useful model since he factors in domestic and international forces which 
altered the Russian stance, and finally the actual policies regarding the Armenian subjects 
of the empire.  
He suggests that the three phases of the dominant Armenian image were ‘the Christian 
ally’ in the initial period of annexation; ‘the merchant and urban’ character in mid-
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nineteenth century; and ‘the dissident revolutionary’ by the end of the nineteenth 
century.
37
 Although the range of his book does not stop there, he does not extend his 
analysis to the further reversal of this ‘dissident revolutionary’ image to a ‘crucial ally’ 
for Russia both internally and externally between 1903 and 1914. Instead, he discusses 
the Tsarist oppression of the Armenians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
at length until the end of the revolution of 1905. As often in the literature, he then quickly 
jumps to the First World War without presenting an analysis on the change of the Russian 
position. 
In my thesis, I would like to extend his model and scrutinize why and how the last shift 
of Tsarist perception of its own Armenians evolved between 1903 and 1914 by 
examining the relations between the Russian administration and the Russian Armenians. 
This study aims to account for the gradual evolution of the improved relations by 
scrutinizing the Russian domestic policy-making regarding the three political pillars of 
the Russian Armenians (the Dashnaktsutiun, the Armenian Church and the Armenian 
bourgeoisie) between 1903 and 1912. By 1912, the Russian administration had no serious 
friction with the main political pillars of the Russian Armenians, who were in total 
rebellion against Russia not long before. The Armenian image as the most troublesome 
element in the South Caucasus was now replaced with the most ideal ally for the Russian 
regime, both internally and externally.  
Between 1912 and 1914, foreign policy imperatives became the dominant influence on 
relations between the Russian administration and its Armenians. What happened in this 
period confirmed the improved relations and further solidified these relations in the face 
of big changes in the international arena. By drawing on a variety of unpublished archival 
documents, as well as a wide range of published material, this thesis offers a complete 
treatment of the relations of the Russian administration with the main political pillars of 
the Russian Armenians between 1903 and 1914.  
The shift of relations between Russia and its Armenian subjects was part of the Tsarist 
nationalities question, which was critical for the future of the empire. An important part 
                                               
37 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 38-51. It should be noted that these images are not mutually exclusive and 
Suny’s emphasis in his model is on the dominant Armenian image in the Russian eyes.   
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of this question had to do with the religious affairs of the nationalities as this study 
demonstrates by analysing the Russian stance on the Armenian Church and the pan-
Islamist movement. Apart from the students of ecclesiastical history, this study would 
also be of interest to the students of revolutionary organizations with its comprehensive 
examination of the fate of the Dashnaktsutiun in the Russian Empire—an under-explored 
theme in the literature.  
Finally, by focusing on the intricate links between Russian domestic concerns about the 
Russian Armenians and Russian foreign policy interests regarding the Ottoman 
Armenians, this study accounts for the Russian position on the Armenian question in the 
Ottoman Empire from 1912 and 1914. Considering the consequences of this international 
dimension of the subject on the Russian and Ottoman origins of the First World War and 
even what actually happened during the war, the final section of the this study is intended 
to contribute to our understanding of the Russian foreign policy-making between 1912 
and 1914. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The relations between Russia and its own Armenians between 1903 and 1914 have been 
less of a focus in the general Armenian historiography, which tends to concentrate on the 
Ottoman Armenians. Although general histories of the Armenians usually mention key 
events, such as the measures of Russification in the late nineteenth century and the 
confiscation decree in 1903, as part of their narratives of Russian oppression on the 
Russian Armenians, the aftermath of this period is usually neglected. In these narratives, 
Russia suddenly appears around 1912 as the patron of the Armenian reforms in the 
eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This is often followed by an account of the 
Russian-Armenian collaboration in the initial years of the First World War. In almost all 
of these works, the upshot of the Russian shift was seen as a side issue to the bigger 
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questions or taken for granted whereas the relations of the Tsarist regime with its 
Armenians between 1903 and 1914 have been mostly ignored. 
Compared with the literature on the Ottoman Armenians, the number of studies on the 
relations between the Russian administration and the Russian Armenians between 1903 
and 1914 is limited. Apart from Suny, the works of Somakian, Tunian, Hovannisian, 
Sarkisyanz, Ter Minassian and Gregorian are the major works.
38
 With the exception of 
Somakian and Tunian, a main deficiency of these works is the lack of primary archival 
material from the Russian archives.
39
 Although this is understandable given the dates of 
publication of these works and the restrictions on the Russian archives during the Soviet 
period, it is still a key shortcoming for tracking out how the Russian position changed 
from 1903 onward.
40
 In the absence of a thorough examination of Russian primary 
archival material, these accounts could not provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
evolution of the relations of the Russian administration with the political pillars of the 
Russian Armenians. The historiography on the imperial aspects of Russian rule in the 
Caucasus fares better in this aspect. However, because of their broader focus and time 
frame, these works do not offer a comprehensive analysis of the change of the fortunes of 
the Russian Armenians between 1903 and 1914.
41
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The lack of interest in the changing relations between the Russian administration and its 
Armenians has to do with the immense interest shown in the foreign policy 
considerations in this period. This is hardly surprising considering the importance of the 
foreign policy imperatives on the eve of the war.
42
 Given its connection with the Russian 
road to the First World War, the revived Russian interest in the Armenian reforms in late 
1912 was often explained by the diplomatic rivalry of the great powers in the Ottoman 
Empire.
43
 Although the Russian foreign policy interests regarding the Ottoman Empire 
played a key role in this revived interest, the impact of the improved relations of the 
Tsarist regime and its own Armenians has been less scrutinized. 
The changing Russian perception of its own Armenians (totalling more than a million 
people at the turn of the twentieth century), was a decisive factor as it was the continuous 
demands of the Russian Armenians regarding the Ottoman Armenians that prompted a 
more active Russian policy in late 1912. Given the state of the relations between the 
Russian administration and the Russian Armenians in the 1890s and its impact on 
Russia’s indifference to the demands of the Ottoman Armenians, this was an important 
dimension. The interconnection between the Ottoman and Russian Armenians from the 
Russian perspective became even more obvious from 1912 on as Sazonov repeatedly 
underlined the importance of good relations with the Russian Armenians for his 
government as one of the key motivations for the Russian support for the reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
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This point has been raised by various scholars. The Russian support for the Armenian 
reforms was seen as a precautionary act in the wake of possible unrest among the 
Ottoman Armenians, which could spread across the border to the South Caucasus.
44
 The 
most popular sources for this argument are the memoirs of the Russian diplomats (most 
notably Sazonov’s Fateful Years) along with published diplomatic correspondence 
regarding the origins of the First World War.
45
 However, these accounts did not further 
elaborate on the how and why these improved relations, which paved the way for the 
Russian decision in late 1912, changed between 1903 and 1912. 
Biographies of the key personalities, such as Vorontsov-Dashkov and Stolypin, also shed 
light in the changing image of the Armenians in the eyes of the Russian authorities.
46
 
This was conspicuously the case for the viceroy, with his wide administrative authority in 
the periphery, which gave him more flexibility and power to influence Tsarist policy-
making. However, apart from Ismail-Zade’s important works, the role of the viceroy in 
the change of Russian attitude toward its Armenians often appears in the narratives in a 
superficial way. Called as ‘the Armenophile viceroy,’ Vorontsov-Dashkov’s personal 
inclinations have been depicted as the main reason for the changing Russian relations 
with the Tsarist Armenians. Given the endless problems that the Armenians had under 
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s predecessors, it is understandable that he has been considered by 
some scholars to be heavily inclined to favour the Armenians. However, to explain the 
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shift of Russian policies solely on his Armenophilism based on a few sources is very 
simplistic. Although I think the role of Vorontsov-Dashkov was very important, the 
evolution of his views on the design of Tsarist policy on the Armenians needs a deeper 
analysis.  
Examining the process of Tsarist decision-making on the key questions in the South 
Caucasus, this study argues that the key Russian policies regarding the Russian 
Armenians were mainly the results of a rational decision-making process based on the 
deliberations between St. Petersburg and Tiflis rather than personal inclinations of the 
key individuals, like Vorontsov-Dashkov. For instance, the differences of opinion 
between St. Petersburg and Tiflis were displayed during the discussions regarding the 
status of the Armenian Church and the trial of the Dashnaktsutiun. While the viceroy’s 
suggestions prevailed thanks to the support rendered by the Foreign Ministry in the 
former case, his preference for a milder approach was overridden by the capital in the 
latter.  
In the period from 1903 to 1914, the impact of the Armenian revolutionary parties, 
particularly the Dashnaks, on the situation of the Russian Armenians was also critical.
47
  
Maintaining a level of stability in the South Caucasus by 1907, the viceroyalty was alert 
about the Dashnaks, whose capabilities in the region raised eyebrows in St. Petersburg. 
Soon after, the Dashnaks were crushed in the South Caucasus with a mass trial between 
1908 and 1912. Although there is no scholarly treatment of the trial process in the 
literature, there are some hints on the results of the final session. 
                                               
47 In line with the general situation in the Armenian historiography, the Dashnak organization and 
operations in the Russian Empire in this period have been studied far less than their activities in the 
Ottoman Empire. For partial exceptions to this, see Irada S. Bagirova, Politicheskie partii i organizatsii 
Azerbaidzhana v nachale XX veka 1900-1917 (Baku: Elm, 1997); Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill; Oganesian, 
Vek borby; Houri Berberian, Armenians And The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911: The 
Love for Freedom Has No Fatherland (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001). Regarding the activities of the 
Dashnaktsutiun in the Ottoman Empire between 1907 and 1914, see Dikran Kaligian, Armenian 
Organization and Ideology in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2009); Gadiz F. Minassian, ‘Les relations entre le Comité Union et Progrès et la Fédération 
Révolutionnaire Arménienne à la veille de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale d'après les sources arméniennes,’ 
Revue d'histoire arménienne contemporaine 1 (1995): 45-99; Feroz Ahmad, ‘Unionist Relations with the 
Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire,’ in Christian and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire, vol. 1, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meyer, 1982), 401-434. 
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The final session of this mass trial that started with ferocity produced a limited number of 
convicts. In the absence of studies drawing on the Russian documentation of the trial, 
scholars concluded that these light sentences were the result of a grand imperial policy 
change, implying interference from the Russian government, which demonstrated its 
interest in the reforms for the Ottoman Armenians in the same period.
48
 Given how the 
Tsarist judiciary mechanism worked, such interference was not impossible; however such 
a claim needs more substantiation from the Russian official correspondence. In addition, 
since the trial has not been treated in its entirety in the literature, its achievements for the 
Tsarist regime have also been ignored. The trial successfully crushed the Dashnak 
organization in the South Caucasus and intimidated the Armenian clergy and the 
Armenian bourgeoisie, which made it easier for the Tsarist administration to get them on 
its side between 1907 and 1912.
49
 
An important source in this aspect, the papers of the Dashnaktsutiun trial (1908-1912), 
has not been utilized sufficiently to put the Russian stance into perspective. The papers of 
the official investigation process, which are held in the archives of the Hoover Institution, 
at Stanford University, are used in this study to investigate the fate of the Dashnaks in the 
Russian Empire.
50
 These documents include detailed interrogations of party members, 
eyewitness accounts, official Russian correspondence, and Tsarist evaluation of the 
illegal material that was seized during police raids. These documents are vital for 
understanding the Tsarist perspective on the Dashnaktsutiun, given the fact that the 
number of scholarly studies on the history of the trial within the Russian context is 
virtually non-existent. The correspondence of various Okhrana (the Russian secret 
service) branches, located at GARF and SSSA, is also used to shed light on how the 
Tsarist policies regarding the Dashnaks were formulated during the trial process and its 
                                               
48 See for instance, Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 31; Dasnabedian, 94-95. A 
popular source of this claim was the memoirs of Kerensky, who was one of the lawyers of the Dashnaks. 
Aleksandr F. Kerensky, The Kerensky Memoirs: Russia and History's Turning Point (London: Cassell, 
1966), 81. 
49 See chapter 2 for a more thorough review of the historiography and my own explanations.   
50 Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), Boris I. Nicolaevsky Collection (1801-1982) (hereafter Nic.), Series 
no. 197, Dashnaktsutiun, Armenian Revolutionary Party- Trial, Printed Records of the Trial. The citations 
in the thesis are given with series, box, folder and page numbers. 
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aftermath.
51
 The coverage of the trial by the influential newspapers in Tiflis and St. 
Petersburg was also added into the narrative to provide an alternative perspective. 
From 1903 to 1912, the Tsarist regime’s relations with the Armenian Church radically 
changed and these improved relations were strengthened further between 1912 and 1914. 
The image of Echmiadzin as a centre of anti-Russian subversion in 1903 was replaced by 
a loyal institution and the facilitator for the Russian interests both at home and abroad by 
1914. As it was stated, the confiscation of 1903 and its aftermath until its annulment have 
been mentioned in the relevant historiography. However, the rest of the story is usually 
missing; although there are excellent exceptions to this, mainly by Tunian and Werth.
52
  
An analysis of the resolution of the tension between the imperial regime and the 
Armenian Church needs to be taken into account because of the influence of Echmiadzin 
on the Ottoman and Russian Armenians. Apart from the discussions among the Russian 
authorities regarding the status of the Catholicosate in the Russian Empire, the 
Dashnaktsutiun trial was part of this and needs to be added into the picture. One of the 
Tsarist motivations of launching such a mass trial had to with weeding out the 
revolutionary elements within the Armenian clergy. In addition to the trial papers, the 
correspondence between St. Petersburg and Tiflis on the suspected clergymen, located at 
RGIA, is utilized for adding this dimension to the narrative.
53
 
Another important dimension of the Tsarist shift was about the upward trend in their 
relations with the Armenian bourgeoisie, particularly after the annulment of the 
confiscation decree in August 1905. In the post-revolutionary period, the viceroy saw this 
                                               
51 The archival material regarding the viceroyalty’s policies in this period is held in the Georgian State 
Historical Archive (Sakartvelos sakhelmtsipo saistorio arkivi, hereafter SSSA) in Tbilisi—a vital but an 
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(Moscow: Nauka, 1978); Jones, Socialism in Georgian Colors. 
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1914,’ Ab Imperio 3 (2006) 99-138. See also Arslan, who mainly relies on Ottoman archival material, 
which provides an alternative perspective. Ali Arslan, Kutsal Ermeni Papalığı: Eçmiyazin Kilisesinde 
Stratejik Savaşlar (Istanbul: Truva, 2005). 
53 This archive is very resourceful on the Tsarist regime’s relations with the non-Orthodox faiths, including 
the Armenian Church. See primarily fond 821 (Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del: Departament dukhovnykh 
del inostrannykh ispovedanii (DDDII) (Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions). 
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element as a key ally of the viceroyalty and the stabilization process in the South 
Caucasus. Compared with the elite segments of the other nationalities, the Georgian and 
Azeri nobility, the Armenian bourgeoisie was far more prosperous and more in line with 
the general policies of the viceroyalty. From 1905 on, the improvement of the relations of 
the viceroyalty with the Armenian bourgeoisie, who again became a dominant force in 
local politics, has been noted in the literature, particularly in the Soviet historiography.
54
 
Increased cooperation between the viceroyalty and the Armenian bourgeoisie also 
benefitted from the problems of the viceroyalty with the Georgian and Azeri national 
movements in this period. The thorny relations of the viceroyalty with the Georgian 
national movement, which had the support of all segments within the Georgian 
community, have been put into perspective by several scholars on the subject.
55
 
Nonetheless, in the South Caucasus, the main concern of the viceroyalty, as well as the 
central government, increasingly became about the Azeris. Apart from the rising levels of 
politicization among them in the post-1905 era, what really vexed the Russian officials 
were their fears of a pan-Islamist movement, masterminded by the CUP.  
The change of Tsarist perception of the most immediate threat in the region in this period 
was included in various studies, mainly based on the published reports of the viceroy to 
the Tsar.
56
 From 1910 onward, a similar situation was also observed among the top 
Tsarist functionaries in the capital, who were disturbed by the machinations of the pan-
Islamist emissaries against Russia. Examining the correspondence of the Okhrana 
                                               
54 Initially see Galust A. Galoian, Rabochee dvizhenie i natsionalnyi vopros v Zakavkaze 1900-1922 
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bureaus in St. Petersburg, Tiflis, Baku and Istanbul and the discussions between the 
viceroyalty and the central government on the pan-Islamist threat, this study highlights 
the implications of the Russian fears of this threat in the South Caucasus, which went on 
even after the outbreak of the Great War.
57
 
The first chapter opens up with the lowest point in the relations between the Russian 
administration and its Armenian subjects, the Russian confiscation of the properties of 
the Armenian Church in 1903. It explains how the total Armenian rebellion against the 
Russian authorities in the aftermath of this decision aggravated the unrest in the South 
Caucasus toward 1905. The rise of the Dashnaktsutiun with their leadership against the 
Tsarist authorities and the Azeris during 1905-1906 is also examined in this chapter. With 
the arrival of the viceroy in Tiflis and the gradual stabilization in the region, the Russian 
stance regarding the Russian Armenians was reformulated and the first chapter pays 
attention to this reformulation until 1907 and how it was affected by the views of the 
viceroyalty and the central government.  
The second chapter deals with how the Tsarist authorities decided to eliminate the most 
urgent threat in the South Caucasus by 1907: the Dashnaktsutiun. The Tsarist response, 
mainly designed by St. Petersburg, was a mass political trial of the party, which initially 
crushed the Dashnak organization in the region and weeded out the Dashnak associates 
within the other political pillars. This chapter delineates how this was handled and why 
the Tsarist authorities slowed down once the party lost its hopes in the Russian Empire 
and the region was stabilized. Taking into account of the general improvement in the 
relations between the Russian administration and the Russian Armenians and the 
changing international factors toward 1912, this chapter traces the final phases of the trial 
and how the Dashnaktsutiun decided to not to antagonize Russia from then on, which was 
a major reversal of the party strategy compared with 1907.   
The third chapter looks at the Tsarist policies to turn the Armenian Church into a 
subordinate and useful agent for its dealings with the Armenians at home and abroad 
from 1907 to 1912. In this period, there was a continuous difference of opinion between 
                                               
57 The relevant correspondence is held in GARF, RGIA and SSSA.  
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St. Petersburg and Tiflis as to how to handle this and this chapter draws upon these 
conflicting views to explain the formulation of Tsarist designs on the Armenian Church. 
In conjunction with the elimination of the Dashnaktsutiun in the region as a political 
force, the Armenian Church had more reasons to be in better terms with the regime, 
which kept most of the religious and educational privileges of the church intact. Finally, 
this chapter relates the culmination of this upward trend at home to the increased concern 
of both the Russian government and the Catholicosate for the Ottoman Armenians by 
1912.  
The Tsarist response to the question of nationalities in the post-revolutionary South 
Caucasus and how this related to the changing relations of the viceroyalty with the 
Armenians, particularly with the Armenian bourgeoisie is the main theme of the fourth 
chapter. In this period, the Georgian national movement, as part of a broader Russian 
Social Democrats, annoyed the Russian authorities. However, the growing fears of a pan-
Islamist movement in the South Caucasus orchestrated by Istanbul became the chief 
concern of the Tsarist authorities between 1907 and 1912. Against this background, this 
chapter dwells on the impact of the Russian concerns with the Georgians and Azeris on 
the Tsarist rapprochement with the Armenian bourgeoisie, a viable economic force with 
similar interests in political stability in the region.  
By 1912, Russia had made its peace with the political pillars of the Russian Armenians. 
About the same time, changing international conditions, mainly centred on the possibility 
of an Ottoman collapse, brought about a more active Russian policy on the question of 
Armenian reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The fifth chapter demonstrates how restored 
relations between Russia and its Armenians made this possible and how, in turn, these 
relations were further improved between 1912 and 1914 because of the Russian concerns 
about the Ottoman Armenians. Accounting for these concerns as part of grander Russian 
foreign policy interests about the Ottoman Empire, this chapter sheds light on the link 
between these interests and the Russian domestic priorities in the South Caucasus.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RUSSIAN ARMENIANS IN THE SEA OF TROUBLES: FROM 
CONFISCATION TO REVOLUTION (1903–1907) 
 
Introduction 
 
In September 1903, the vice-governor of Erevan, Prince Nakashizde arrived in 
Echmiadzin accompanied by the police and troops to implement the measures of 
confiscation of the properties of the Armenian Church. Supported by his flock, the 
Catholicos and other higher-ranking clergymen resisted. Initially, Nakashizde could not 
convince any of the clergymen to sign the official papers which were needed to start the 
actual confiscation process. However, a few weeks later the Catholicos had to yield in 
and the confiscation measures started. Meanwhile, Golitsyn was busy ordering the exile 
of some uncooperative Armenian clergymen.
58
 A few weeks later, when Golitsyn was 
returning with his wife from a visit to the Botanical Gardens in Tiflis, his carriage was 
stopped by a few locals posing as petitioners. In fact, they were three Hnchaks assassins 
with hidden daggers. The assassins failed to murder Golitsyn, who was wounded in the 
head and hand. By a chase, the attackers were killed or captured.
59
 Golitsyn was the 
target of this attack because of his role in a decision that marked the lowest point in 
Russian-Armenian relations since 1828: the Tsarist decision to confiscate the Armenian 
Church properties. 
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Often called an ‘Armenophobe’, Golitsyn had a major role in this contentious affair.60 A 
member of the famous Golitsyn family, the Prince was no stranger to the Caucasus.
61
 
After serving as a senator and a member of the State Council, he arrived in Tiflis in 1896 
to solve Russia’s Armenian question once and for all. It is true that Golitsyn, with his 
strong dislike of national movements, stubbornly insisted on more extreme measures on 
the Armenian Church despite the opposition by various concerned parties in St. 
Petersburg. In Golitsyn’s reports to the capital, the Armenian national movement 
appeared to be the most troublesome element to be dealt with in the Caucasus. Perhaps 
the sense of urgency intensified with Golitsyn, but in essence he was by no means 
different from his predecessors regarding his standpoint on the activities of the Armenian 
Church and its revolutionary links.  
Golitsyn’s predecessors, Dondukov-Korsakov and Sergei A. Sheremetev, had already 
pointed out that there was a rising danger of an Armenian revolutionary movement, the 
centre of which was the Armenian Church.
62
 Coupled with the growing instability in the 
Caucasus in the late 1890s, the continuous mistrust of the Armenian Church by top 
Tsarist administrators in the region persuaded many in the capital that more decisive 
steps had to be taken. As soon as Golitsyn arrived in the region, he informed St. 
Petersburg about the nefarious designs of the Armenian Church and the urgent need to 
curb its influence. Golitsyn’s plans were put into effect immediately, particularly 
concerning the privileges of the Armenian Church in education.
63
  
In a series of measures, the Armenian Church was first deprived of its right to administer 
Armenian parish schools, which were put under the Ministry of Education. Golitsyn also 
believed that Armenian Church properties related to the parish schools had to be 
                                               
60 Suny, ‘Eastern Armenians under Tsarist Rule,’ 132; Ter Minassian, ‘Le mouvement révolutionnaire 
arménien,’ 545; Edouard Aknouni, Political Persecution, Armenian Prisoners of the Caucasus (New York: 
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62 Memorandum of the High Commissioner of the Caucasus, S.A. Sheremetev to the Tsar, December 1895, 
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transferred to the Ministry, which would further restrict the area of influence of the 
Armenian Church. Although there was an attempt to do this as early as 1898, it failed as 
the Armenian Church filed a lawsuit based on its legal ownership of the premises.
64
 
Meanwhile, several Armenian charitable institutions and libraries were closed and the 
Armenian press was put under severe pressure in an effort to stop the Armenian 
nationalist movement.
65
 
However, Golitsyn’s conviction about more heavy-handed measures against the 
Armenian Church intensified as the region was being shaken by a series of strikes and 
general discontent. By 1901, Golitsyn again addressed the necessity of imposing 
economic sanctions on the Armenian Church, which he considered one of the key sources 
of discontent in the South Caucasus. When a special committee led by Eduard V. Frisch, 
chairman of the legislative department of the State Council, met in 1901 about the 
situation of the Armenian Church, Golitsyn’s earlier suggestions concerning the transfer 
of Armenian Church properties and its right to run the parish schools were again in the 
agenda. Although his proposal did not take effect in 1901, it became the subject of debate 
for both Tiflis and St. Petersburg for the next two years as the situation in the South 
Caucasus became more serious.
66
 As Golitsyn’s pleas for more radical measures found 
more supporters in the capital, another meeting of ministers in 1903 would determine the 
fate of the governance of the Armenian Church in the Russian Empire.  
 
The Confiscation of the Properties of the Armenian Church (1903) 
 
When various ministers and Golitsyn met in 1903 to reconsider the idea of confiscation 
of the properties of the Armenian Church, Golitsyn had a major ally: the Minister of 
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Internal Affairs, Viacheslav K. von Plehve. A staunch supporter of the Romanov dynasty 
and a former director of the Department of Police, he was the type of bureaucrat that 
Nicholas II entrusted to fight against revolutionary fervour.
67
 He had no sympathy for any 
sort of national movement and he started the Russification drive in the Grand Duchy of 
Finland in 1899, which turned quite violent in the following years. By all accounts, his 
tenure as the Minister of Internal Affairs (1902-1904) saw a rise in serious instances of 
oppression of the empire’s national minorities. Hated by all revolutionaries, his 
indifference towards the Jewish pogroms in April 1903 in Kishinev was noted by various 
contemporary critics.
68
 
As Golitsyn’s earlier idea was again on the table in 1903, Plehve immediately approved 
of it. As the Minister of Internal Affairs, Plehve’s approval was of paramount importance 
to get the support of the Tsar.
69
 Backed by Plehve and a few other ministers, Golitsyn’s 
proposal was aimed at confiscating both the immovable properties and cash holdings of 
the Armenian Church and the transfer of its rights in education to the Ministry of 
Education. The proponents of this measure were completely aware that this would create 
discontent among the Armenians, which would worsen the fragile situation in the 
Caucasus—so why did they continue to press for it?    
In his memoirs, Sazonov notes that the 1903 confiscation was carried out because of a 
suspicion that the Armenian Church might be used for revolutionary purposes.
70
 In fact, 
by 1903, most of the proponents of the confiscation were past the suspicion phase. The 
main reason for the insistence by the Golitsyn and Plehve camp was grounded in their 
firm belief that the Armenian Church was accommodating Armenian revolutionaries and 
promoting Armenian nationalism with its privileged status in cultural matters. For them, 
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the Armenian Church was supporting the Armenian national movement, which had 
‘political independence’ as its final objective.71 
According to Tsarist reports, from the late 1890s on, the Armenian Church increasingly 
supported the Armenian revolutionaries, particularly in their struggle against the Ottoman 
Empire, which in turn revolutionized the Russian Armenians.
72
 To support the struggle 
against the Ottoman Empire, revolutionary committees were formed in the Caucasus 
under the leadership of the Armenian clergy although they were not active against Russia 
by then. Meanwhile, the revolutionaries managed to infiltrate into Echmiadzin as a close 
associate of Khrimian (a clergyman with strong revolutionary inclinations) was an 
eminent member of the Armenian revolutionary groups. The members of the Armenian 
clergy were largely considered by the Russian administration in the Caucasus to be 
affiliated with the revolutionary nationalism, which they used to agitate Russian 
Armenians, particularly in cities with large Armenian populations. According to the 
former procurator of the Echmiadzin Synod, the confiscation decision was proposed as a 
measure against ‘the greed and plunder of the Armenian clergy when it was established 
that huge sums of the Church income went to the hopes of revolution.’73 
Relying on his links with the Armenian revolutionaries and his autonomous status, the 
Catholicos was displaying open signs of disobedience in 1899 when he did not comply 
with the act regarding the obligatory oath in Russian for non-Orthodox subjects working 
in government service.
74
 For the Russian administration in the Caucasus, the 
insubordinate attitude of the Armenian Church did not only disrupt the order in the 
region, but it also damaged ‘the prestige of the government in the eyes of the Armenians 
and generally the non-Russian population.’75 For Golitsyn, in a region that was infested 
with student and worker unrest, Russia had ‘only one malicious and irreconcilable 
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enemy: It was the Armenians.’76 Plehve was in agreement with the reports coming from 
the Caucasus pointing out the problems created by the status of the Armenian Church as 
he argued that it should be stripped of its autonomy and privileges just like the Georgian 
Church was with the advent of Russian rule.
77
 To sort this problem out, what was needed 
was a radical measure that would help break ‘the soul of opposition’ demonstrated by the 
Armenian clergy and ‘render its separatist dreams harmless.’78 The act of confiscation 
would be a step in that direction.   
Another motive of the proponents of the confiscation act was the negative influence on 
Armenian youth by the Armenian schools run by the church. The teachings of the 
Armenian clergy were considered to have the most influence on the Armenian students 
by promoting the national uniqueness of the Armenians and their political dreams.
79
 This 
view was also advocated by Armenophobe publicists like Velichko, who claimed that the 
Armenian parish schools as well as seminaries were hotbeds of Armenian nationalism.
80
 
By taking away the Armenian Church’s rights to administer these schools and their 
properties, this harmful influence would be eliminated. Moreover, new Russian state 
schools for Armenian students could be funded by the income of the properties of the 
Armenian Church.
81 
This move, in a sense, would help the official cultural Russification 
policy.
82
  
Plehve and Golitsyn were ready to dismiss the opposition centred on the implications of 
such an act on Russian foreign policy interests. According to them, so far Russia had not 
benefitted as expected from the Catholicos’ influence on the Ottoman Armenians because 
of the self-interest of the Catholicosate.
83 
Perhaps it was time for Russia to abandon being 
the patron of Ottoman Armenians because once their ideas of a ‘Great Armenia’ were 
materialized by revolutionary means, they would be ‘inevitably directed against Russian 
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interests.’84 Therefore, Golitsyn and Plehve believed that any negative implication of the 
confiscation act on Russian foreign policy interests would be compensated by the greater 
benefits it would bring to the domestic sphere. 
Rather disingenuously, Plehve and other supporters of the confiscation act publicly noted 
that it would in fact benefit the Armenians and the Armenian Church. The vast properties 
of the Armenian Church, which were badly managed by the Armenian clergy, would be 
run more efficiently by the central government. Moreover, the Armenian Church would 
also be relieved of its educational responsibilities. As a result, instead of affiliating 
themselves with political and educational matters, the Armenian clergy could concentrate 
their efforts and time on purely religious matters—thought to be the ideal situation by 
Golitsyn and Plehve.
85
 
The proposal put forward by Golitsyn and Plehve met with strong opposition from other 
participants at the meeting, most notably by premier Witte, who had a better idea about 
the Caucasus than most of the top officials in St. Petersburg. Born and raised in Tiflis 
where his father served in the Caucasian viceroyalty, Witte knew about the importance 
the Armenians attached to their church, which he described as ‘the soul of the Armenian 
life in which all charity and education of the nation was concentrated.’86 Witte and other 
ministers, including the arch-reactionary Pobedonovtsev, noted that the proposed 
measures would only create more anti-government sentiments among the Armenians and 
the Armenian clergy and ‘then the idea of resistance could concern those layers of the 
Armenian population who had submitted to the orders of the authorities.’87 The 
opponents believed that such an extreme act could easily radicalize the whole Armenian 
community in the South Caucasus, where the situation was already chaotic.
88
 
The opposition to the confiscation act also had a foreign policy dimension. Rejecting 
Plehve’s dismissal of the potential benefits of the Catholicosate for Russian foreign 
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policy interests, Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorf pointed out that Russia could not 
risk alienating the Catholicos, who had considerable influence on the Armenians in the 
Ottoman and Persian empires.
89
 If confiscation was enacted, Echmiadzin’s ecumenical 
significance and influence abroad would be reduced, which would mean a loss of an 
important asset for Russian foreign policy imperatives in the Ottoman and Persian 
Empires. At the end of the meeting, the majority of the participants (12 against 5) were 
against the confiscation.
90
 
Trusting his like-minded Minister of Internal Affairs and the High Commissioner of the 
Caucasus, in June 1903, Nicholas II approved the decree despite the majority’s decision. 
One of the opponents, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, begged the Tsar to reconsider 
his decision but to no avail.
91
 With the decree, the administration of the Armenian Church 
properties and capital was put under the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. Technically, the Armenian Church kept ownership of its 
holdings but was barred from governing the income from them.
92
  
Under the decree, the Armenian Church was deprived of its rights to supervise its parish 
schools, which were transferred to the Ministry of Education.
93
 The jurisdiction of the 
Armenian Church was restricted to the properties essential for basic religious services 
which would be funded by the government.
94
 The decree was the end of an era with 
regard to Russian-Armenian relations as it meant the end of the statute of 1836. Contrary 
to what Golitsyn and Plehve expected, the decision triggered a total Armenian resistance 
to the Tsarist regime, which would only worsen the situation in the troubled Caucasus. 
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The Armenian Reaction to the Tsarist Decision (1903–1905)  
 
 ‘Never have he, nor his clergy, nor his flock, thought of disobeying You, the Lord’s 
Anointed.’95 So wrote the Catholicos in a petition to the Tsar just after the approval of the 
act of confiscation. Understandably, the Catholicos also demanded an audience with the 
Tsar.
96
 When the Catholicos received the news of approval of the confiscation act, he 
immediately ordered the Echmiadzin Synod and the Armenian clergy not to comply.
97
 
Meanwhile, the Armenian masses were displaying their displeasure with the decision and 
their support for their church. From June 1903 onward, demonstrations were held by 
Armenians in several cities in the South Caucasus with escalating anger. Supporting the 
Catholicos’ acts of resistance, the demonstrators began to confront the Russian troops 
who were sent to quell the unrest.  
The protests in Echmiadzin, Aleksandropol, Elizavetpol, and Tiflis, among other places, 
ended with a large number of casualties. In Elizavetpol, the police who came to disperse 
the protestors were met with ‘a shower of stones and shots’ and then retaliated, resulting 
in seven deaths and 27 wounded among the protestors.
98
 On the pages of Iskra, the scenes 
from the conflict between the protestors and the Russian troops (accompanied by the 
artillery) were considered to be ‘completely like in the time of war.’99 The Armenian 
unrest coincided with strikes in Baku; 11 protestors died and 65 of them were 
wounded.
100
 
By September 1903, Catholicos Khrimian was still hoping to get an audience with the 
Tsar. By the time his demand was denied, Khrimian had already received orders from St. 
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Petersburg to comply—otherwise more serious measures would follow.101 Khrimian told 
the Russian officials that the properties of the Armenian Church belonged not only to 
Russian Armenians but to all Armenians in the world and their seizure would be 
unlawful.
102
 The resistance of the Catholicos continued for a while but soon it ended and 
the measures of confiscation were implemented. 
Soon after the approval of the decree in June 1903, the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul 
along with the Patriarchates in Jerusalem and Sis had petitioned Nicholas II through the 
Russian ambassador in Istanbul. They demanded the annulment of the confiscation 
decree because the properties of the Armenian Church belonged to Armenians all over 
the world.
103
 A similar petition by the congress of Armenian bishops in Istanbul was also 
forwarded to St. Petersburg but all these pleas fell on deaf ears.
104
 Meanwhile, the 
Armenian clergy in Echmiadzin began to entertain the idea of moving the Catholicosate 
to the Ottoman Empire, for which the Catholicos asked for an audience with Abdulhamid 
II.
105
 The Armenian backlash to the decision of confiscation was carefully monitored by 
the Ottoman consulate in Tiflis and it was reported in the summer of 1903 that a cautious 
policy was necessary.
106
 In the end, the proposal was rejected by Abdulhamid II, possibly 
to avoid complicating relations with Tsarist Russia when the Ottoman Empire had its 
own internal problems.
107
 
The reaction showed by the Armenian clergy infuriated Golitsyn. As a solution, he 
proposed to move the Armenian clergy from Echmiadzin and Tiflis to further reduce their 
influence.
108
 One of the possible provinces where these clergymen could be exiled was 
Kutaisi province, a predominantly Georgian region and, subsequently, some of these 
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clergymen were exiled.
109
 Even though the Golitsyn-led initiative against the Armenian 
Church backfired and created more troubles for the Tsarist administration, Golitsyn had 
no change of heart regarding the Armenian Church. In a correspondence with Plehve in 
May 1904, Golitsyn still argued that the Catholicosate was the centre of Armenian 
revolutionary movement.
110
 
As the pleas of the Armenian clergy produced no results, the Armenian unrest was 
making things even more difficult for the Russian administration in the Caucasus. A 
witness noted that the scenes created by the Armenian antagonism to the Tsarist decision 
were similar to those in revolutionary France in the 1790s when the state confiscated the 
properties of the church.
111
 In their defence of the church, the Armenians continued to 
show signs of resistance against state officials. What the confiscation act accomplished 
was the opposite of what Plehve and Golitsyn envisioned because it turned even the loyal 
segments of the Armenian population against the Russian government.
112
  
Apart from mass demonstrations, other types of insubordination followed. Many 
Armenian families boycotted Russian state schools and sent their children to Armenian 
parochial schools, which were run on voluntary donations.
113
 It was reported that the 
Russian Armenians were also unwilling to pay taxes to the Russian administration.
114 
The 
Armenian discontent was making the situation in the Caucasus even worse as Golitsyn’s 
popularity among the people in the Caucasus was plummeting. According to Kuropatkin, 
who was worried about the acts of insubordination and desertion among the Armenian 
soldiers, the Caucasus was on the verge of rebellion by the end of 1903.
115
 The 
Armenians’ response became more intense as they burned portraits of the Tsar in one of 
their February 1904 demonstrations.
116
 The Armenian protests were not limited to the 
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South Caucasus as the Armenian reaction to the Tsarist decision made an impression on 
the Persian Armenians as reported by the Russian diplomatic corps in the area.
117
 
When the confiscation decree was on the table in 1903, Plehve asserted that it would be 
reasonable not to expect unfavourable reaction from the Armenian population. The only 
opposing segments would be the higher clergy and secular figures that ‘put themselves 
the aim of fight against the existing state structure.’118 Perhaps Plehve and Golitsyn 
believed that it would be feasible to suppress a small church as fait accompli as they did 
with the Georgian Autocephalous Church in 1811. However, nearly 90 years later, the 
national solidarity of the Armenians, unique nature of their religion and language, and, 
most importantly, a more literate, urban, and mobile population spearheaded by 
revolutionary parties, particularly the Dashnaktsutiun, proved to be a stumbling block. 
The next two years demonstrated that they were off the mark as the Armenian response 
was explosive. 
 
The Response of the Dashnaks to the Decree of Confiscation  
 
Until 1903, the most capable Armenian revolutionary party, the Dashnaktsutiun stayed 
away from operating in Russian territory believing that a two-front war was a bad idea. 
The Hnchaks were also operating mainly in the Ottoman Empire, though with much less 
efficiency and following. After the Tsarist insistence on the decision, these two leading 
Armenian revolutionary organizations openly manifested their support for the Armenian 
Church. Perhaps the only exception was the response of some of the Armenian Social 
Democrats (SDs). An eminent Armenian SD, Knuniants was ecstatic as the confiscation 
was carried out: ‘The Tsar declared war on the Church! Bless you; let these two true 
enemies of the labouring masses beat each other.’119 
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As the strongest Armenian revolutionary party, the Dashnak attitude was quite interesting 
since it had always been very critical of the Armenian clergy and religion in general. 
Many of its members believed that the Armenian Church was an ‘inert institution.’120 The 
conservative stance of the church and its inclusion within the Tsarist administrative 
scheme was harshly criticized. However, after June 1903, despite their differences, the 
church and revolutionaries came together. An Armenian revolutionary, Ruben Ter 
Minasian, recalled that from June 1903, Khrimian was not just the Catholicos but also 
‘the leader’ of all Armenians irrespective of their revolutionary faction or religious 
affiliation.
121
 When the news about the approval of the confiscation decree reached 
Echmiadzin, the Dashnaks encouraged the Catholicos not to comply with the orders and 
declared their full support for resistance.
122
 The Catholicos was glad about the support of 
the Dashnaks, who praised Khrimian for his ‘heroic’ and ‘truly-national’ actions against 
the Tsarist authorities.
123
 
Despite their general disapproval of religion, the Dashnaks considered the Tsarist 
decision of confiscation an oppressive measure against the Armenians. Symbolically 
important, the Armenian Church survived under a number of vast empires and preserved 
the Armenian religion and language for a long time. The Armenian Church was a 
national church and it represented both nation and religion for the Russian Armenians. As 
Miliukov pointed out, the confiscation act was seen as a Tsarist attack on the ‘last refuge 
of their [Armenians’] nationality, their supreme hope of better future: their national 
school and the material resources of their national church.’124 Therefore, it was not very 
surprising to see that the Dashnaks, whose nationalist ideas were obvious, came for 
Echmiadzin’s help against the Tsarist act, which threatened one of the cornerstones of the 
Armenian national identity.
125
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As the confiscation was carried out, the Dashnaks quickly stepped in. They already had 
party cells in the South Caucasus; to coordinate them for the struggle against Tsarist 
authorities, a central Committee for Armenian Self-Defence (later renamed the 
Responsible Body for the Caucasus) in Tiflis was formed.
126
 Dashnak publications 
harshly criticized the Russian authorities for their treatment of the Armenian Church. It 
was decided to discuss the next steps of the party in Russia during the third world 
congress of the party in Sofia, which started in February 1904. Manifesting ‘The Plan of 
Action for the Caucasus,’ the Dashnaks openly announced their dislike of the Tsarist 
regime. Furthermore, they added the liberation of the Armenians of Tsarist Russia as a 
part of the federal system in the South Caucasus to their programme.
127
 Another 
important resolution of the congress was the adoption of self-defence of the Russian 
Armenians for which acts of terror, mass demonstrations and various types of propaganda 
would be used.
128
  
After the failed assassination attempt on Golitsyn by the Hnchaks in October 1903, the 
assassination of Plehve by a member of the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) in July 1904 
was music to the ears of the Dashnaks.
129
 Soon, they began to take matters into their 
hands in the South Caucasus. Several Tsarist officials of varying ranks were now the 
targets of the Dashnak-led Committee for Armenian Self-Defence. Among the casualties 
were the vice-governor of Elizavetpol, Andreev; the police superintendent of Shusha, 
Sakharov; Colonel Bykov; and Prefect Boguslavski.
130 
The procurator of the Echmiadzin 
Synod, Frenkel, was fortunate enough to escape the assassins’ bullets more than once.131 
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Another important decision made in the Sofia congress concerned collaboration with 
other revolutionary parties.
132
 For their struggle against the Tsarist regime, the Dashnak 
cells were allowed to collaborate with the Hnchaks and other revolutionary 
organizations.
133
 The dispersed condition of the Dashnak committees in the South 
Caucasus and the need for logistic support from other parties for their struggle against the 
Tsarist response were the main reasons for this.
134
 Among the broader Russian 
revolutionary organizations, the SRs responded most positively to the call of the 
Dashnaks since their methods and ideology were quiet similar.
135
 Soon, the SRs began to 
support the Dashnaks by helping them out with the purchase and transfer of arms to the 
Caucasus.
136
  
As the economic crisis in the empire deepened and the South Caucasus was shaken by 
strikes, particularly in Baku and Batumi, the Dashnaks knew that the increased impact of 
organized labour had to be taken into account. Previously, the Dashnaktsutiun was a 
party with mainly nationalist inclinations and had little sympathy for the internationalist 
approach of the socialist movement. It even discouraged Armenian workers from entering 
into the worker strikes held in the Russian Empire prior to 1903 fearing they would join 
other broader Russian parties.
137 
 
However, after June 1903, the Dashnaks knew that closer relations with the socialist 
movement would benefit their struggle against the Russian administration. In such an 
atmosphere, restrictive measures on its members, such as forbidding them to participate 
in joint strikes or demonstrations, would only drive them away. During the congress in 
Sofia, it was decided to allow party members to take part in strikes.
138
 Based on the 
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general economic difficulties and the position of the church, this move enabled the party 
to increase its appeal to Armenian workers.
139
 As a result, other socialist groups, the SRs 
and Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), were able to recruit smaller 
numbers of Armenians into their ranks during these years.
140
 
The recently started war with Japan further intensified the cooperation of Dashnaks with 
other disgruntled parties. An important event in that aspect was the conference of 
opposition parties held in Paris in November 1904 to assemble a coordinated body to 
resist the Tsarist regime. The Dashnaks attended the conference along with the Kadets, 
the SRs, the Polish National League, the Finnish Active Resistance Party, the Georgian 
Socialist-Federalist Party, and the Latvian Social Democratic Labour Party.
141
 The 
Dashnaks, like all other participants, were defeatists in the war with Japan, and supported 
the decisions of this congress, which called for the overthrow of autocratic rule.
142
  
In August 1904, St. Petersburg was rejoicing at the birth of the Tsarevich Aleksei, while 
nearly all parts of the Russian Empire were suffering from grave troubles. The French 
Ambassador to St. Petersburg reported to Paris that a general explosion was possible in 
the Russian Empire.
143
 The situation in the South Caucasus was particularly alarming 
with the rising strength of organized labour demonstrated by several strikes during that 
period. It was no coincidence that the first collective labour agreement in the Russian 
Empire was signed in Baku in December 1904 after a general strike led by 
Shchendrikov.
144
 
The Armenian reaction to the confiscation decree further worsened the situation in the 
region. In addition to the resistance demonstrated by the Armenian clergy and the masses, 
the Dashnaktsutiun stepped in and began to lead the Armenian reaction against the 
Tsarist administration with its organization in the area. By collaborating with other 
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revolutionary parties, the Dashnaks undermined the Tsarist hold in the Caucasus. From 
late 1903 on, the governors in the region noted how the Armenian unrest worsened the 
situation in the area and asked for more funds for police from St. Petersburg, but rarely 
got what they wanted.
145
 Even Golitsyn’s pleas in 1904 went unanswered.146 
Meanwhile, the initiator of this disaster, Golitsyn (and his wife) avoided another 
assassination attempt by the Dashnaks in 1904 after attending a ceremony held in a 
church.
147
 Soon, Golitsyn left for St. Petersburg for good. Witte believed that Golitsyn 
was essentially an honest and good man. Nevertheless, with his policies, Golitsyn 
managed to arm all elements in the Caucasus, even the Russians and the soldiers 
stationed in the region, against him.
148
 Golitsyn’s role in the confiscation process was an 
important example of how he managed to unite all Armenians against the Tsarist regime, 
which began to crumble in early 1905.  
 
The Revolutionary Explosion in the South Caucasus and the Establishment of the 
Viceroyalty (1905–1906)  
 
In early 1905, even the loyal proponents of the Tsarist regime saw that the system was 
not working. Almost all segments of the empire, both in socio-political and national 
terms, had problems of their own and the only response of the Russian government was 
to intensify its police state and declare war on Japan. Loyalty to the Tsarist monarchy, 
even for the new elites of industrialists and bankers, was getting weaker toward February 
1905.
149
 Meanwhile, growing economic problems were creating a suitable ground for the 
revolutionary movement. The failure of the regime to respond to the revolutionary 
movement began at the top—namely, Nicholas II. One of the measures he came up with 
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as a solution was to order the Academy of Sciences to eliminate the word ‘intelligentsia’ 
from the Russian dictionary.
150
 
The South Caucasus was unquestionably one of the places in the empire that was feared 
to explode and this soon became a reality. The chaos in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday 
and more bad news from the Japanese front soon amalgamated with worker and student 
unrest in the region, which the young Mayakovski was a part of as the Marseillaise was 
sung in the church.
151 
This chaotic atmosphere also provided an ideal ground for all major 
nationalities to express their national grievances. By early 1905, the Georgian national 
movement had positioned itself within the wider Russian Social Democratic movement 
and intensified its opposition to the Tsarist administration both on national and economic 
grounds. It peaked in Guria, where after an uprising, a short-lived republic was 
proclaimed during the revolutionary turmoil in 1905.
152  
The other two main inhabitants 
of the region, Armenians and Azeris, also had grievances toward Russian rule; however, 
rising national tensions between the two eclipsed them and resulted in bloody inter-ethnic 
clashes. 
There were structural reasons as to why the Armenians and Azeris directed their 
discontent at each other rather than the Tsarist regime. The South Caucasus had a high 
fertility rate and a very large population of youth as the empire moved into the twentieth 
century.
153
 Both nationalities were steadily growing in size and this increased the inter-
national competition in various dimensions. As Kappeler explains, the main competition 
was among the nationalities, not the non-Russian nationalities against their Russian 
rulers.
154
 
The Armenian-Azeri competition was deeply felt in social and economic spheres.
155
 The 
Azeris were by far the most populous group in the South Caucasus, dominating the oil-
rich Baku and its environs. However, they lagged far behind the Armenians 
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economically. Particularly in the cities, the Armenians dominated commerce and 
industry. In Baku, Armenians, with their 18.8 percent share of the city’s population, 
owned 43.5 percent of the real estate while the Azeris had 34 percent. In firms worth 
more than 50,000 roubles, Armenians had 23.1 percent while the Azeris had only 4.2 
percent.
156
 
 
The Armenian economic superiority also extended to professional jobs; as of 1905, the 
Armenians occupied more skilled jobs in industries and professions while the Azeris 
were mostly employed as unskilled labourers.
157
 The predominantly peasant Azeris were 
suffering under the crumbling agricultural sector and witnessing better-performing 
Armenians in economic and cultural spheres. For the nascent Azeri national movement, 
Altstadt argues that the Armenians represented the ‘surrogates’ of Russian rule, a reason 
why the Azeris directed their anger at them when things spiralled out of control in 
1905.
158
 
Following Bloody Sunday in the capital, the Armenian-Azeri clashes began in Baku in 
February 1905 and quickly spread to other cities. In Baku, where the general tension was 
already high, the clashes between the Armenians and the Azeris further undermined 
stability. The oil industry, already hit by incessant strikes, was seriously damaged as 
several oil wells were targeted by mobs.
159
 Further, monarchists in Baku also attacked 
Armenians—as they disliked them for not being Orthodox Christians and for their 
revolutionary image—killing 60.160 The Russian authorities, under severe pressure, 
declared martial law in Baku in February 1905.
161
 
The existing Russian administration in the Caucasus was clearly unable to stop the 
ongoing unrest in the region. It was both discredited in the eyes of the local population 
and lacked the resources and dynamism to do so.
 
For strategic and economic reasons, the 
Caucasus was too important to be left in turmoil and the ministers knew that more drastic 
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measures had to be taken before it was too late. For that reason, in late February 1905, it 
was decided to reinstate the viceroyalty of the Caucasus.
162
 
In fact, the reintroduction of the viceroyalty with wider executive powers had been 
proposed earlier by none other than Golitsyn, who had compiled a series of reports about 
it.
163
 Although his project was rejected by Witte and Nicholas II, the condition of the 
infrastructure (especially the roads), increasing revolutionary fervour, and the economic 
importance of the region made the reintroduction of the post of viceroy inevitable in 
1905. Additionally, the Russian bureaucratic machine was chronically understaffed. In 
places as unstable as the Caucasus, the Tsarist regime needed to react quickly, bypassing 
most of the usual procedures.
164
 In this new scheme, the viceroy, as the chief civil and 
military man in the Caucasus, would be directly responsible to the Tsar in civil matters 
and was mostly free of central government control.
165
 
For the post of viceroy of the Caucasus, Nicholas II wanted a man whom he could fully 
trust and Graf Illarion I. Vorontsov-Dashkov fit the bill perfectly. A very well-known 
figure in the elite circles of the capital, Vorontsov-Dashkov was of highly aristocratic 
stock and had always been very close to the Tsar’s court.166 As one of the founders of the 
Holy Brotherhood, formed just after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 to fight the 
revolutionary movement, Vorontsov-Dashkov was a close associate of Alexander III.
167
 
Before coming to Tiflis as the viceroy, this warhorse’s last post was the Ministry of the 
Imperial Court, which he had to leave after the Khodynka incident in 1896.
168
 Despite 
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this unfortunate incident, he continued to spend his summers in Tsarskoe Selo with the 
imperial family.
169
  
As soon as Vorontsov-Dashkov arrived in Tiflis in May 1905, he quickly formed his own 
cadres to pacify the region. Despite the shortage of staff, with a selection of like-minded 
bureaucrats, the viceroy began to address the urgent problems in the region.
170  
For 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, the agrarian unrest was one of these problems. In the Caucasus, the 
redemption payments were still intact and the general agricultural situation was 
gruesome, which was helping the revolutionary movement.
171
 To fix this, he proposed the 
abolition of redemption fees in the region, which was accepted by St. Petersburg in 
principle but could not be materialized quickly. Another scheme Vorontsov-Dashkov 
envisioned for the pacification of the countryside was the introduction of zemstvos, for 
which a conference was organized by the viceroyalty in July 1905 for public 
discussion.
172
 
Another urgent problem was obviously the national question. The clashes between the 
Armenians and Azeris continued and the Georgians had their own demands. The viceroy 
decided to hold meetings with the representatives of these nationalities to hear them out. 
With the support of the viceroy, peace committees were formed by each religious 
group.
173
 However, the viceroy soon found that reconciliation between the Armenians 
and Azeris was a very difficult feat. In the end, these initial conciliatory talks failed to 
produce an immediate result while killings and assassinations of Russian officials 
continued.  
Under such circumstances, Vorontsov-Dashkov was aware that a key aspect of the 
instability in the region was the ongoing Armenian reaction to the Tsarist 
administration.
174 
In his correspondence with Baron Emmanuel Iu. Nolde, his 
representative in St. Petersburg, the viceroy stated that two decades of ‘systematically 
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repressive measures in relation to the Armenian Church and the Armenian population’ 
produced nothing but discontent and played into the hands of the Armenian revolutionary 
movement.
175
 In particular, the decision to confiscate the properties of the Armenian 
Church, an institution so important for the Armenians, pushed the Armenians away from 
Russia and led them to think about autonomy and support Armenian revolutionaries.
176
 
For the Russian Armenians, these measures created the impression that they were seen as 
the ‘unfavourable element’ by the Russian authorities.177 The viceroy argued that a 
subject nation like the Armenians, which had its own history, culture, literature, 
newspapers, and theatres, should not be denationalized by repressive measures of 
Russification—itself responsible for ‘the Armenian revolution in the Caucasus.’ 
Vorontsov-Dashkov complained that unable to differentiate peaceful nationalists from 
revolutionary terrorists, the Russian administration alienated the Armenians in the 
empire.
178
 
According to the viceroy, this had to stop and the annulment of the 1903 decree would be 
the most urgent step in that direction.
179
 This move would help get the Armenian Church 
on the side of the regime and check the support for the Armenian revolutionary 
movement, which would abate as soon as the decree was annulled.
180
 In June, a 
delegation comprising representatives of the Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis visited the 
viceroy and their most pressing demand concerned the confiscation decree.
181
 The 
viceroy was positive, but he demanded from the delegation, ‘as people of order,’ that they 
needed to give him all their support to stop the terrorist activities of the Armenian 
revolutionary committees.
182
 
                                               
175 Vorontsov-Dashkov to Nolde, 19 July 1905 [1 August 1905], RGIA, f. 1276, o. 19, d. 2, ll. 40- 40 ob. 
176 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska po upravleniiu Kavkazskim Kraem, 8-9; Diakin, 746-8. 
177 Vorontsov-Dashkov to Nolde, 19 July 1905 [1 August 1905], RGIA, f. 1276, o. 19, d. 2, ll. 40- 40 ob. 
178 Pliaskin, 289. 
179 Vorontsov-Dashkov to Nolde, 19 July 1905 [1 August 1905], RGIA, f. 1276, o. 19, d. 2, ll. 40- 40 ob. 
180 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Vsepoddanneishii otchet za vosem let upravleniia Kavkazom, 7; Hovannisian, 
Armenia on the Road to Independence, 20.  
181 Among these representatives were Khatisian, Samson Arutiunian, and Aleksandr A. Melik-Azariants. 
Chalkhushian, 61-3. 
182 Ibid., 65-69. 
54 
 
Finally, in August 1905, Nicholas II annulled the 1903 decree, as Vorontsov-Dashkov 
suggested.
183
 The confiscated properties of the Armenian Church were handed back and 
the Armenian parochial schools were again allowed to be run by the Armenian Church. 
All segments of the Russian Armenian community were pleased with this decision and 
acts of gratitude were demonstrated in various parts of the Caucasus. Apart from the 
Armenian clergy, the Armenian bourgeoisie and the masses, the Dashnaks also 
participated in the celebrations.
184
 
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s insistence on the annulment of the confiscation act and the 
prospects of the October Manifesto quickly pacified the conservative elements of the 
Armenian community in the South Caucasus. However, the Dashnaks, along with other 
revolutionary organizations in the region, were still at odds with the Tsarist 
administration. As a member of the Caucasian platform of 1905, the Dashnaktsutiun 
increased the cooperation with other socialist groups.
185
 In addition, the party reiterated 
its target of political autonomy within a federative republic in the South Caucasus and 
Russia, and the necessity of armed struggle against Tsarism.
186
 
Until the official declaration of the annulment of the confiscation decree, the Dashnaks 
hunted down several Tsarist officials during the revolutionary period. After August 1905, 
the Dashnaks continued their assassinations of Russian officials, now because of their 
attitude about the Armenian-Azeri clashes, which spread to Nakhichevan, Shusha, and 
then Tiflis and Baku in November.
187
 With their experience in armed struggle, the 
Dashnaks led the Armenian armed operations against the Azeris. The Armenian property 
owners, despite their dislike of the Dashnaks, had an agreement with them about the 
protection of their property.
188
 According to the Dashnaks, some of the Russian 
bureaucrats were favouring the Azeris in this and they had to pay for it.
189
 The message 
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of the Dashnaks to these Tsarist officials clear: ‘A gift of 25 roubles by the viceroy or the 
revolutionary bullet—that’s your choice.’190 
The Dashnaks declared that any Tsarist official who confiscated their weapons would be 
eliminated.
191
 The most well-known figure on the Dashnaks’ list was Prince Nakashidze, 
the governor of Baku, whose role in the confiscation process in 1903 was not forgotten. 
Apart from the memories of 1903, Nakashizde was now blamed by the Dashnaks for the 
Armenian losses in the clashes with the Azeris, for which he was assassinated in May 
1905.
192
 After the assassination, a Dashnak publication stated that ‘the bomb spoke. It 
was the thunderous voice of the enraged Armenian people’s revenge. The monster that 
drained our heart’s blood is a pitiful corpse now.’193 Among the other well-known 
victims of this wave of assassinations was General Maksud Alikhanov.
194
 
Toward the end of 1905, things were going downhill in the empire. The winter harvest 
was disastrous, the gold reserves were depleted, and exports were down.
195
 In the 
Caucasus, the situation was no different. The clashes crippled the oil industry in Baku, 
the main economic artery of the whole region.
196
 The revolutionaries were running 
rampant as strikes and expropriations were in the headlines. During the strikes in October 
1905, Tiflis was described as a ‘ghost town.’197 In an effort to calm the population of the 
Caucasus, the viceroy dismissed the rumours passed by the revolutionaries that the 
government intentionally incited disorder to keep its hold.
198
  
These problems of the region were not the only concerns for Vorontsov-Dashkov, who 
was not a young man and the difficult state of affairs in the Caucasus was further wearing 
him down. To make things worse, his son-in-law, Pavel P. Shuvalov, gradonachalnik 
(the city chief) of Moscow, was murdered by the revolutionaries, who later tried their 
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luck on the viceroy and his assistant in August 1905.
199
 In the meantime, in St. 
Petersburg, there was a strong dislike of the reestablishment of the viceroyalty, which 
reduced the authority of the ministries over such a critical region. Coupled with personal 
rivalries, voices of dissent about the ongoing troubles in the Caucasus began to grow 
toward the end of 1905.  
The dissenters’ main argument was that Vorontsov-Dashkov was not fit to quell the 
revolutionary disturbances to which his approach had been too lenient anyway. An 
incident in November 1905 particularly played into the hands of the critics of the viceroy. 
During the Armenian-Azeri clashes in Tiflis, the viceroyalty, unable to keep the order 
because of the shortage of available police and troops, distributed 500 rifles to the 
Mensheviks, who would be the mediators between the Armenians and Azeris.
200
 
Although it was later abandoned due to the opposition of the conservatives and the troops 
stationed in Tiflis and the rifles were taken back, it gave the viceroy’s opponents a huge 
opportunity to oust him and abolish the viceroyalty.
201
 The Tsar, who had backed the 
viceroy since his arrival, was perplexed, as he wrote to the viceroy that ‘he refused to 
believe this incredible news.’202 
In an effort to convince Nicholas II of the abolition of the viceroyalty, Witte noted that 
‘the Caucasus was fully in revolution’ and the solution could be to establish three general 
gubernias in the region instead of a single viceroyalty.
203
 Witte went on, arguing that 
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s poor health was also failing him. Under severe pressure, the 
viceroy offered his resignation to the Tsar but asked him to keep the viceroyalty intact as 
an institution. However, Nicholas II still had faith in Vorontsov-Dashkov, a long-time 
friend of the royal family, and rejected his resignation. To appease the critics of the 
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viceroy in the capital, an amendment was made stipulating that all the decisions of the 
viceroyalty that needed to be approved by the Tsar had to pass through the Council of 
Ministers, of which the viceroy would technically be a member.
204
 
After receiving the personal backing of the Tsar once again, Vorontsov-Dashkov knew 
that he had to act fast on the conflict between the Armenians and the Azeris. In February 
1906, he called a meeting at the palace of the viceroy. The representatives of the 
Armenians and Azeris, as well as the local press, were invited to discuss what needed to 
be done.
205
 The meeting started with an impressive speech by the viceroy, who stressed 
that this conflict had to stop.
206
 Both the Armenians and Azeris were in agreement but 
each believed that the massacres were the other’s fault. While the Azeris saw the 
Dashnaktsutiun as the main culprit, the Armenian representatives countered by stating 
that the Dashnaks were only defending against the Muslim offensive. For the Armenian 
representatives, the blame also was placed on the Tsarist administration, which failed to 
act in time.
207
 From February 1906, similar meetings followed as the viceroy continued 
his efforts of reconciliation between the Armenians and Azeris chiefly by using the 
religious institutions to pacify the masses.
208 
The revolution of 1905 broke out at a time when there was serious Armenian unrest 
against the Tsarist administration. However, the Armenian clashes with the Azeris, 
particularly after the annulment of the confiscation decree, became more prevalent for the 
Armenians concerning their relationship with the Russian authorities. What was the net 
result of these bloody confrontations? To begin with, although both the Armenians and 
the Azeris blamed each other for the outbreak of these bloody conflicts, both sides 
believed that the Russian authorities, who did not act to stop the clashes, were the main 
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perpetrators.
209
 Many Armenians, in particular the Dashnaks, believed that it was the 
Russians (for instance, Prince Nakashidze), who incited the Azeris against the 
Armenians.
210
 Similarly, the Azeris blamed the Russian authorities for employing a 
divide-and-rule strategy during the clashes.
211
 Shaumian also echoed this view, 
articulating that the real enemy of these two peoples was no one other than the Russian 
state.
212
 
There might be a motive for the Russians to have a divide-and-rule policy, but there was 
another side to it. The Tsarist administration in the Caucasus was chronically 
understaffed as was the rest of the empire.
213
 Coupled with the depletion of the troops 
stationed in the region because of the Russo-Japanese war, this shortage partially explains 
the Tsarist forces’ failure to act effectively to end the clashes. Senator Aleksandr M. 
Kuzminskii, who was sent from the capital to investigate the incidents, argued that the 
events broke out due to national-religious and economic character, and it was the idleness 
of the authorities that let them ‘grow to terrible proportions.’214 However, Kuzminskii 
underlined that the rumours about Tsarist perpetration of these events were false.
215 
The 
responsibility of the Tsarist administration was also confirmed by the viceroy, who saw 
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the inefficiency of the Russian military and bureaucracy in the region as an important 
factor in the outbreak of these bloody clashes.
216
  
By the end of the hostilities, the Armenian clergy and the Armenian bourgeoisie were 
generally content with the annulment of the confiscation decree and a visible return to 
normalcy—thanks to the policies of the viceroy, who saw these pillars as the natural 
allies of the regime. The most visible imprint of the clashes was on the Dashnaktsutiun, 
which solidified its position as a political power. The strength and popularity of the party 
among the Armenians rose immensely, particularly with its organizational leadership 
during the Armenian-Azeri clashes.
217
 In 1906, the Dashnaktsutiun was no longer a 
vanguard party but a mass party because its membership continuously grew in 
relationship to its popularity.
 
On the other hand, other Armenian parties, like the 
Hnchaks, were marginalized due to inter-party rifts, ideological viewpoints, and strategic 
choices.
218
 Another result noted by the Tsarist administration concerned the more visible 
national animosities between the Armenians and Azeris. As Hovannisian claims, these 
bloody confrontations reinforced national consciousness and rivalry between both 
nationalities.
219 
Particularly, the nascent national movement among the Azeris, parallel to 
the general Muslim question in the empire, would be an important factor for the 
viceroyalty in the coming years. 
 
The Constitutional Period and the Tsarist Recovery (1906–1907)   
 
By spring 1906, with strikes and peasant unrest weakened, the Tsarist government 
secured the biggest loan in Russian history from France.
220
 From then on, Pyotr A. 
Stolypin would arguably be the most dominating statesman in Russian political life—first 
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as Minister of Internal Affairs and a few months later as Prime Minister. Stolypin’s task 
was to manage the Tsarist recovery as quickly as possible and his main strategy was to 
consolidate the possible allies of the Tsarist regime, with peasantry being the main target. 
A pragmatic man, Stolypin believed that peasants only demanded more land not 
significant political changes; thus, he ordered all governors to get the peasants on their 
side.
221
 The Caucasus was no exception in that regard as he frequently corresponded with 
the viceroy, who had a similar vision about the agrarian issue.
222
 
Another priority in Stolypin’s recipe for recovery was the total eradication of the Russian 
revolutionary movement. He set an example as to how to do this with his launch of court-
martials (soon to be termed ‘Stolypin neckties’), which had an immediate impact. The 
fates of more than a thousand people charged with crimes against the state were decided 
in 48 hours in these courts, which usually sent them to the gallows (195 people were 
executed in the Caucasus alone) or to Siberia.
223
 However, Stolypin was still unhappy 
with the situation in the Caucasus, where he believed the revolutionary movement was 
still strong. Of particular concern for the premier was the influence of the 
Dashnaktsutiun, which extended to the Armenian clergy.   
The viceroy was aware of the influence of the Dashnaks, which he believed was 
gradually fading as the party was showing signs of wear and tear with the annulment of 
the 1903 decree and the end of clashes with the Azeris. For Vorontsov-Dashkov, his 
policy of reconciliation with the Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie would 
undermine the popular support for the Dashnaktsutiun. Moreover, the recovery of the 
Russian authority in the Caucasus and the return to normalcy would further drive them 
away, so it was only a matter of time.
224
 Thus, unlike Stolypin, the viceroy was proposing 
a gradual approach because a massive campaign against the Dashnaks would risk 
damaging the improving relations of the viceroyalty with the Armenians.  
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Meanwhile, the general meeting of the Armenians at Echmiadzin in the summer of 1906 
would provide Stolypin with an excellent excuse to push his preferred line of action. The 
meeting was organized to discuss the regulations on the church and education and to elect 
communal delegates. The viceroy did not want the Catholicos to go beyond these issues 
and discuss political matters.
225
 The meeting was nominally led by the Armenian clergy, 
as the place of the meeting indicates; however, the Dashnak delegates were also present. 
As the meeting proceeded, some Armenian clergymen left in protest at the radical 
demands made by the Dashnak members—as a result, the Dashnak dominated, winning 
45 out of 53 delegates.
226
 
According to the reports of the procurator of the Echmiadzin Synod, Frenkel, the 
Dashnak delegates began to act like a national assembly
 
and voiced their demands, such 
as the nationalization of the church properties and the separation of the church and the 
state.
227
 Frenkel noted that the academy at Echmiadzin was a centre of propaganda and 
agitation and the new candidates for the new Synod were mostly questionable 
characters.
228
 For Frenkel, the Catholicos, who was under the influence of the Dashnaks, 
was the main reason for the outcome of the congress.
229
 
Stolypin, who disapproved of the meeting even when the viceroy first informed him 
about it, became enraged when Vorontsov-Dashkov gave him the news, which confirmed 
Stolypin’s suspicions about the Dashnaks and their influence on the Armenian Church.230 
Although the meeting was shut down by order of the viceroy, the damage was done. 
Nicholas II was also informed about the meeting and how it was dominated by the radical 
elements, who according to Stolypin, seemed to manipulate the ailing Catholicos. The 
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Tsar noted that the Catholicos had to be informed about ‘the inappropriateness of his 
actions.’231 
The meeting provided an excellent way for Stolypin to point the finger at Vorontsov-
Dashkov for his lack of strict measures on the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, 
particularly the Dashnaks. In his defence, the viceroy noted that he did not want to 
intervene prematurely as this could easily foment anti-government agitation among the 
Armenian masses.
232
 The viceroy assured Stolypin that as soon as he received the news 
about what was occurring in the meeting, he ordered its closure.
233
 Moreover, the 
Catholicos, who did not openly approve of the closure fearing that it would damage his 
popularity among the Armenians and even put his life in danger, was not unhappy about 
the decision.
234
 Even after the meeting, Vorontsov-Dashkov still believed that both the 
general situation in the region and the relations with the Armenians were stabilizing and 
there was no reason to take a more aggressive stand.  
This was not how Stolypin viewed things from the capital as he was alarmed about the 
Dashnaks and their influence on the Armenian Church. In a letter to the viceroy, Stoypin 
underlined that some of the newly elected members of the Echmiadzin Synod had 
sympathies for the Dashnaktsutiun.
235
 The rectors of the Nersesian seminary in Tiflis and 
the Echmiadzin Academy were also associates of the revolutionaries who had a negative 
influence on the Armenian youth and used these institutions for hiding weapons and 
illegal literature.
236 
Reminded of the reports of the procurator of the Synod, Stolypin once 
again stressed to the viceroy that the Catholicos was under the influence of the 
Dashnaks.
237
 For Stolypin, the situation was unacceptable and a more serious line of 
action was needed was needed, including the forced retirement of the Catholicos.
238
 In 
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addition to the Dashnak influence on the Armenian Church, the premier also complained 
about the murders and expropriations committed by the Armenian revolutionaries, 
especially in Baku. He again asked the viceroy to take a more resolute stand and 
eliminate the Dashnak threat.
239
 
The viceroy replied that it was true that the party had gained popularity with its 
leadership during the Armenian response to the Tsarist decision to confiscate the 
Armenian Church properties and Armenian-Azeri clashes. However, since the end of 
hostilities, this was changing and soon the party would lose its base and support among 
the Russian Armenians. Therefore the comments made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
depicting all Armenians as supporting the Dashnaktsutiun were not correct and all 
necessary steps were taken to forestall the Dashnaktsutiun’s armed operations.240 In line 
with the observations of the viceroy, the reports from Tiflis also indicated that by the end 
of the revolution, the Dashnaks were showing signs of attrition.
241
 Regarding Stolypin’s 
proposal of a more aggressive approach to the Catholicos, the viceroy opposed the idea 
because it would create a massive disturbance among the Armenians.
242
 Thus, by 1907, 
the viceroy reiterated his preference for a more balanced approach considering the recent 
problems the Russian administration had with its Armenian subjects.  
As the disagreements between St. Petersburg and Tiflis surfaced, the Armenian deputies 
from the Caucasus added more drama to the situation.
243
 During the brief existence of the 
First Duma, all Armenian deputies were Kadets because the Dashnaks—like the 
Bolsheviks—boycotted the elections. From Erevan, Kegam M. Ter-Petrosian and Levon 
F.Tumaniants; from Elizavetpol, Khristofor I. Bagaturov; and from Tiflis, Artemii G. 
Aivazov, were elected as deputies for the First Duma.
244
 Not surprisingly, these 
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Armenians were professionals from big cities of the region. However, their impact on the 
First Duma was minimal. 
The elections for the Second Duma produced a more radical outcome than the first one in 
its composition. Already popular among the Armenians, the Dashnaks improved their 
chances in these elections by making tactical alliances with the SRs.
245
 In the Second 
Duma, three of the seven Armenian deputies were Dashnaks.
246
 The Dashnak deputies in 
the second State Duma were Ivan Ia. Saghatelian (Aleksandropol), a former prosecutor 
and the rector of the Echmiadzin Seminary; a philosophy teacher in the Armenian 
seminary, Sirakan F. Tigranian (Erevan); and Stepan Kh. Ter-Avetikiants (Elizavetpol), a 
teacher and publicist.
247
 The Tsarist authorities immediately took notice of the 
revolutionary affiliations of the Dashnak deputies in the Duma, who decided to sit with 
the SRs because they had similar demands, such as the nationalization of the land, 
cultural autonomy, and a federative republic.
248
 
The Dashnak deputies in the Second Duma, with their collaboration with the SRs, were 
vexing Stolypin and worsening the image of Armenians in his eyes; however, it would be 
an ex-Dashnak, Arshak G. Zurabian, who would infuriate Stolypin with his criticism of 
the huge Tsarist army and its upkeep in a parliamentary session in April 1907. Zurabian, 
now a Menshevik deputy from Tiflis, stated that the Tsarist army was kept only ‘for 
destroying and the shootings of labourers and peasants’ and would be useless against 
foreign armies. As expected, the right reacted strongly; Rediger, the Minister of War, and 
others left and chaos prevailed in the Tauride Palace, which even extended to duel offers 
to Zurabian. A member of the state council and the state comptroller, Piotr Kh. 
Schwanebach noted that this sort of behaviour ‘could be expected only from a 
representative of the national minorities like the Armenian Zurabov [Zurabian].’249  
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The Zurabian affair almost ended with the closure of the State Duma—which Nicholas II 
seriously thought of doing—if the insults to the Tsarist army went unpunished.250 
Although he gave up on the idea at the moment, it would be one of the incidents that 
convinced Stolypin that the current State Duma, with the number of radical deputies in it, 
was unworkable and had to be dissolved.
251
 Regarding his views on the Armenian 
question in the South Caucasus, the activities of the Armenian deputies in close 
collaboration with other revolutionary parties in the Second Duma further convinced 
Stolypin and other ministers that the Armenian revolutionary movement was still 
threatening the order in the Caucasus and urgent action was necessary. 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘The opponents of the state system would like to choose the path of radicalism, a path 
alien to Russia’s historical past, to its cultural traditions. They need great upheavals, we 
need a great Russia!’252 Stolypin’s address in the State Duma in May 1907 set forth the 
essence of his politics concerning the revolutionary movement and the need to crush it. 
The State Duma was dissolved in June and a more systematic campaign against the 
revolutionary movement began. The minorities, with their national movements, would 
also suffer from the increased centralization and restrictive measures, starting with the 
reduction of ethnic minorities in the composition of the next Duma. 
The Armenians were one of these minorities and in the South Caucasus. They were still 
seen as the most troublesome nationality by the central government. However, relations 
between the Tsarist regime and its Armenian subjects were far better than the disastrous 
situation in 1903. This improvement was not an easy feat as it took a huge effort to undo 
the damage of Golitsyn’s policies. Although Golitsyn was not the first top official in the 
Caucasus who suspected the links of the Armenian Church with revolutionary groups and 
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its nationalist influence on Armenian education, he was the one who stubbornly insisted 
on more extreme measures since his arrival in Tiflis. According to Golitsyn, the 
privileges of the Armenian Church and its autonomous status were the reasons why the 
Russian administration could not take more decisive measures. As the instability in the 
Caucasus grew with general strikes, student unrest, and economic stagnation in the 
region, Golitsyn grew even more impatient.  
When Golitsyn’s proposal was again on the agenda in 1903, it found several supporters in 
St. Petersburg, most notably Plehve. The proponents of confiscation were firmly 
convinced that the Armenian Church was the centre of the Armenian revolutionary 
movement, but the majority of the ministers, such as Witte and Lamsdorf, opposed it. 
Underlining the importance of the Armenian Church for the Armenians, these ministers 
noted that the measure would not only worsen Russia’s relations with the Russian 
Armenians but it also would complicate her relations with the Ottoman and Persian 
Armenians. Despite the majority’s opposition, Nicholas II approved the decree in June 
1903, when the Armenian reaction to the Tsarist regime began. 
This ‘international theft,’ as Victor Berard called it, created a persistent response from all 
segments of the Armenian population, even the traditionally loyal elements.
253 
The 
Armenian clergy, led by the Catholicos, protested the decision and resisted as much as 
they could. When the Catholicos’s petitions for an audience with the Tsar were not 
granted, the higher Armenian clergy even considered transferring the Armenian 
Catholicosate to the Ottoman Empire, although this was later rejected by the Ottomans. 
Meanwhile, the Armenian masses showed their dissatisfaction about the decree with mass 
demonstrations in which they often clashed with Russian troops.  
The Dashnaks, despite their critical stance toward the church, also joined the Armenian 
resistance in the Russian Empire, against which they did not act until the decision to 
confiscate. In essence, for the Dashnaks, the confiscation decree was the culmination of 
the Russian oppression of the Armenians to which they could not remain indifferent. 
During the Dashnak world congress in February 1904, the party officially declared its 
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anti-Russian stance and a new programme aiming at autonomy in the South Caucasus 
within a federative system. Furthermore, the Dashnaks supplemented their theoretical 
moves with action. In close collaboration with other revolutionary parties, the Dashnak 
committees in the Caucasus began to hunt down Tsarist officials. 
Toward the end of 1904, the empire was hit by a combination of worker and student 
unrest, economic troubles and bad news from the war with the Japanese. By then, the 
initiators of the confiscation decree were not in their posts. Plehve had been assassinated 
and Golitsyn had left Tiflis for St. Petersburg after failed assassination attempts on his 
life. Soon after Bloody Sunday in the capital, the revolutionary turmoil spread to the 
Caucasus, where bloody inter-ethnic conflicts between the Armenians and Azeris as well 
as the general grievances of the nationalities toward the Tsarist administration dominated 
the political scene. Apart from these, the oil industry was severely damaged which 
signalled to St. Petersburg that something had to be done.  
The reestablishment of the Caucasian viceroyalty, with wide institutional autonomy, 
seemed to be the answer since this would speed up the decision-making process in a 
chronically understaffed periphery hit by revolutionary chaos. For the post of viceroyalty, 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, a personal friend of the royal family and a very experienced 
statesman, was the choice of the Tsar. When Vorontsov-Dashkov arrived in Tiflis in May 
1905, aside from the agrarian question and the revolutionary movement in the region, the 
Armenian unrest was at the top of his agenda. The viceroy believed that the Armenian 
discontent would fade provided that the decree of confiscation was annulled thus 
pacifying the Armenian clergy, bourgeoisie, and, to a large extent, the Armenian masses. 
Upon the recommendation of the viceroy, the decree was annulled and the Armenian 
resistance abated but the Armenian clashes with the Azeris went on. Although the clashes 
ended in 1906 thanks to the reconciliation efforts of the viceroyalty and the general 
weakening of the revolutionary movement, both the Armenians and Azeris were bitter 
about their losses—for which they blamed each other and the Tsarist authorities, who 
remained quite passive during the clashes. 
By the end of the revolutionary period, the Dashnaktsutiun emerged as the most popular 
and capable of all revolutionary groups in the Caucasus, a situation that troubled even top 
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officials in the capital, particularly Stolypin. For the premier, the influence of the 
Dashnaktsutiun in the region, which extended to the Armenian Church, was a bad omen 
and he recommended that the viceroy follow his example with his drastic measures 
against the Russian revolutionary movement, which was gradually weakening and going 
underground. Particularly after the Dashnak domination of the meeting in Echmiadzin in 
1906 and the Dashnak appearance in the Second Duma together with the SR faction, 
Stolypin demanded stronger measures from the viceroy against the Dashnaks as one of 
the most pressing threats to the stability in the South Caucasus.  
The viceroy, who was aware of his critics in St. Petersburg, was still resisting Stolypin’s 
approach because he believed that extreme measures against the Dashnaks or the 
Armenian clergy would be untimely, as they could be interpreted by the Armenians as 
acts of oppression. According to the viceroy, the Dashnaks were losing their support 
among the Armenians since the annulment of the confiscation decree, while the 
Armenian clergy and the Armenian bourgeoisie were happy with the return to the old 
arrangement with the Russian administration. Therefore, as the Tsarist recovery 
continued and the region stabilized, normal policing measures would be sufficient to 
stamp out the Dashnaks. Although the relations between the Russian administration and 
its Russian subjects reached a much more manageable level from 1903 to 1907, the 
difference of opinion between St. Petersburg and Tiflis remained and it would continue to 
be an important part of the evolution of the Armenian question in the South Caucasus in 
the coming years.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RUSSIA AGAINST THE DASHNAKTSUTIUN (1907–1912) 
 
The Aftermath of June 1907 and the Stolypinshchina  
 
Named after Ivan F. Paskevich, the commander who led the Russian conquest of Erivan 
in 1827, the Erivan square in Tiflis hosted various important buildings. The building of 
the Tiflis City Duma with its beautiful Moorish façade, the Georgian seminary where 
young Stalin studied, and a massive caravanserai were located around the square. More 
importantly, the square linked the city’s world of authority based on Golovinskii Avenue 
and its world of commerce in Sololaki. One morning in June 1907, the residents of the 
square were aghast at the chaos caused by gunshots and bomb explosions. This was the 
Tiflis bank robbery, or Tiflis expropriation, staged by local Bolsheviks including Simon 
Ter-Petrossian (aka Kamo) and Stalin, on the instructions of the party leaders. When the 
police and gendarmerie arrived, it was too late, the perpetrators escaped with a 
considerable sum of money. The heist created a world-wide sensation adding to the 
worries of St. Petersburg regarding the situation in the Caucasus.
254
  
Not long after the robbery, the most influential figure of Georgian politics, Ilia 
Chavchavadze was assassinated, confirming Stolypin’s suspicions about the state of 
affairs in the South Caucasus. These two incidents continued to receive much attention, 
but Stolypin’s biggest concern about the region was the Dashnaktsutiun. The measures 
taken by the viceroy based on Stolypin’s instructions, could only quell smaller 
revolutionary parties in the region, which soon became inactive.
255
 However, with its 
formidable organization in the South Caucasus, the Dashnaks remained entrenched in 
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segments of the Armenian community because of the leadership they demonstrated in the 
struggle against Tsarism between 1903 and 1907. Understandably, the party still had a 
considerable influence on the Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie by 1907 
and this frustrated the premier, who was concerned about this economically and 
strategically important region.   
By 1907, Stolypin managed to cripple the revolutionary movement in most parts of the 
empire with his rather stern methods. Although his harsh tactics were criticized by some, 
revolutionary activity experienced a huge setback in the empire and what Stolypin 
wanted from Vorontsov-Dashkov was a similar drive in the Caucasus, especially against 
the Dashnaktsutiun. The viceroy, on the other hand, was not as pessimistic as Stolypin. 
One element upon which the viceroy relied was the conservative Armenian bourgeoisie. 
Emphasizing the importance of Armenian commercial classes in the region, the viceroy 
stated that Armenians were generally fond of capital and private property and would not 
support socialism. When the revolutionary movement was pacified, the Dashnaks would 
automatically lose its support among these classes.
256
 Similarly, the Armenian Church 
would loath the idea of socialization of church lands as proposed by the Dashnaks.
257
 
According to the viceroy, the Armenian people, who wanted to form good relations with 
the Russian government, were not ‘contaminated with the autonomous aspirations’ at 
which the Dashnaktsutiun was aiming. The Dashnak efforts for autonomy were only 
discrediting the party in the eyes of the people.
258
 
For Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Armenian revolutionary movement was already getting 
weaker day by day as the Armenians now had fewer reasons to support them. Other 
Armenian parties like the Hnchaks had lost their organizational capabilities and the 
Dashnaks’ fate would be the same given enough time. The viceroy was sure that effective 
policing and maintaining good relations with the other political pillars of the Armenian 
society would resolve the problem of the Dashnaktsutiun for good.
259
 Differing in their 
views of the urgency, both Stolypin and Vorontsov-Dashkov believed that the Dashnaks 
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needed to be stamped out as a political force for the sake of stability in the region. 
Meanwhile, the news from Europe regarding the Dashnak participation in the Second 
International added to the concerns of both. 
 
 
The Dashnak Flirtation with Socialism and the Second International 
 
Until the revolution of 1905, socialism failed to gain popularity among the Armenians. 
For most, the idea of emancipation of the proletariat and the transition to bourgeois 
capitalism did not mean much while the urgency of the emancipation of Armenians 
(especially Ottoman Armenians) was waiting.
260
 The Armenian parties, who adopted 
orthodox Marxism like the Hnchaks, also faced incessant criticism about Marxism’s 
stance on national identity, which ultimately barred them from gaining mass popularity. 
Led by Stepan G. Shaumian, the Armenian SDs, as a part of the Caucasian Union of 
RSDWP, were in a similar position.
261
 However, this began to change near 1905 as the 
appeal of socialism grew in the empire, but in the South Caucasus its impact became even 
more significant, mainly because of the transformation caused by the oil industry. In 
places such as Baku and Batumi, the words ‘proletariat’ and ‘capitalist’ became more 
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meaningful as industrial giants like the Nobels and Rothschilds were dominating the 
places despite organized labour’s strong opposition.  
The revolutionary convulsion further increased the appeal of socialism in the South 
Caucasus and many national parties took notice as they added socialist concepts to their 
agenda.
262
 One of these parties was the Dashnaks, who thought that embracing socialism 
would benefit the party with its extensive links in the Russian Empire and Europe and 
help them not lose the Armenian workers to broader socialist parties. In April 1907, in 
their fourth world congress in Vienna, these ideas officially materialized. ‘The Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation, as a revolutionary and a socialist party, puts its goal of defence 
of economic, political and national interests of the Armenian labouring masses with a 
view to replace monarchy with a people’s rule and capitalism with socialization of tools 
and means of production.’ This was the opening sentence of the new party programme.263 
What the Dashnaks now envisioned was a ‘federative [Transcaucasian] republic based on 
most extensive decentralization’ and then they would introduce socialist order by means 
of expropriation of all tools and means of production.
264
 This democratic ‘Transcaucasian 
Republic’ would be within the larger framework of a Russian Federal Republic, but 
would retain its internal autonomy and have its own parliament.
265
  
Despite the socialist content, the programme still retained the primacy of the national 
question concerning both Ottoman and Russian Armenians.
266
 Even so, this move toward 
socialism drove the Armenian bourgeoisie as well as militant nationalists away from the 
party.
267
 A small group of guerrilla fighters led by a well-known figure named Gabriel N. 
Keshishian, better known by his alias ‘Mihran’, had already raised its opposition to the 
party’s ‘Plan for the Caucasus of 1905’ and incorporation of socialist themes. According 
to Mihranists, the party should concentrate its energies on Turkish Armenians and stay 
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away from Russian affairs.
268
 Mihran stated that he was in the party ranks not for 
socialism but ‘simply for the reason that he promised to avenge on the Turks, who killed 
his sisters and brothers.’269 In the end, his line was not adopted and Mihran and his 
followers left the party for which Mihran was condemned to death by the 
Dashnaktsutiun.
270
 However, it was not easy to hunt down an experienced guerrilla leader 
like Mihran, who would ultimately help doom the fortunes of the Dashnaktsutiun in the 
Russian Empire.  
Another famous Armenian guerrilla chief, Andranik believed that the new programme 
was incorrectly bold in its aims regarding the Caucasus, which could further increase 
Tsarist hostility, and thus weaken the party.
271
 He went on by voicing his concerns over 
the compatibility of socialist values and concepts with nationalist rhetoric and the 
potential dangers of this type of propaganda.
272
 Respected as a man of action, Andranik 
and his clique were in a minority in this situation and the adoption of socialist concepts 
into the party programme went forward.  
The loss of support within the party ranks was thought to be compensated by increased 
cooperation with other socialist parties in Russia, which was encouraged in the congress 
in Vienna. During the revolutionary years, Dashnaksutiun had allied itself with various 
social political parties for tactical purposes. In the post-revolutionary period, the 
measures taken by the Stolypin administration made the collaboration with socialist 
parties especially the SRs even more desirable. For the third Duma elections, the SR 
party boycotted the elections. However, tactical alliances with the Dashnaks were kept, 
especially with the support of a prominent SR member, V.V. Lunkevich, who wrote 
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several articles for the Dashnak journal, Droshak depicting the woes of the Tsarist 
Armenians during these years.
273
  
The only Dashnak deputy in the third State Duma was Hovhannes Saghatelian. A lawyer 
by training, he worked in the Echmiadzin Seminary and later in the Legal Advisory 
council to the Oil Producers’ Union in Baku.274 In the absence of the SRs, Saghatelian sat 
with the Trudoviki faction in the Duma.
275
 In the South Caucasus, room to make an 
impact was getting smaller for the Dashnaks and the Duma was indeed becoming an ‘idle 
talking shop’ as Goryemkin described it.276 Stolypin, under his program of recovery, 
cracked down on all socialist parties and most of their members fled to Europe, where 
they could work more freely. In the face of increased police pressure, the Dashnaks 
decided to collaborate with these socialist groups based in Europe.  
In fact, the party was already familiar with the European intelligentsia. Particularly 
sympathetic to the Armenian cause, eminent French socialists and liberals such as George 
Clemenceau, Jean Jaures, Anatole France and Pierre Quillard were collaborating with the 
Dashnaks in publishing the Dashnak-funded Pro-Armenia journal in Paris.
277
 The 
Western Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun was located in Geneva and it was in constant 
touch with the Eastern Bureau of the party in Tiflis as they were organizing their 
congresses in Europe.  
The key step came in August 1907 when the Dashnaks were invited to participate in the 
congress of the Second International in Stuttgart with the support of SRs. Some parties, 
like the Bolsheviks, protested on the grounds of the nationalist origins of the party.
278
 
Another sceptic emphasized that the party’s first aim was still the ‘emancipation of 
Turkish Armenia’ not the emancipation of the working classes and blamed the Dashnaks 
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for trying to ‘benefit from the socialist movement without being true socialists.’279 
Despite these criticisms, the Dashnaks took part in the congress in Stuttgart by sending 
three delegates from the Russian Empire.
280
  
More importantly, the Dashnaks were again in a hide-and-seek game with the Tsarist 
secret police in the cities where they were based, chiefly Paris and Geneva. Perhaps an 
indicator of the Tsarist approach to fighting the revolutionary movement was an Okhrana 
bureau headquartered in Paris for hunting down the revolutionaries among the Russian 
émigrés whose numbers in France rose to 35,000 by 1911.
281
 This bureau was called the 
Foreign Agency (Zagranichania Agentura) and was founded in 1883. Ironically, the 
initial steps to set up a secret police branch in Europe for collective security against the 
revolutionary movement were taken by Loris-Melikov, who was of Armenian descent.
282
 
Later, Plehve, the founder of the first systematic Russian secret police at home, ensured 
the establishment of the bureau in Paris. 
Having both Tsarist secret agents and local detectives on their staff, this branch was 
constantly observing the movements of the revolutionaries, especially in France, 
Switzerland, and Germany. Informers were abundant, infiltrating the circles of radicals 
and creating similar scenes described in Joseph Conrad’s Under Western Eyes. Dashnaks, 
recently a thorn on the side of the Tsarist regime in the South Caucasus, were now 
joining the Socialist International and became part of the bigger game. The Foreign 
Agency took notice and soon the traffic of intelligence reports from Paris to St. 
Petersburg and Tiflis about subversive activities of the Dashnaks grew. 
Dashnaks joined the Second International in 1907 as they sought to benefit from the 
general power of the socialist movement both theoretically and pragmatically. The 
troublemaker image of the Dashnaks as the most powerful Armenian political party was 
further entrenched upon their arrival in the European arena thanks to the reports provided 
by the Tsarist secret police in Paris. On top of the complications they caused on the 
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national level, the Dashnaks were now a part of a broader international socialist network. 
In addition, their involvement in the constitutional revolutions in the neighbouring 
empires was adding more fuel to the fire.  
 
 
Armenian Revolutionaries in the Making of Revolutions in the Neighbouring 
Empires (1907–1908) 
 
As Russia was recovering from revolutionary insurrection, two neighbouring empires 
were experiencing constitutional movements in which the Armenian revolutionaries were 
instrumental. The first of these was the revolutionary movement in Persia, which resulted 
in the proclamation of the Persian Constitution and the inauguration of the parliament in 
1906. This Tabriz-based constitutional movement upset not only the Shah but also the 
Russians and the British who had interests in the Persian Empire. In order to prevent 
further complications, the Russians concluded an agreement with the British in 1907 that 
put northern Persia under the Russian sphere of influence and southern Persia under the 
British.  
In northern Persia, Russia had political and commercial interests, for which political 
stability was essential. More importantly, this region, with its considerable Azeri and 
Armenian populations, had close links with the South Caucasus. Disorder in northern 
Persia could easily threaten order across the border. This was increasingly the case in 
Persia after the conclusion of the Russian-British agreement of 1907, which intensified 
the conflict between the constitutionalists and the Shah’s forces. Among the supporters of 
the constitutionalist groups were the Dashnaks, who called Russia and Britain ‘thieves’ 
for the 1907 agreement.
283
 The Dashnaks were becoming more of a factor in the 
revolution throughout 1908 and their anti-Russian attitude was growing. For the 
Dashnaks, the Persian constitutional movement was ‘not just a movement for 
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constitutionalism but also one for independence from Russian oppression and 
exploitation and from “Russia’s blind or seeing tool,” the Shah.’284 In the publications of 
the party, Russia was portrayed as having expansionist aims regarding northern Persia.
285
   
While the Russian-led Persian Cossacks were busy bombarding the parliament building, 
Droshak was criticizing Tsarism as ‘it interfered moreover in Persia’s bloody sorrow, 
with its usual cynical barbarity and extinguished the emancipatory blaze.’286 Despite all 
the efforts, with Russian help, the Persian Parliament was shut down in the summer of 
1908.
 
During the Civil War that followed, the Dashnaks, along with other Caucasian 
revolutionary groups, including the Hnchaks, intensified their support for the opposition 
forces against the Russian-backed Shah.
287
  
The Dashnak participation in the Persian constitutional movement was noted not only by 
Russian diplomats. Baron Nolde, in his speech in the State Duma in 1907, argued that 
‘these revolutionaries [the Dashnaks], who were fighting in three fronts needed to be 
stamped out from the Russian Empire.’288 Vladimir M. Purishkevich stressed the 
difficulties the Dashnaks caused for the Russian imperial interests with their role in the 
Persian constitutional revolution.
289
 Thus, by the end of 1908, the Dashnaks’ participation 
in the Persian revolution reflected their antagonism against the Tsarist interests in 
northern Persia and their capabilities as a revolutionary organization, which was a serious 
security concern for the South Caucasus. As this further deteriorated their image in the 
eyes of the Russian authorities, the party was also active in another struggle against a 
strong autocrat in the Ottoman Empire.  
In the late 1890s and early 1900s, partly owing to the mutual understanding of two 
autocrats, Abdulhamid II and Nicholas II, and partly to political repression by the 
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Hamidian regime, the Dashnak efficiency in the Ottoman Empire was greatly reduced. 
This was also the case for other oppositional groups in the Ottoman Empire. These 
groups were often called Young Turks as a reference to other national movements in 
Europe; among them were many members of different nationalities of the empire. There 
was some cooperation between these various groups and the Armenian revolutionaries 
prior to that date. For instance, the Dashnaks and the Hnchaks joined the congresses of 
the Ottoman oppositional groups in Paris in 1905 and 1907.
290
  
This began to change in 1905 when the opposition groups began to expand. In the same 
year, the Dashnaks masterminded an assassination attempt on Abdulhamid II with the 
help of a Belgian anarchist. Although the bomb failed to kill the Sultan, it demonstrated 
Dashnak capabilities. Later as the general opposition movement took root, the Dashnaks 
sided with the CUP, which later became the dominant political party in Ottoman politics. 
The Sultan had relented to the revolutionary outburst in the summer of 1908 and accepted 
the constitution and the reopening of the Ottoman Parliament. From then on, the 
Dashnaks were in league with the CUP. As stated by Mikael Varandian, for the 
Dashnaks, this was a ‘defensive alliance’ to protect the constitutional regime in the 
Ottoman Empire.
291
 For the CUP, the alliance with the Dashnaks was the key to holding 
the Armenian loyalties to the empire. In addition, the CUP believed that the Dashnaks 
needed them in the face of the Tsarist persecution.
292
 
Although the priorities of these two were not identical, the Dashnaks believed that the 
new government could meet their demands concerning agrarian relations in Eastern 
Anatolia by addressing land reforms, tax arrangements and the issue of Kurdish 
nomads.
293
 As the allies of the CUP, the Dashnaks were promising the Ottoman 
Armenians more individual liberties and the guarantee of civic equality under the 
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constitution. With these expectations, nearly 50,000 Tsarist Armenians moved back to 
Eastern Anatolia after July 1908.
294 
 
With their role in yet another revolutionary movement against an autocrat, the 
Dashnaktsutiun’s capabilities made it a more imminent threat for the recovering Tsarist 
regime. In August 1908, the Tsarist police were speculating that the party, with its 
substantial fighting force, could organize assassination of Shah and the Sultan and 
perhaps an important terrorist act against Russia and could even proclaim ‘independent 
Armenia’ by using the confusion.295 On the other hand, given the anti-Tsarist position of 
the Dashnaks, their rising political influence on Ottoman Armenian politics was 
distressing for the Tsarist authorities. The promises of liberties for the Ottoman 
Armenians given by the Dashnaks after the revolution of 1908, if fulfilled, could have 
undesirable repercussions on the political demands of the Russian Armenians.
296
 
Therefore, by the end of 1908, the Dashnak involvement in the constitutional movements 
in the Persian and Ottoman empires continued to vex the Tsarist authorities as they called 
the Dashnaks ‘spiritus rectorum (the guiding spirit) of all constitutional movements’ 
between 1907 and 1908.
297
 However, both countries were enormously important for 
Russia and the Dashnaks could not be allowed to complicate Russia’s interests. The 
Dashnak activity in neighbouring empires was also a sign of potential problems for 
ongoing Tsarist stability in the South Caucasus. In the end, all of this added up to a 
negative image in the eyes of the Russian officials, most of whom believed that the 
pressure on the party had to be intensified.
298
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The Tsarist Urgency  
 
By 1908, both St. Petersburg and Tiflis knew that they had to eliminate the Dashnak 
powerbase in the region for a stable Caucasus and better relations with Russian 
Armenians. The other political pillars, the Armenian Church and the urban elements, 
were mostly eager to ally with the regime if the power of the Dashnaks was broken. 
However, there were differences as to how to handle this. As in the case of the Armenian 
Church, there was a difference of opinion between St. Petersburg and Tiflis regarding the 
level of threat posed by the Dashnaks and the way to eliminate it. Acknowledging the 
importance of security precautions, the viceroy was again pressing for a more gradual 
approach that would alienate the Dashnaks from the other elements of the Armenian 
community in the region. 
However, the level of urgency to sort out the problem of Dashnaktsutiun was much 
higher in St. Petersburg. The premier believed that a more proactive method was 
necessary and blamed the viceroy for being too lenient with the Dashnaks. In a report to 
the viceroy, Stolypin argued that the Caucasus was not as peaceful as Vorontsov-
Dashkov described in his report to the Tsar. Terrorist activity, brigandage, and other 
forms of crime were rampant in the region for which he blamed the Caucasus 
administration.
299
 The Dashnaks were the centre of the premier’s attention in this failure. 
According to Stolypin, the war against the Dashnaks achieved too little and the party was 
still strong enough to terrorize Armenians by methods such as extorting money from 
Tiflis merchants or forming a shadowy police organization in Elizavetpol.
300
 Stolypin 
believed that the viceroyalty, with its wide administrative powers, should have been more 
active regarding the Dashnaks, as the central government was with the Russian 
revolutionary movement.
301
 The government was now facing a threatening criminal 
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organization that was growing strong in the eyes of the local administration, ‘which 
remained indifferent to this dangerous phenomenon for several years.’302 
The viceroy still insisted on his methods and did not share the views of Stolypin about the 
level of danger the Dashnaks posed in 1907 or his administration’s passivity to stop them. 
Acknowledging that the Dashnaktsutiun was ‘more dangerous than other organizations in 
the region,’ he stressed his previous line as to how to approach the problem. In a normal 
state of relations between the Armenians and the Russian government, unlike the period 
between 1903 and 1907, the Dashnaks would eventually lose their power as other 
elements ceased to support them.
303
 For the viceroy, this was increasingly the case as the 
support of the Armenian masses for the Dashnaks was falling since the party’s services of 
protection were not needed anymore with the end of the hostilities with the Azeris. More 
importantly, the party’s financial demands and its coercive methods were damaging its 
popularity.
304
 Moreover, the Ottoman Armenian immigrants in the South Caucasus, a key 
Dashnak resource for manpower, were expelled by Russian Armenians.
305
 By July 1908, 
both in Tiflis province and in the Caucasus in general, the viceroy noted that ‘the 
aspirations of the Armenian population for liberating itself from the guardianship of the 
Dashnaktsutiun’ were observed.306 
Considering ‘the cultural state and the level of development of the sense of justice of the 
local population as well as the geographical conditions and the lack of proper 
communication network in the region,’ Vorontsov-Dashkov was pleased with his 
performance against the revolutionary movement.
307
 What the viceroy saw as missing 
was the lack of funds for effective policing for which the Caucasus did not get anything 
while inner regions were given 20 million roubles between 1905 and 1906.
308
 Soon, other 
reports siding with Stolypin’s perspective began to flow to St. Petersburg.309 A report by 
the Department of Police claimed that the Dashnaks, far from losing power, controlled 
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the Caucasian press, possessed a formidable army of guerrillas, a budget that could reach 
up to 10 million roubles, and an active membership base of 165,000.
310
 The report went 
on saying that owing to its power, the party could still attract donations from wealthy 
Armenians, and something should be done about this.
311
 In addition to the Sultan and the 
Shah, the party could also target Stolypin and Nicholas II for assassination.
312
  
In the Tauride Palace, the Dashnaktsutiun’s strong presence in the South Caucasus 
provided the rightists ammunition to rant about how Vorontsov-Dashkov’s liberal 
policies failed. In an exaggerated fashion, Purishkevich was claiming that as the leading 
separatist organization in the Caucasus, the Dashnak organization expanded all over the 
Caucasus and the main body of the party (the Eastern Bureau in Tiflis) ‘gave directives 
and practically ruled the Caucasus.’313 Purishkevich’s speech about Vorontsov-Dashkov 
was so scathing that one of the daughters of the viceroy, furious at the slanderous 
accusations of the eccentric deputy, wrote that ‘such a bastard should be strangled.’314 
All these reports highlighted that the main reason for all this was the lenient approach of 
the viceroyalty.
315
 Hardliners gained more supporters among the Tsarist officials; 
however, the viceroy, with his extensive administrative powers in the region, was still 
resisting. Meanwhile, the confessions of the former Dashnak guerrilla leader Mihran 
proved to be what St. Petersburg was waiting for to crush the Dashnaktsutiun. Soon, with 
the approval of Stolypin and the Minister of Justice, Shcheglovitov, a grand undertaking 
was underway to end the Dashnak threat in the Russian Empire once and for all.
316
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The First Phase of the Trial of the Dashnaktsutiun (1908–1910)  
 
In June 1907, Mihran was sitting with three other Dashnak dissidents in a hotel in the 
village of Armavir. A killing squad sent by the Dashnaktsutiun rushed in and attacked, 
instantly killing one of Mihran’s associates, Vartapetiants. Mihran and Mukhtarov were 
seriously wounded while Giulmazinian managed to run away. Soon, Muhtarov also died 
of his wounds. This was not the first time the party made attempts on Mihran’s life. In 
May, he had survived an attack by two men in the streets of Tiflis, which forced him to 
hide in Armavir. After the last failed attempt in Armavir, the Dashnak committees grew 
more relentless as they kept on hunting down not only Mihran but his supporters and 
family as well. Fearing for his life and admitting to the police that he was a member of 
the Dashnaktsutiun until the split, Mihran accepted being an informer for the police and 
began to tell the secrets of the Dashnaks.
317
 Mihran’s revelations throughout 1908 gave 
the police and the judiciary more insight about the machinations and organization of the 
party.
318
 This was the opportunity St. Petersburg was waiting for to take them down.  
Based on Mihran’s confessions, a series of raids and mass arrests were initiated in 1908. 
These were the first steps of the grand political trial of the Dashnaktsutiun. Soon, on the 
orders of Shcheglovitov, the ‘initiator and encourager of the Dashnaktsutiun trial,’ the 
chief prosecutor of Novocherkassk judiciary chamber, Nikolai I. Lyzhin was appointed to 
carry out the preliminary investigation.
319
 On top of his responsibilities as the Chief 
Prosecutor of Novocherkassk, Lyzhin now assumed extraordinary responsibilities for the 
trial as the investigator for especially important cases. Shcheglovitov’s choice was quite 
controversial since Lyzhin was under close scrutiny after the recent rumours of 
misconduct about his involvement in the Novorossiysk republic trial.
320
 Despite the 
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reports pointing out signs of improper conduct on the evidence, he was cleared of the 
charges and he was now awarded with a bigger political trial.
321
  
As Lyzhin began to work, pressure on the party was growing. The number of arrests rose 
beginning in late 1908. In less than a year, more than a thousand Armenians who were 
suspected of being party members were apprehended. The most imminent target of 
Lyzhin was the Dashnak committees responsible for the Russian Empire, starting with 
the Tiflis-based Eastern Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun. Most of the leading members of 
the Eastern Bureau were arrested and put into prison. Among them were Avetis 
Aharonian [aka Garib], the rector of the Nersesian Seminary in Tiflis, who was also 
suspected of being a member of the party’s executive terrorist council. In his 
interrogation, Aharonian denied being a member of the party and a member of the 
executive terrorist council. As a man of letters, Aharonian stated that he was opposed to 
terrorism; otherwise he would not have been appointed as the rector of the Nersesian 
seminary or as the delegate of the Catholicos to the Hague conference of 1907. 
Aharonian’s defence did not impress Lyzhin and he was put into prison in May 1909.322  
Soon, other members of the Eastern Bureau such as Dr. Amazasp Ohanjanian, who was 
reported to manage the party’s propaganda affairs, Stepan Zorian (aka Rosdom), one of 
the original founders of the party, and Arutiun Sharikian, also a member of the party’s 
executive terrorist council of the party met the same fate.
323
 Following the Eastern 
Bureau, other lesser Dashnak committees under its hierarchy were targeted and soon the 
party organization of the Dashnaktsutiun in the South Caucasus was debilitated. Some 
prominent Dashnaks like Pastermadjian were luckier as they left the Caucasus before the 
storm hit. One of the organizers of the Armenian units in the clashes against the Azeris in 
1905–1906, Pastermadjian left for the Ottoman Empire in November 1908 and avoided 
imprisonment.
324
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The Armenian intelligentsia was also included in the investigation process. Perhaps the 
most famous of them, Hovhannes Tumanian, the Armenian national poet, was accused of 
being a member of the Dashnaktsutiun, tried and arrested in Tiflis, and put into Metekhi 
prison.
325
 Suspected of being an organizer of the terrorist branch of the party, a 
participant in the murder of a Tiflis Okhrana detective in December 1908, and the murder 
of a tobacco factory owner, Aram Safarov, Tumanian was released only a few months 
later with a bail of 5,000 roubles.
326
 Another well-known Armenian poet, Avetik 
Ishakian, was also arrested as he was suspected of being a member of the Tiflis 
committee of the party and the leading acquirer of arms. Soon, he also headed to Metekhi 
prison.
327
 Suspected of sympathizing with the party, Armenian publishing houses, 
particularly Hermes, owned by S.P. Edigarov, and Arach in Tiflis, were also targeted for 
publishing illegal literature.
328
 
Apart from these usual suspects, many Armenians from various backgrounds were also 
included in the trial, which brought another dimension to it. The Russian Armenian 
community was shaken by the arrests of well-known members of the Armenian 
bourgeoisie and the Armenian clergy. A curious example was Aleksandr A. Melik-
Azariants, whose family owned the trading centre—a fine building at the end of the city’s 
main street, Golovinskii Avenue. In April 1909, the same merchant Melik-Azariants was 
under arrest for taking part in Dashnak financial transactions. In his defence, he accepted 
neither belonging to the party nor supporting it financially.
329
 He claimed that the 
transactions with Archimandrite Koriun were for protecting the Armenians against the 
Azeris during the Armeno-Azeri clashes in 1905–1906.330 As a wealthy merchant, Melik-
Azariants told the police that the Dashnaks were his ‘enemy’ and he financed the liberal 
Mshak journal to oppose Dashnak influence among the Tsarist Armenians.
331
 The arrest 
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of Melik-Azariants, along with several other urban elements, created a shock wave 
among the Armenians of the South Caucasus. The mayor, Alexander Khatisian, suspected 
that Lyzhin was looking for an excuse to arrest him as well.
332
 
Archimandrite Koriun, who was involved in the accusations against Melik-Azariants, was 
also considered by the Tiflis Okhrana to be a member of the Elizavetpol Central 
Committee of the party. He was accused of organizing the assassinations of a score of 
Tsarist officials as well as purchasing arms for the party. Although he was acquitted in 
the first instance, he was tried again and was put into prison.
333
 Besides Koriun, other 
Armenian clergymen who were suspected of being Dashnak members or sympathizers 
were also arrested. Particularly concerned about this news was the newly elected 
Catholicos, Izmirlian. The intelligence reports pointed out that Izmirlian was planning to 
ask the Tsar for amnesty for some of the arrested Dashnaks and also Hnchaks in his visit 
to the capital in May 1909.
334
 The Catholicos indeed told Nicholas II about the arrested 
Armenian revolutionaries and although Nicholas II promised that he would review their 
situation, little changed.
335
 
 
 
The Repercussions of the Initial Phase of the Dashnak Trial 
 
As arrests and interrogations continued, the current Dashnak organization in the Caucasus 
was being exposed more for their past deeds.
336
 According to the former procurator at the 
Echmiadzin synod between 1903 and 1908, Leonid A. Frenkel, the Dashnaks murdered 
or maimed nearly 250 government officials and Armenians between 1904 and 1908.
337
 
                                               
332 Alexander Khatissian, ‘The Memoirs of a Mayor (Part II),’ The Armenian Review 2, no. 4 (Winter 
1949): 105. 
333 Ostrovskii, 521-2.  
334 The Head of the Gendarmerie of Odessa to the Director of the Department of Police N.P. Zuev, 4 Маy 
1909 [17 May 1909], GARF, f. 102, OO (1909), о. 239, d.14 (obshch.), ll.163- 163ob.  
335 Aknouni, 50. 
336 HIA, Nic., s. 197, b. 254, f. 1, 235-60. 
337 HIA, Nic., s. 197, b. 255, f. 4, 2658-60.  
87 
 
Frenkel claimed that he was also condemned to death by the party, whose assassins tried, 
and failed, to kill him three times. As a close observer of the relationship between the 
Dashnaks and the Armenian Church, the former procurator also pointed out that having 
realized that the Armenian masses were very fond of their religion and clergy, the 
Dashnaks lost their hopes of luring them to socialism. What the Dashnaks were now 
trying to do was to stir up the masses against the Armenian religious and public 
institutions and to link their [the Dashnaks’] failure to incite rebellion among the 
Ottoman Armenians to ‘the treacherous policy of Russia.’338  
As such reports kept coming; St. Petersburg and Lyzhin-led investigation team became 
even more assured of the extent of the Dashnak threat in the region. Based on the 
findings of the preliminary investigation, the evaluations by Lyzhin in the first stages of 
the trial were highly unfavourable. According to Lyzhin, the Dashnaks set up their own 
courts, had similar aims to the SRs, and their main objectives in the Russian Empire were 
to overthrow the Russian state structure and change the fundamental laws with a view of 
establishing a democratic Russian republic. For these objectives, the Central Committee 
in Tiflis and others collected a huge amount of money for arms and explosives, which 
was necessary for creating terror directed against, first, the representatives of the 
government, and, second, individuals.
339
  
Similar reports produced by Okhrana were circulated within the Tsarist institutions 
related to the trial. In one of these reports, the activities of the Dashnaks were seen 
mainly as self-defence until 1905, when the party adopted ‘the Plan for the Caucasus’ 
that defined its strategy in Russia. At that point, the party moved from self-defence to 
direct struggle with the Russian government in collaboration with Russian revolutionary 
parties. From then on, one of the slogans of the party for Russia was ‘Down with the 
autocracy.’340 Another report written in 1909 considered the resolutions taken in the 
Vienna congress in 1907 a watershed. It was in this congress that the party took an 
‘exclusively revolutionary direction’ for the accomplishment of its final aim: 
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overthrowing the existing government structure and the establishment of the Armenian 
democratic republic within the federative Russian Republic.
341
 With its well-established 
organization in the Caucasus, the Dashnaktsutiun, in the eyes of a Tsarist official, was ‘a 
sort of state within the state.’342  
There were also some complications the trial process brought about. The sheer number of 
the arrested Armenians as well as their diverse profile created the impression that the trial 
was not only against the Dashnaktsutiun but against the Armenians. This was 
understandable given the recent problems the Russian Armenians had with the Russian 
government. Growing anxiety among the Russian Armenians troubled the viceroy, who 
was bitter about the way the trial was launched directly on orders from the capital. For 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, it was initiated without his consent as he claimed that the trial went 
on despite his arguments and ‘without enough foundations.’ More importantly, he argued 
that the trial ‘was obligated to prove ‘the revolutionism (revolutsionnost) of an entire 
nation [Armenians],’ which did not exist.343 According to the viceroy, the Armenians 
loved three things: ‘their schools, church and money,’ and such people could not be 
revolutionaries.
344
 
Nevertheless, Vorontsov-Dashkov warned the authorities that all steps had to be taken to 
avoid giving the impression that Armenians as an entire nation were persecuted. He was 
particularly worried about the apprehensions of well-known public figures and 
businessmen as he thought this could lead to discontent among the Russian Armenians.
345
 
For the case of Melik-Azariants, Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote personally to the Ministry of 
Justice arguing that the detainment of such a prominent Armenian for unexplained money 
transactions from his business office was not convincing enough for his arrest.
346
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Vorontsov-Dashkov’s plea for reconsideration of the decision failed to convince 
Shcheglovitov, which added to the viceroy’s dissatisfaction about the trial.347 
In fact, the way the Dashnak trial was handled created the impression that Vorontsov-
Dashkov feared. In order to garner support from both Armenians and the European 
circles, the Dashnaks, considering themselves as the true representatives of the Armenian 
nation, depicted the trial as an act of oppression against the Armenians by Tsarist Russia. 
The chief of the Special Section of the Police Department, Evgenii K. Klimovich, 
asserted that the Dashnaks indeed had a diverse following among the Russian Armenians 
as of 1909 owing to their popularity during the Armenian struggle with Tsarism between 
1904 and 1907. Not only was this true, with a successful tactical move, the Dashnaks 
made this phenomenon ‘a pan-Armenian question’ rather than simply the affair of a 
revolutionary party, and won the hearts and minds of many.
348
 
A common theme emphasized in the writings of the Dashnaks was the diverse profile of 
the arrested Armenians in the trial process. Reflecting this line, a prominent member of 
the Western Bureau, Khachatur Malumian, known by his nom de plume Emmanuel 
Aknuni, wrote that ‘People were searched indiscriminately, the office of the Armenian 
Catholicos, the head of the whole Armenian Church; the author who preached new life 
and new thought; the most ignorant peasant who cannot even read; the millionaire who 
enjoys life: the labourer who toils; the merchant who does not recognize any world 
outside his store…in short, the whole Transcaucasus from one end to the other, and the 
Armenian people living there, every man, every class. That is the characteristic line in 
this “adventure.”’349 Another Dashnak was lamenting that the whole nation was being 
accused as subversives of ‘high treason.’350 
According to Malumian, Lyzhin took his orders from St. Petersburg, particularly from 
Stolypin. It was believed that the trial was politically motivated and all the trial procedure 
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was formulated to make a case with a predetermined conclusion.
351
 Under these 
circumstances, the Dashnaks convened their fifth world congress in Varna in August 
1909. One of the resolutions taken in this congress was that preparations for an armed 
resurrection in ‘Russian and Turkish Armenia’—circumstances permitting—were to be 
organized. Soon, it was decided that terror was going to be carried out on all Russian 
gendarmerie units in the Caucasus.
352
 Droshak was lamenting that ‘with a historical 
blindness, we naively believed that Russia was the “traditional” protector of the 
Armenians.’353  
In this period, the Dashnaks also intensified their relations with the Second International, 
of which they had full membership by 1910, to garner support against the Tsarist 
persecution.
354
 Reiterating their resolution in their congress in Varna, they called other 
socialist parties of the Russian Empire for a full-scale fight against Tsarism in their report 
to the congress of the Second International in Copenhagen in 1910.
355
 Both the Socialist 
International and the political parties of the Russian Empire, such as SRs and Kadets, 
expressed their support for the Dashnaks regarding their trial.
356
 
As the Dashnaks were losing their operational capability in Russia, they were investing 
more of their energies in the Ottoman Empire. Tsarist pressure forced the party to cling 
more to their alliance with the CUP. Even after the massacres in Adana in April 1909, the 
Dashnaks decided to continue their alliance with the CUP, which they still saw as the 
only viable option both for the party and to improve the situation of the Ottoman 
Armenians. In the meantime, the Dashnaks were voicing their hardships and trying to 
turn public opinion against the Russians, which could put more pressure on them.  
Among the Ottoman Armenians, where the Dashnaktsutiun was still strong, this created 
an immediate response. It was reported that in the Armenian churches in Istanbul, anti-
Russian speeches were made on Sundays about the ‘oppression in the Caucasus’ and 
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messages of protests were sent to the representatives of the foreign governments and all 
opposition fractions in the Duma.
357
 The Russian vice-consul in Van, Sergei P. Olferev, 
warned that the anti-Russian propaganda of the Dashnaks given to the Armenian masses, 
particularly in the Russian border areas with the Ottoman Empire and Persian Empire, 
had to be stopped.
358
 The Ottoman diplomatic corps in Russia also responded as the 
Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg, Turhan Pasha, requested the release of an 
Ottoman Armenian who was arrested as a suspect in the Dashnak trial in 1910; however, 
it did not produce any results.
359
  
Despite its negative side effects, the trial served its intended purpose for St. Petersburg. 
With the first phase of the trial, the Dashnak organization in the South Caucasus was 
seriously weakened.
360
 Even in places where it was previously very powerful, the party 
was ‘completely defeated.’361 The leading cadres of the Eastern Bureau were either 
apprehended or fled abroad. Furthermore, the suspected affiliates of the party within the 
Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie were weeded out. However, things were 
getting out of hand by 1910 as Lyzhin’s stern methods and the inclusion of a large 
number of Armenians from various backgrounds in the trial process began to attract 
serious criticism and complaints from various strata of Russian Armenians, whose 
support for the viceroyalty was of crucial importance. Now that the Dashnak threat in the 
South Caucasus was eliminated, the next phase of the trial took a different turn.  
 
Slowing Down the Tempo: The Second Phase of the Dashnak Trial (1910–1912) 
 
After being released by the Tsarist authorities, Mihran again went into hiding as the 
Dashnaks started another manhunt. This hide-and-seek game ended with the murder of 
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Mihran in September 1910 at the Bataisk train station near Rostov-on-Don by a Dashnak 
hit man. The Dashnak vows to kill Mihran were finally fulfilled but their nemesis had 
already given Tsarist authorities enough ammunition to cripple the Dashnak organization 
in the South Caucasus.
362
 Stolypin was pleased that one of the strongest organizations in 
a troubled region was added to the casualty list in his successful drive against the 
revolutionary movement. As the viceroy wrote to the Tsar, the Caucasus was a very 
peaceful place by 1910 compared with the mess when he came in. In the aftermath of the 
‘revolutionary storm,’ the viceroy went on, there was not a significant revolutionary 
organization left in the Caucasus.
363
 
Smaller parties such as the Himmat and the Specifists had already been crushed. In the 
immediate aftermath of the revolutionary period, the effectiveness of another Armenian 
party, the Hnchaks, was considerably reduced in the Russian Empire due to internal 
disputes and leadership problems.
364
 By the end of 1911, the Hnchaks were reported to 
have lost their organization in the Caucasus and were not considered a threat by the 
Tsarist administration. According to the Tiflis gendarmerie, no organization affiliated 
with the Hnchaks existed in Tiflis; there were only separate members, who had ties with 
the Persian organization of the party.
365
 
The most capable of them, the Dashnaktsutiun, was also seriously weakened with the 
ongoing trial. The Tsarist officials were claiming that, thanks to the efforts of the 
judiciary and the police, as well as the anti-Dashnak attitude of the conservative elements 
of the Armenian society, the Dashnaktsutiun lost much of its power in the region, 
although it was difficult to say for certain that the party gave up all hope.
366
 As the trial 
continued and included a massive number of Armenians, the lamentation of the Dashnaks 
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about the continuing legal process found a greater audience. In Europe, the Second 
International declared its support for the Dashnak trial.
367
 The length of the apprehension 
and the poor physical condition of Tsarist prisons were criticized both by the Dashnaks 
and others.
368 
As a result, Lyzhin, ‘a creature of the ancient regime’—as he was called by the 
Dashnaks—increasingly became the centre of criticism.369 Demonized in the accounts by 
the Dashnaks and the liberal Russian press, the prosecutor and the allegations about the 
party were now under close scrutiny because of the rumours of misconduct in the trial of 
the Novorossiysk republic.
370
 In one of these scornful articles, it was argued that in the 
Ministry of Justice, there was much evidence about Lyzhin’s past misconduct and ‘the 
fate of many Armenians lied at the hands of such a moral monster and criminal 
prosecutor.’371 Apart from Lyzhin, his patron Shcheglovitov was also under fire. Known 
as ‘Stolypin’s lackey,’ the minister was accused of using the judiciary machine for 
political purposes, where accusations about the problematic evidence and false witnesses 
were made.
372
  
Coupled with the earlier reservations of the viceroy about the implications of the trial 
process on the relations of his administration with the Armenians, the authorities began to 
be less resolute. The first phase of the trial had already achieved the main task of 
eliminating the Dashnaks as a threat to stability and pushing this further would only 
complicate things. Accordingly, the number of arrests and raids significantly dropped and 
many of the detainees were released by 1911. Soon, in May 1911, the prosecution 
completed the indictment. The Dashnaks were accused of actions between 1905 and 1909 
against the Russian government with an aim to ‘change the existing method of 
administration set by the fundamental laws and replace it with a federal democratic 
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republic, of which the Caucasus was a part with an autonomous administration.’373 To 
this end, the indictment accused the party of organizing assassinations of various Tsarist 
officials and conspiring against the Tsar and the royal family.
374
 One hundred fifty-nine 
members of the Dashnaktsutiun would head to the final session of the trial to be held in 
the capital in early 1912.  
 
 
The Dashnaktsutiun toward the Final Session 
 
By 1910, the Dashnaks were aware of their precarious fortunes in Russia; this forced 
them to resume their alliances in the Persian and Ottoman empires. Owing to their 
problems from Tsarist persecution, the Dashnaktsutiun’s stance was becoming 
increasingly anti-Russian. In the Persian Empire, the Dashnaks continued to complicate 
Russian interests led by the efforts of Yeprem Khan, ‘the Garibaldi of Iran.’375 Apart 
from the Dashnak support for the constitutional forces, the party found other ways to 
irritate the Russian officials there. In that period, they were supported by the Ottomans, 
who were planning to undermine Russian interests in northern Persia. For that purpose, 
the Dashnaks were provided with arms by the Ottoman authorities and offered legal 
shelter, when needed, through the Ottoman diplomatic corps stationed in the region.
376
 
Although this abated toward 1912, during the decline of the constitutionalist forces in the 
Persian Empire, it was still a concern for the Russian authorities. 
In the Ottoman Empire, Malumian stated in 1910 that liberal Ottoman rule was preferable 
to Tsarist rule.
377
 For the Ottoman Armenians, the Dashnak detainees in Tsarist prisons 
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were patriots and their numbers were considered exorbitant. Not only party members, but 
even non-Dashnak public figures like Krikor Zohrab or the Ottoman newspaper Ikdam 
were throwing their support to the Dashnaks under arrest. To help them, lawyers were 
sent to Russia and money was collected by the Ottoman Armenians.
378
  
Another public figure concerned about the trial was the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul, 
Arsharuni. Just before the final session in St. Petersburg in a private conversation with 
the Russian Ambassador, Charykov, the Patriarch asked about the fate of the Armenians 
who would appear in the final session. The Patriarch requested a pardon by the Tsar for 
these people, who appeared to be ‘the black sheep of the community.’ He added that ‘the 
entire flock’ [the Armenians] should not be judged by these people and even those under 
arrest were ready to serve the Russian government. The Patriarch concluded that given 
the internal problems of the Ottoman Empire, ‘the future of the Armenian nation 
depended completely on Russia and the nation was counting on her [Russia’s] 
benevolence.’379   
The ongoing anti-Russian propaganda by the Dashnaks about the trial was 
unquestionably damaging Tsarist prestige among the Ottoman Armenians, whose 
sympathies for Russia were otherwise growing. For Olferev, the Ottoman Armenians lost 
their hopes for reform by the Ottoman government and were looking for support from 
Russia. According to the vice-consul, ‘the majority of them [the Armenians] put all their 
hopes only to Russia.’380 This was an important dimension since the Russian government 
did not want to alienate the Ottoman Armenians, most of whom were living on its border 
with the Ottoman Empire. It was more so with the change of foreign policy dynamics in 
late 1911 when hostilities between Italy and the Ottoman Empire started and Russia and 
Britain handed over an ultimatum to the Persian government. Particularly, the situation of 
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the Ottoman Empire was getting more uncertain which made obtaining the sympathy of 
the Ottoman Armenians more crucial for Russia. 
Equally important was the unravelling of the Dashnak collaboration with the CUP about 
the same time. Things had already begun to stagnate and the Dashnaks voiced their 
concerns over this situation in Eastern Anatolia to the CUP.
381
 Olferev repeatedly hinted 
about this downward trend in the relations between the two parties throughout 1911.
 
For 
the vice-consul, the Dashnaks lost confidence in the CUP and the break off would soon 
happen.
382
 The Dashnaks also believed that their allies were gravitating toward a more 
‘nationalist’ line.383 Meanwhile, the CUP had problems of its own as the general 
opposition to the party grew in the Ottoman Empire and as a result, they became less 
accommodating to the Armenian demands for reform.
384
 Therefore, it was no surprise 
that the sixth world congress of the Dashnaktsutiun in 1911 was quite grim about the 
future of the alliance with the CUP. The CUP was to be given a memorandum containing 
the demands of the party, and unless they were met, the alliance would be off the table.
385
   
At this point, a quiet end to the Dashnak trial could help Tsarist interests concerning the 
sympathies for both Russian and Ottoman Armenians. The party was not a serious threat 
in the South Caucasus by early 1912 and the relations of the viceroyalty with the Russian 
Armenians were generally good. On the other side of the frontier, the Dashnaks were still 
influential among the Ottoman Armenians. Under the bleak circumstances the Ottoman 
Empire was in with the outbreak of war against the Italians, the sympathy of the Ottoman 
Armenians was essential, and the constant Dashnak anti-Russian propaganda was an 
enormous encumbrance for Russian foreign policy interests. Considering the downward 
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trend in the Dashnak-CUP relationship, a smooth end to the trial could help Russia in its 
dealings with Russian and Ottoman Armenians. The case of the Dashnaktsutiun was 
getting even more attention in the capital as the hearings began in January 1912. The end 
of the trial was going to be quite unexpected for all the parties involved. 
 
 
The Final Session (January–March 1912) 
 
In late 1911 and early 1912, the final preparations were underway for ‘the trial of the 
159,’ as the Russian press now referred to the final session. The Dashnaks on the list of 
159 were being apprehended to be sent to the final session of the Dashnak trial in St. 
Petersburg. Along with them, 330 witnesses from various backgrounds and close 
relatives of the defendants were on their way to the capital.
386
 Among the witnesses were 
important Armenian figures such as Mayor Khatisian and Archbishop Sukias Parzian.
387
 
The safety precautions were fairly tight as Tsarist police had been receiving disturbing 
intelligence about Dashnak plans for the trial for some time. At first, it was reported that 
the Dashnaks were seriously entertaining the idea of bribing some of the officials 
involved in the trial with the donations collected from Armenians all over the world.
388
 
According to these reports, even Lyzhin and his close colleagues were going to be 
approached.
389
 Similar rumours of bribery continued to circulate among the Okhrana and 
gendarmerie correspondence throughout 1911; however, in the end they were dismissed 
by the Tsarist authorities.
390
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More vehemently, these intelligence reports pointed out that, if bribery attempts were to 
fail and a harsh verdict was given, the Dashnaks would organize serious terrorist 
attacks.
391
 Particularly toward the final session, the Dashnak frustration grew in 
conjunction with the speculations about a terrorist attack. If the verdict was harsh, which 
the Dashnaks considered a strong possibility, then they would organize a sensational 
assault on the presiding judges and possibly on other participants in the session.
392
 
According to the reports, three experienced hit men of the party (Dro, Nalbandian, and G. 
Ter-Akopian (aka Martyn)) would infiltrate the Senate building where the final session 
was going to be held with the help of an accomplice who worked in the state council.
393
 
Under these circumstances, it was decided by the authorities that the trial would be held 
behind closed doors.
394
 
For the final trial, a special hearing at the Governing Senate was convened.
395
 As it began 
in late January, the accused began to appear in the courtroom in groups. Just like during 
the first wave of the trial, in the courtroom of the Governing Senate, ‘millionaires with 
diamond rings in their fat fingers’ sat with the ordinary Armenians among the accused.396 
The witnesses were present as well as the close relatives of the defendants. Led by the 
presiding judge Aleksei N. Krivtsov, Senators Vasilii I. Markevich, Nikolai P. Garin, 
Vladimir Ia. Bakhteiarov, and Anatolii I. Pollan would decide the fate of the Dashnaks. 
All of these judges had extensive experience with revolutionary organizations. Krivtsov 
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must have known about the Dashnaks beforehand when he began serving as the chairman 
of the Novocherkassk district court in 1902.
397
  
The prosecution team was led by V.V. Sergeev and V.S. Aksakov.
398
 On the other side of 
the courtroom, there were many familiar faces for the judges. The Dashnaks were 
defended by a score of St. Petersburg–based elite lawyers, who were very experienced in 
political trials, as well as some Armenian (Dashnak) lawyers. Among the members of the 
defence team were Aleksandr S. Zarudnyi, Nikolai D. Sokolov, Sergei A. Andreevskii, 
Oskar O. Gruzenberg, Miosei L. Goldshtein, Giorgii I. Khatisov (the mayor’s brother), 
and Alexander Kerensky.
399
 
Soon after the hearings began, things became very interesting as the defence raised 
serious allegations of misconduct by the prosecution. The senators were quite surprised 
and Krivtsov, the presiding judge became pale and then blushed as reported by 
Utevskii.
400
 One of the lawyers who stood out in making the claims of perjury was 
Kerensky. A political trial specialist and a deputy in the State Duma, Kerensky, at a fairly 
young age, gradually built up a strong reputation with his performances in various 
political trials.
401
 Kerensky argued that there were alterations on the statements of the 
accused such as ‘unlike’ to ‘very like’ or ‘cannot recognize’ to ‘and also recognizes.’ As 
a result, a team of experts had to be called to determine the extent of the forgery.
402 
Other 
forms of misconduct were also claimed like the arrest of a certain Melkhonian when the 
real Melkhonian (with different name and patronymic) could not be found.
403
 Even more 
surprised by such bold claims, Kritvsov asked Kerensky: ‘Do you know what will happen 
to you if you are mistaken?’404  
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This was a chance the defence team had to take. Under such circumstances, Krivtsov 
stated that postponement of the session was not necessary but on the demand of the 
defence, a team of experts would be summoned to inspect the evidence.
405
 Soon, a panel 
of experts was formed by three members from St. Petersburg and three from the 
Caucasus.
406
 Meanwhile, Shcheglovitov ordered that all the material pertaining to the 
preliminary investigation be brought to the capital. Conceding that there were two or 
three problematic documents, the minister said that based on the allegations of the 
defence, a new investigation would be carried out by an investigator for important cases, 
Pavel A. Aleksandrov.
407
  
Meanwhile, the witnesses continued to appear in the courtroom. Khatisian’s statement at 
the trial stressed that the Dashnak activities in the South Caucasus were not against the 
Russian government per se but against Azeris and Tsarist officials ‘who reeked in graft.’ 
The mayor went on by arguing that the party, with its main target being the liberation of 
the Ottoman Armenians, did not oppose the Russian foreign policy interests in the 
Ottoman Empire.
408
 As the news about misconduct continued, it was reported that the 
mood among the judiciary circles was getting more favourable toward the accused.
409
  
More importantly, speculations about forgery caused more pressure from liberal circles 
and public opinion, and hence making it difficult to sweep things under the rug.
410
 Lyzhin 
was now under severe criticism and soon after the expert team came in, he lost his access 
to the rooms where the evidence was stored.
411
 Fortunately for Kerensky and other 
defence lawyers, as the experts worked on the documents, their initial opinions confirmed 
some of the allegations made by the defence.
412
 In an interesting turn of events, a police 
officer, Bakradze, who was involved in the preliminary investigation process, turned up 
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in the final trial and declared that there was a distortion between the statements and his 
signature that he gave to the gendarmerie and to Lyzhin.
413
 
In late March, the judges heard the last words of the accused. Two days later the verdict 
for the 159 Dashnak members was rendered. Most of the accused were acquitted while 52 
of them were sentenced to administrative exile or a few years in prison.
414
 The time spent 
under arrest was deducted from those who took term sentences, which alleviated some of 
their burden.
415
 Only four of the accused were sentenced to hard labour (katorga): Sarkis 
S. Manasian (six years); Amazasp Ohanjanian, Ovanes Gazarian, and Arshak M. 
Muradov (four years).
416
  
Meanwhile, Aleksandrov was working on the investigation concerning the accusations 
against Lyzhin. Best known for his role in the investigation carried out against the 
Bolsheviks after their failed coup d’état in the summer of 1917, Aleksandrov made his 
way up through the judiciary machine in the capital as he was promoted to the post of 
prosecutor for important cases in 1909. Another well-known case in which he was 
involved was the assassination attempt on Witte.
417
 As Aleksandrov was preparing for his 
trial, Lyzhin was dismissed by the order of Shcheglovitov in April 1912 until the 
allegations against him were cleared. 
Aleksandrov’s initial findings on Lyzhin confirmed most of the allegations of the 
defence. In his report, the doubts of some of the members of the police and judiciary who 
worked in the preliminary investigation were emphasized. In line with the experts’ view, 
Aleksandrov confirmed that there were certain examples of perjury on the documents.
418
 
Aleksandrov also produced an account where he reflected on possible explanations 
regarding Lyzhin’s conduct in the trial. The interesting aspect of Aleksandrov’s report 
was his views of Lyzhin’s personality and his mental condition during the trial process. 
Aleksandrov noted that Lyzhin was a very hardworking official who came in the morning 
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and worked solely on the trial until midnight. In ‘rare unanimity,’ several witnesses 
confirmed that Lyzhin often did not go home and his colleagues had to remind him to eat. 
However, Lyzhin, aware of the terrorist methods of the Dashnaks, developed a certain 
level of fear and anxiety about being assassinated. As a result, he avoided sitting by the 
window and worked in the corner under the shutters. ‘Under the circumstances similar to 
a war atmosphere,’ Lyzhin began to believe that the accused were ‘extremely evil,’ which 
convinced him that they were certainly guilty of their crimes. Therefore, to Lyzhin, the 
trial was a means to ‘clear the subversion in the Caucasus.’ Aleksandrov concluded that 
the forgeries Lyzhin made were not selfish or personal but the result of an instinctive 
conviction that the accused were guilty.
419
  
Soon, Lyzhin was sent to a mental institution for psychiatric evaluation. Protecting 
Lyzhin, Shcheglovitov was still claiming that the mistakes were not done on purpose by 
Lyzhin, who was involved only in some of them.
420
 Moreover, the minister alluded to the 
difficult conditions of the trial and the enormous workload Lyzhin was under.
421
 
Although the verdict was more favourable than the Dashnaks anticipated, they still felt 
bitter about the sentences given the confirmation of Lyzhin’s misconduct, which they 
immediately appealed to the higher courts.
422
 
 
 
Conclusion: ‘Ended with a Puff’ 
 
The grand trial of the Dashnaktsutiun, which shook the Russian Armenians for several 
years ‘ended with a puff,’ as Vorontsov-Dashkov put it. Looking at the end result, the 
viceroy believed that this could have been handled without making such noise. As he was 
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concerned with the implications of such a grand political process on the Russian 
Armenians from the start, the viceroy was nevertheless happy to observe that in the 
aftermath of final session ‘not only did the Russian Armenians not break away from 
Russia, but even Turkish Armenians persistently aimed for Russian patronage.’423  
Why did it end like this? Obviously, the forgery scandal was a major factor as it had a 
direct influence on the opinions of the judges. Although the documents under scrutiny 
were a very tiny part of an enormous body of evidence, it worked in favour of the 
defendants both technically and psychologically. Various scholars also speculated that 
improved relations between the Russian administration and Russian Armenians, as well 
as increased Russian interest in the Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire around 
1912 played a role in this outcome. The favourable end of the trial could be used to 
garner Russian and Ottoman Armenian sympathies in such a critical period.
424 
In his 
memoirs, Kerensky also supports this view by claiming that ‘this outcome helped Russia 
increase its prestige among the Turkish Armenians.’425 
Indeed, the favourable outcome was helpful for garnering the sympathies of both Russian 
and Ottoman Armenians toward Russia who mainly inhabited the Russian-Ottoman 
border regions at a time when there were Russian concerns over the fate of the Ottoman 
Empire. Given the state of the Russian judiciary, it could be suspected that the verdict 
was a result of political interference from above in line with Russia’s imperial interests. 
Although this claim needs more than circumstantial evidence, it is entirely possible, 
particularly considering the criticisms the Russian judiciary machine under 
Shcheglovitov and the Russian interests concerning the Ottoman Armenians.
426
 
Furthermore, the role of the lawyers for the Dashnaktsutiun in obtaining the favourable 
outcome was also crucial.
427
 Given the credentials of these talented lawyers in political 
trials, this was a key element in the final session. Most of these lawyers were affiliated 
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with the Russian liberal circles, which also helped to pressure the judiciary authorities, 
both before and during the final session.
428
  
Criticism of the trial process notwithstanding, by 1912 the trial achieved its original aim: 
the elimination of the Dashnaktsutiun from the South Caucasus as a political force. As a 
mass trial, it also helped the viceroyalty improve its relations with the Armenian Church 
and the Armenian bourgeoisie as they were weeded out of the Dashnak elements. As the 
viceroy wrote to Prime Minister Kokovtsov in May 1912, the influence of the 
Dashnaktsutiun on the Armenians faded and ‘the Armenian nationalist movement was 
weakened and at any rate it was not threatening state order.’429 This was a far cry from 
the picture in 1907 when the party represented everything the Russian government hated: 
It had a mass national following and had experienced extensive terrorist activity both at 
home and abroad. The party was also a part of the international socialist network and an 
uncontrollable force complicating the Russian policies in the neighbouring empires. The 
image of the Caucasus in general and the Armenians in particular was that of a 
troublesome revolutionary and with their strong organization in the South Caucasus, the 
Dashnaks were an integral part of that. 
Both Stolypin and Vorontsov-Dashkov knew that this could be reversed and the 
Armenians, too important to be left out because of their internal and external 
significance, could be accommodated into the regime’s needs if necessary steps were 
taken. The most essential of these steps was to crush the Dashnaks since the loyalties of 
the church and the bourgeoisie could not be secured unless the Dashnaks were gone 
because of the party’s influence on them. To do that, instead of Vorontsov-Dashkov’s 
milder and gradualist approach, St. Petersburg opted for a grand trial aimed at destroying 
the Dashnak powerbase even if it shook the entire Russian-Armenian community until 
the job was done. 
As Mihran was giving away the secrets of his former party, the Tsarist police carried out 
mass arrests, raids, and interrogations during the first phase of the trial orchestrated by 
Lyzhin. More than a thousand Armenians, from various backgrounds, were arrested in 
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the first couple of years into the trial. In two years’ time, the Dashnak powerbase in the 
region was crushed and its influence over the Armenian Church and the Armenian 
bourgeoisie was greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the party continued to disturb the Tsarist 
authorities with its increased anti-Tsarist stance in the Ottoman and Persian Empires as 
well as in Europe.  
‘Searching by night! Imprisonment by day! This has been the ‘political life’ in the 
Caucasus since 1908, where, by the regulation of Tzarism [sic], the Armenian people are 
pronounced dangerous, and out of the pale of law’s protection.’430 This was how a 
prominent Dashnak described the case. Besides the Dashnak depiction of the trial as a 
Russian drive against Armenians, allegations about the prosecution and other procedural 
concerns about the process had negative implications for both Russian and Ottoman 
Armenians. By 1910, as the trial seriously weakened the party in the South Caucasus, the 
Tsarist authorities, in line with Vorontsov-Dashkov’s reservations, slowed down. Many 
of the detainees were released and fewer arrests and raids were carried out from then on. 
Soon after the reading of the indictment in May 1911, 159 Dashnaks were heading to St. 
Petersburg for the final session of the trial to be held in January 1912.  
The final session in the Governing Senate witnessed an interesting turn of events with the 
allegations of forgery against Lyzhin. As pressure was mounting on both Lyzhin and the 
judges, the verdict was more favourable than most Dashnaks expected when they were 
packing for St. Petersburg in late 1911. On top of these light sentences, Lyzhin was now 
under investigation. The initial conclusion was that Lyzhin, whose mental condition was 
not healthy, committed perjury. By mid-1912, he was sent to a mental institution for 
further evaluation while the Dashnaks were heading to the higher courts of appeal.  
Around 1912, the Russian foreign policy imperatives on the Ottoman Empire were 
changing and their interest in the Ottoman Armenians was growing. Although the trial 
left some of the Dashnaks quite bitter and anti-Russian, the party’s general anti-Russian 
stance abated with the end of the trial and the revived Russian interest in the Armenian 
Question in the Ottoman Empire. Some of the acquitted Dashnaks were even penning 
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articles depicting Russia as the saviour of the Ottoman Armenians, whose future became 
uncertain with the worsening situation of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, in the South 
Caucasus, thanks to the trial, the Dashnaks were no longer a serious threat for the Tsarist 
authorities in the region, who were now worried about another movement that had more 
potential for mayhem in the Russian Empire.   
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CHAPTER 3 
ST. PETERSBURG AGAINST TIFLIS: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMENIAN CHURCH (1907–1912) 
 
Introduction  
 
 ‘A stupid law about the Armenian Church properties angered the Armenian soldiers of 
lower ranks. In the Georgian regiment, 19–20 Armenians gathered to flee with arms. 
Cartridges were stolen. An Armenian clergyman was organizing this.’ This was what the 
War Minister Aleksei N. Kuropatkin initially made of the Tsarist decision to confiscate 
Armenian Church properties in 1903 in his diary.
431
 The events that followed Golitsyn’s 
risky decision to confiscate the properties of the Armenian Church in 1903 demonstrated 
the importance of the Armenian Church for the Armenians in the South Caucasus. Even 
the revolutionary groups stood up for the defence of the Armenian Church, which in 
theory they opposed. As soon as Vorontsov-Dashkov arrived in Tiflis in 1905, he knew 
that normalization of the relations with the Armenian Church was essential for the 
effective control of the Armenian population, especially against the increasing appeal of 
the radical political parties.  
This conservative institution could help normalize the relations between the Tsarist 
administration and the Armenians, who were quite attached to their church for its 
historical significance, which was ‘even apart from a religious standpoint’ in the words of 
the viceroy.
432
 Additionally, an understanding with the church could help curb the 
influence of the Armenian revolutionary parties in the region.
433
 Once good relations 
were maintained at home, the Catholicos could then be an effective agent for Russia to 
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garner the sympathies of the Ottoman Armenians for its foreign policy aims. Therefore, 
for Vorontsov-Dashkov, the reformulation of an understanding with the Armenian 
Church was essential and mutually beneficial. Provided that the Armenian Church was 
allowed to keep its primacy in the cultural and educational matters of the Armenian lives 
in the South Caucasus, as well as its autonomous status, it would support the Russian 
administration. This was a crucial aspect for Echmiadzin, particularly considering the rise 
of the secular forces, challenging the monopoly of the church on cultural matters.  
The annulment of the decree of 1903 upon the recommendation of Vorontsov-Dashkov 
and handing back the privileges and the rights of the Armenian Church were steps in this 
direction. However, there was an additional factor in the equation: a legacy of the policies 
pursued by Golitsyn. It was the Dashnaktsutiun that provided the muscles for Echmiadzin 
when the Russian authorities initiated the confiscation in 1903. This added to the 
popularity of the party in the eyes of the masses and the Armenian clergymen, among 
whom the party gained several sympathizers because of the leadership it demonstrated 
against the Russian authorities. The Dashnaks’ domination of the meeting for the election 
of councils in Echmiadzin in 1906 was a bad omen for the Russian authorities.  
By 1907, both the central government and the viceroyalty were in agreement that the 
Armenian Church needed to be brought to the regime’s side but its revolutionary 
elements must be weeded out. This would go hand in hand with the general anti-
revolutionary drive in the empire. Thus, it was no surprise that Stolypin had asked the 
viceroy to start the purge of the revolutionary elements from the Armenian Church after 
hearing about the Dashnak-dominated Echmiadzin meeting of 1906. However, there was 
a major problem: Catholicos Khrimian. 
As an enormously influential figure among the Armenians, Khrimian was known to have 
had links with the Armenian revolutionaries for a very long time.
434
 It was reported that 
Khrimian was under the strong influence of the Dashnaks, who actually ran the affairs of 
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the Catholicosate.
435
 Coupled with his disobedient actions against the Russian authorities 
in the aftermath of the decision of confiscation, the Catholicos was considered by 
Stolypin as a threat to the internal stability in the region. In early 1907, as a part of an 
immediate plan of action against the Armenian Church, Stolypin contemplated pressuring 
the Catholicos to resign. It was the warnings of the viceroy that deterred Stolypin from 
going farther. Aware of Khrimian’s influence on the Armenians, the viceroy reminded 
Stolypin that any pressure on the ailing octogenarian ‘would be taken as violence on the 
Armenian-Gregorian Church and the Armenian nation.’436  
Instead of such provocative policies, Vorontsov-Dashkov believed that the Catholicos 
could be talked to about the elimination of revolutionary elements within his church. 
Soon, the Catholicos complied with the instructions of the viceroy and the members of 
the Armenian clergy who had conspicuous links with the revolutionary movement began 
to be purged. For instance, the rector of the Shusha Armenian seminary, Arshak 
Chilinkarian, was arrested and later exiled for his anti-government activities.
437
 Another 
eminent Armenian clergyman, the former secretary of Catholicos, Nerses Melik-Tangian, 
was also monitored by the Tsarist administration for his sympathies for the 
Dashnaktsutiun and was barred from taking important posts.
438
 In the meantime, the 
viceroy noted that the influence of the Dashnaks on the Russian Armenians was already 
falling and one of the reasons for that was the newly adopted socialist programme in the 
Vienna congress of 1907, which was ‘insulting to the church.’439  
These small steps were hardly sufficient for Stolypin, who thought that there were also 
structural reasons for the recent problems with the Armenian Church and more 
comprehensive changes had to be made regarding the organization of the Armenian 
Church in Russia. For Stolypin, the current status given to the Catholicosate enabled the 
Catholicos ‘to unite around himself Armenian parties of local and foreign origins.’ Thus, 
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Echmiadzin ‘became to a certain degree a hotbed for the revolutionary movement among 
the Russian Armenians.’440 
In July 1907, Stolypin informed the viceroy of what he had in mind for the future of the 
Armenian Church in Russia. According to Stolypin, the administration of the Armenian 
Church needed a thorough review and his first recommendation was about the closed 
voting system for the elections of the Catholicos.
441
 This would prevent any pressure on 
the voters by revolutionaries. What Stolypin ultimately expected from the reorganization 
of the Armenian Church was the equalization of its status with other non-Orthodox 
churches in the empire and ‘the removal of its exclusive independence, which it used for 
the harm to the interests of the government at the moment.’442 Nevertheless, the premier 
accepted the viceroy’s view that such critical changes should be carried out in a more 
favourable time, perhaps after Khrimian’s death.443 Stolypin did not have to wait too long 
as news about the worsening health of Khrimian increasingly circulated in the 
newspapers in October, giving him the opportunity to launch the administrative changes 
he wanted.  
 
 
The Russian Strategy in the aftermath of Khrimian’s Death and the Catholicosate 
Elections of 1908  
 
On his deathbed, Khrimian was contemplating two things: the financial troubles of the 
Echmiadzin Seminary and naming his deputy. Although his current deputy, Surenian, 
stood out, Khrimian passed away on October 29 without making a final decision.
444
 The 
Armenian clergy immediately began preparations for the elections as Surenian, as the 
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deputy to Catholicos, would assume the duties of the Catholicos until the election was 
held in late 1908.
445
 While the Tsarist bureaucracy, especially the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, was preparing for major changes concerning the rights and regulations of the 
Armenian Church, the reception of Khrimian’s funeral in January 1908 confirmed their 
suspicions. The laurels attached to his coffin by the Dashnaks, such as ‘to the first 
revolutionary Khrimian’ or ‘to the founder of revolution,’ signalled the authorities in St. 
Petersburg that something very urgently needed to be done.
446
  
Stolypin had already begun pressing for the changes he suggested. The most critical of 
these was about the exclusive autonomous status of the Catholicosate, which was granted 
by the imperial statute of 1836. According to this statute, the Catholicos was elected for 
life and could not be removed by the central government, which Stolypin found irritating 
especially in the light of what happened between 1903 and 1905. Stressing a gamut of 
problems this status created, the premier was again insisting on transforming the 
Catholicos into an ordinary head of a church, who would be under the direct control of 
the central government just like the other non-Orthodox churches in the empire.
447
  
In a similar vein, the regulations governing the election of the Catholicos were also 
offensive to Stolypin. To sustain the ecumenical significance of Echmiadzin, the Ottoman 
Armenians were included in the Catholicosate elections, which they dominated owing to 
their greater number of eparchies (and hence, delegates). Therefore, the results of the 
elections would reflect the interests of the Ottoman Armenians rather than those of 
Russian Armenians, which according to Stolypin was an anomaly. As a result, the 
Catholicoses were mostly Ottoman subjects and did not know Russian, which for 
Stolypin was another source of trouble.
448
 For instance, Khrimian was not a Russian 
Armenian, did not know Russian, and had extensive links with Armenian revolutionary 
organizations. Besides, owing to his immense popularity among the Armenians, he rallied 
the Armenian resistance against the Russian government in the aftermath of the 
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confiscation of the Armenian Church properties in 1903. What annoyed Stolypin were 
the regulations governing the Armenian Church, which allowed the election of men such 
as Khrimian and their almost untouchable status after they were elected.  
It was obvious that the priority of the premier was the formation of a subservient 
Catholicos who could be useful first and foremost for the domestic needs of the Russian 
administration in the Caucasus rather than foreign policy purposes.
449
 Stolypin was aware 
that with the inclusion of Ottoman Armenians in the election process, the ecumenical 
significance of the post was retained, which was expected to help Russian foreign policy 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. However, for Stolypin, this aspect was secondary as he 
even proposed sacrificing the ecumenical significance of the Catholicosate by turning it 
into an ordinary non-Orthodox church that would be responsible only for the Russian 
Armenians.
450
 
Meanwhile, in the first half of 1908, the press in the capital was also critical of the 
autonomous status of the Armenian Church and its role in Armenian politics. On the 
pages of Novoe vremia, ‘the unacknowledged rule of the non-existent Armenian state [the 
Armenian Church]’ was criticized because of the recent conflict of the Armenian Church 
with the Russian authorities. It was argued that owing to its immense influence on 
Armenians and its autonomous status, the Armenian Church demonstrated that it would 
not mind being at loggerheads with the Tsarist authorities when Tsarist policies ‘did not 
correspond to the interests of the Armenian people.’451 Not surprisingly, reiterating 
Stolypin’s perspective, Novoe vremia called for curtailment of the privileges of the 
Catholicos, who needed to be transformed ‘from the head of the Armenian nation’ to a 
mere ‘head of the Armenian Gregorian Church,’ dealing only with ecclesiastical 
affairs.
452
   
Vorontsov-Dashkov, perhaps in light of his experience as the viceroy, knew that these 
measures would be a menace to the stability he created. He responded that the Armenian 
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masses and the Armenian clergy were not the enemies of the Russian government and 
they were pacified immediately after the annulment of the confiscation decree. What the 
Russian government needed was a rapprochement with the Armenians, not creating 
grounds for hostile relations by means of unwise policies like demoting the Catholicos. 
If, however, these measures were taken against his recommendation, there could be only 
two outcomes: ‘Either the Catholicos at Echmiadzin would submit to those demands [of 
the Russian government] and then would submit to the authority of another Catholicos 
elected somewhere in Turkey or the Catholicos [at Echmiadzin] would ignore the law and 
himself be the head of all Armenians.’453 In other words, for a legitimate Catholicos, 
ignoring the Ottoman Armenians was not a good idea. Abolishing his title would only 
make his flock unhappy and would only serve the purpose of uniting all revolutionary 
elements against the government.
454
 
The viceroy also did not share Stolypin’s negative view of the Ottoman Armenian 
dominance of the Catholicosate elections. For Vorontsov-Dashkov, this was a boon 
because it helped sustain the ties between Ottoman Armenians and Russia.
455
 Regarding 
the qualities of the Catholicos, Vorontsov-Dashkov did not spare his words. Knowing 
Russian and being a Russian subject were hardly the qualities for a regime friendly 
Catholicos. What Khrimian did against the Russian administration after the confiscation 
decree had no relevance to his not being a Russian subject. He did what any Catholicos 
would do when such drastic measures against his church were implemented.
456
 
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s view of the discussions concerning the Armenian Church was also 
supported by the military. In a Council of Ministers meeting in January 1908, Fedor F. 
Palitsyn suggested that ‘Armenians were the only part of the Caucasian population on 
which they could count unconditionally.’457 Similarly, Foreign Minister Izvolskii 
opposed the initial framework drawn by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and warned that 
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any changes that could be perceived by Armenians as another drive against their church 
had to be avoided. Izvolskii claimed that the demotion of the Catholicos would deprive 
Tsarist Russia of prestige among the Ottoman Armenians, whose sympathies Russia 
needed. As for Stolypin’s proposal for the change of election procedures, Izvolskii argued 
that it would create discontent both among Russian and Ottoman Armenians and 
considering the importance of the Ottoman Armenians residing in the border regions, this 
would hardly be a sensible policy.
458
 
These disagreements went on until mid-1908 when the premier and the viceroy 
exchanged letters while basically insisting on their previous opinions. Although Stolypin 
agreed not to implement substantial reforms while the seat of the Catholicos was vacant, 
he certainly wanted some changes to be made.
459
 In June 1908, Vorontsov-Dashkov 
reiterated his stance on the points made by Stolypin. On the issue of the knowledge of 
Russian, the viceroy conceded that speaking Russian was not necessarily a useful quality 
for the Catholicos. He argued that the only Russian speakers among the Armenian clergy 
were the younger generation who might be more easily influenced by the revolutionary 
propaganda and sympathizing with the social democratic tendencies. Things could be 
sorted out by an interpreter as was traditionally done.
460
  
As for Stolypin’s insistence on the issue of being a Russian subject, Vorontsov-Dashkov 
added that among the Russian Armenian clergy, at the moment there were no suitable 
candidates possessing the authority and general respect and, if insisted this ‘could cause 
very undesirable complications and excessive worsening of the already painful Armenian 
question.’461 In a similar vein, the demands aimed at curbing the influence of the Ottoman 
Armenians by equalizing the votes of Ottoman and Russian Armenian delegates in the 
elections or abolishing the ecumenical significance of the Catholicos would be met with 
resistance by the Ottoman Armenians.
462
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Another aspect concerned the rights of the Armenian Church and the seminaries, which 
were producing revolutionaries both for the nationalist and socialist camps. Most of the 
Dashnak leadership as well as prominent Armenian SDs like Mikoyan were graduates of 
these seminaries, which were the only means for lower-class Armenians to receive higher 
education in the absence of a university in the Caucasus. The exclusive control of them 
by the Armenian Church, which allowed for liberties like education in Armenian, had 
been a matter of debate since the 1880s. The viceroy again suggested a more prudent 
approach and reported to St. Petersburg that a major change on seminaries would be 
untimely and would encourage the Dashnaks to spread the rumours that the Russian 
government had plans to restrict the privileges and rights of the Armenian Church.
463
 By 
August 1908, after intensive correspondence, the two could only agree on the use of a 
closed ballot system in the upcoming elections, and not making substantial changes while 
the seat was vacant.   
This difference of opinion was apparent when the Council of Ministers’ meeting was 
organized to sort things out in August 1908. The main participants of the debate 
concerning the Armenian Church were Stolypin; the assistant Foreign Minister, Nikolai 
V. Charykov, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, Petr P. Izvolskii; the director of the 
Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions, Viacheslav Vladimirov, and 
Vorontsov-Dashkov. Stolypin began by reiterating his position that the extraterritorial 
and autonomous authority of the Catholicos was abused. The recent examples of this 
abuse were the avoidance of taking the oath in Russian, non-compliance by the 
Catholicos regarding the marriages, and resistance to supervision in Armenian 
educational institutions administered by the Armenian Church.
464
 The lack of government 
supervision of the Armenian seminaries and the Ecclesiastical Academy in Echmiadzin 
were particularly annoying for Stolypin. The growing influence of the revolutionary 
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parties on these schools and the Armenian clergy was a result of this lack for the 
premier.
465
 
As Stolypin saw it, this ‘completely abnormal situation’ regarding the Armenian Church 
could only be stopped if the Catholicos was reconfigured as an ordinary head of a church 
just like other church hierarchies in the empire, even if this would damage the potential 
benefits the ecumenical significance of the church would bring to Russia.
466
 With such a 
change, it would be possible to remove the Catholicos by the central government when 
needed. Moreover, he repeated his proposals about the changes in the election system and 
the necessary qualities of the Catholicos (knowledge of Russian, etc.).
467
 Not 
surprisingly, Vladimirov seconded all of his superior’s arguments. In essence, the two 
men from the Ministry of Internal Affairs put domestic concerns about the Catholicosate 
ahead of the foreign policy benefits it would bring.
468
 
Vorontsov Dashkov countered Stolypin’s argument about demoting the Catholicos to an 
ordinary head of church, which would enable him to be removed from his post. Non-
Russian Armenians probably would not recognize such a removal, which would 
undermine not only the ecumenical significance but also his legitimacy among both 
Russian and Ottoman Armenians. Adding his opposition regarding the qualities of the 
Catholicos proposed by Stolypin, the viceroy noted that changes concerning the future 
organization of the Church should wait until the election of the new Catholicos.
469
  
Agreeing with the viceroy on the timing of the changes, Charykov was against the 
proposals put forward by Stolypin. The Foreign Ministry believed that the Catholicosate 
within the borders of the Russian Empire was an important asset for its relations with 
Armenians.
470
 Charykov stated that those proposed measures could hurt the religious 
feelings of the Armenians, which could lead to the transfer of the Catholicosate to a place 
outside the borders of the Russian Empire.
471
 The chief procurator of the Holy Synod, 
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Izvolskii, was also in disagreement with the proposals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
some of which he believed to be in conflict with the canonical laws of the Armenian 
Church. More importantly, ‘outbursts of fanaticism were easily incited every time 
religious questions were handled carelessly, which were closely connected to tribal 
questions.’ This was the case with the discussions about the status and the rights of the 
Catholicos at the moment.
472
  
As Werth points out, the difference of opinion in the meeting was basically a repetition of 
the clash of different priorities displayed by Stolypin and Vorontsov-Dashkov, who was 
supported by another critical institution in this matter, the Foreign Ministry.
473
 For 
Stolypin, the current status of the Armenian Church gave the Catholicos too much 
freedom of action as had happened in the aftermath of the 1903 decree. During that 
period, the anti-government character of the activities of the church was fuelled by 
Armenian clergymen with revolutionary affiliations such as the rector of the Tiflis 
seminary, Tigranian, or the rector of the Echmiadzin seminary, archimandrite Mesrop Ter 
Movsisian.
474
 Thus, the priority had to be reorganizing the Armenian Church in such a 
way that it would not allow such acts of insubordination and eliminating the 
revolutionary elements within the clergy. Although Stolypin was aware of the damage 
these changes could inflict on the ecumenical significance of the church, he nevertheless 
noted that foreign policy matters should not overshadow the domestic necessities, which 
conflicted with them.
475
   
The premier was stating that the proposed measures were beneficial both for the Russian 
government and the Russian Armenians so they would hardly cause any unrest among 
Russian Armenians.
476
 Stolypin’s opponents on this had a more intricate view of the 
potential damage of the changes to the status of the Armenian Church. Unlike Stolypin, 
both Vorontsov-Dashkov and Izvolskii were aware that the negative implications of the 
demotion of the Catholicos to an ordinary head of a Church would not be limited to 
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Russian foreign policy interests; it would also create discontent among Russian 
Armenians. Particularly after the recent problems, they believed that this move would be 
interpreted by the Russian Armenians as an act of oppression toward their church and 
would undermine domestic stability in the South Caucasus, the most critical priority of 
Stolypin regarding the region. In such a case, the Catholicosate could even be moved out 
of the Russian Empire, depriving Russia of a critical asset that could be used for domestic 
and foreign policy. As for the revolutionary affiliations within the church, the viceroy 
believed that they would immediately disappear if the Dashnaks lost their power in the 
region—for him, this was exactly the case.   
The other dimension of the disagreement between Tiflis and St. Petersburg on this 
question, as was demonstrated in the strategy to deal with the Dashnaktsutiun, related to 
the ongoing conflict between the viceroy and the higher echelons of the Tsarist 
bureaucracy since the day he arrived in Tiflis.
477
 The wide administrative authority of the 
viceroy, who had close personal ties with the Tsar and his conciliatory policies—
especially his attitude toward the nationalities in the region—had raised several eyebrows 
in the capital. As in the case of Dashnaktsutiun, Vorontsov-Dashkov’s prudent line of 
action about the Armenian Church must have been too lenient for Stolypin and others. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, aware of this friction and St. Petersburg’s longtime attempts to 
subordinate the viceroyalty, complained and told his daughter ‘Fools, they will be fed up 
with the Caucasus if I leave.’478 
At the end of the meeting, although the Council of Ministers agreed with Stolypin’s point 
about the balance between the domestic and foreign policy concerns related to the 
Armenian Church, it was agreed that such critical changes should be made after the 
elections, in the presence of the new Catholicos. An interdepartmental commission was to 
be formed and with the new Catholicos, it would work on the necessary changes in the 
Statute of 1836 governing the Armenian Church. Meanwhile, Vorontsov-Dashkov was 
entrusted to modify the existing election laws and add the use of closed ballots in the 
upcoming elections, which was the only practical change that resulted from the heated 
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exchange of opinions.
479
 As Nicholas II approved these resolutions, the attention of both 
the capital and Tiflis turned to Echmiadzin for the upcoming elections.  
 
 
The Elections of 1908   
 
While the ministers and the viceroy were discussing the future of the Armenian Church in 
the Russian Empire, election preparations were under way. The candidates for the 
Catholicosate would be an integral part of the debate. When the elections began in the 
church of the Illuminator in November, the two candidates who stood out were Mateos 
Izmirlian, the incumbent Armenian Patriarch at Istanbul, and Egishe Durian, the head of 
Izmir eparchy.
480
 A key factor in the elections was the attitude of the Dashnaktsutiun, 
whose popularity was running high at the time among both Russian and Ottoman 
Armenians. In line with the general attitude among the Ottoman Armenians, the 
Dashnaks decided to support Izmirlian in the elections, which made a critical 
difference.
481
 In the closed ballot elections (the second round), Izmirlian got the most 
votes, outmatching Durian. Therefore, the names of Izmirlian and Durian were sent to St. 
Petersburg for the final approval of the Tsar.
482
   
The viceroy knew about St. Petersburg’s dissatisfaction with the election results and the 
Dashnak presence in the elections. Acknowledging that the two top candidates were 
Dashnak sympathizers, the viceroy still argued that it would be a very risky move not to 
approve one of them as the Catholicos, which would complicate Russia’s relations with 
both Ottoman and Russian Armenians. Rather expectedly, Vorontsov-Dashkov was 
                                               
479 Osobye zhurnaly Soveta Ministrov Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1908 god, 318-9; Tunian, Echmiadzinskii prestol, 
149-150; Werth, ‘Glava tserkvi, poddannyi imperatora,’ 131-32.  
480 ‘Telegrammy Tiflisskago Listka,’ Tiflisskii listok, 6 November 1907 [19 November 1907]. 
481 Arslan, ‘II. Meşrutiyet Öncesinde Osmanlı-Eçmiyazin Katogigosluğu İlişkileri,’ 354-5. 
482 Arslan, Kutsal Ermeni Papalığı, 96; Recep Karacakaya, ‘Istanbul Ermeni Patrigi Mateos Izmirliyan ve 
Siyasi Faaliyetleri,’ Ermeni Araştırmaları 1. Türkiye Kongresi Bildirileri, vol. 1, ed. Şenol Kantarcı et al, 
(Ankara: ASAM, Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2003), 392-3; Tunian, Echmiadzinskii prestol, 
151.  
120 
 
backed by Izvolskii, who also urged the Tsar to approve one of the two candidates as the 
next Catholicos.
483
 Under these circumstances, in December 1908 Nicholas II approved 
Izmirlian as the next Catholicos. 
Although not as politically minded as Khrimian, Izmirlian had been lenient with the 
efforts of Armenian revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire during the 1890s. An 
Ottoman minister once described Izmirlian as a man ‘who was busy with revolution and 
rebellion even in his dreams.’484 His continued sympathies with the Armenian 
revolutionary groups paved the way of his dismissal as the Patriarch in 1896 and he was 
sent to exile in Jerusalem. Only after the revolution of 1908, with the support of the CUP 
and the Dashnaks, Izmirlian was finally able to come back to Istanbul and soon was 
elected the new Patriarch in October 1908.
485
 The years of solitude in Jerusalem did not 
change Izmirlian’s character. During the ceremony of his consecration as the new 
Patriarch in October 1908, he skipped the procedural parts where he was supposed to 
express his loyalty to Abdulhamid II, which cost him the Ottoman imperial orders that 
the new patriarch would normally receive.
486
  
Stolypin was not happy about the election results but there was little he could do about it. 
Nevertheless, he was not left empty-handed as he found practical ways to demonstrate his 
intention to ensure the obedience of Izmirlian. Upon his recommendation, procedural 
changes regarding the consecration process were made. The Catholicos traditionally was 
consecrated in Echmiadzin in the presence of representatives of the Tsarist administration 
in the Caucasus. Now, Izmirlian was informed that he had to present himself to the Tsar 
before formally taking up his post.
487
  
Other symbolic changes aiming at trimming the honorary privileges of the Catholicos 
followed. Considering the privileges of the Catholicos and the unique status of his 
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church, Stolypin believed, the Catholicos was expected to provide exemplary service for 
the Tsar. However, recent experience demonstrated that not only was this not the case, 
but the actions of the Catholicoses were hostile to Russia.
488
 Upon Stolypin’s 
instructions, the practice of awarding the new Catholicos with the order of Aleksandr 
Nevskii (only awarded to high-ranking members of the Russian Orthodox Church) and 
the allowance of 5,000 roubles was abolished. Stolypin believed that elevating the 
Armenian Church to the level of the Russian Orthodox Church was not fair since the 
latter worked closely with the Russian government whereas the representatives of the 
former ‘were under the influence of political agitation and assisted the Armenian 
revolutionary movement.’489 Thus, awarding such actions with important orders or other 
excessive privileges would only be an ‘an insult to the national feelings of all populations 
in the Caucasus save for the Armenians, in particular to those belonging to the Russian 
Orthodox Church.’490 
Although Izmirlian’s doctors recommended that he not go to Echmiadzin because of its 
climate, he was preparing to leave.
491
 Meanwhile, the tension between Tiflis and the 
capital continued. Vorontsov-Dashkov complained to the Tsar that the higher 
bureaucracy of the capital still was frustrated by the existence of the viceroyalty, which 
they believed to ‘take away the jurisdiction and rights of the central government.’492 The 
difference of opinion regarding the last elections and the future of the Armenian Church 
was still being debated as Izmirlian was expected to show up in the capital.   
The viceroy was aware that during the elections, various elements of the Armenian 
community would be present to declare their views about the future of the Armenian 
Church.
493
 This was hardly surprising for the viceroy since the presence of laity in the 
affairs of the Armenian Church was nothing new.
494
 However, this was not how Stolypin 
saw it, particularly given the Dashnak participation in that meeting, which confirmed his 
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earlier suspicions. In a report to the viceroy, Stolypin stated that the meetings held during 
the elections had a political tone and the Dashnaks, who had the majority of the delegates 
in these meetings, attempted to impose their will on the Armenian Church and the new 
Catholicos, who was himself a Dashnak. Given Izmirlian’s political stance, state 
authorities had to keep an eye on the new Catholicos, whose actions could be influenced 
by his political views.
495
  
He added that the decisions taken in the congresses were not ‘so much to the benefit for 
the Armenian Church and its establishment, but for achieving nationalist and separatist 
aims’ led by the Dashnaktsutiun, which was harmful for Russia.496 For instance, the 
demands for democratization of the administration of the Armenian Church by allowing 
popular participation in the administration as well as in the elections would ‘transfer the 
centre of gravity of all religious-economic affairs of the Armenians from the hands of the 
Catholicos, who was under the authority of the government authorities, to the hands of 
the people, or more precisely, to the hands of a leading party [i.e. the Dashnaktsutiun].’497 
For Stolypin, this Dashnak influence on the affairs of the Armenian Church was alarming 
as it could be the ‘first step for the creation of the religious and political autonomy of the 
Armenian population in the South Caucasus.’ To stop this, the premier asked Vorontsov-
Dashkov to tell the Armenians that their economic and religious well-being did not lie in 
aspiring to autonomy in the South Caucasus but in unity with Russia.
498
 
As the date of Catholicos’ arrival to the capital drew near, the newspapers in the capital 
were highlighting the problems that the dominance of the Ottoman Armenians in the 
Catholicosate elections was creating, in line with Stolypin’s reasoning. Some even went 
so far as to advocate for the exclusion of the Ottoman Armenians from the elections. 
When the Armenian delegation headed by Izmirlian arrived in Russia through Odessa, 
the delegation members dismissed these ideas, noting that the individual qualities of the 
Catholicos were most important, not his citizenship.
499
 A few days later, Izmirlian was 
received by the Tsar where official words of courtesy and loyalty were exchanged and 
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other formalities were completed. After the meeting, the Tsar wrote to the viceroy that he 
had a very good impression of Izmirlian.
500
 
The elections of 1908 and its aftermath demonstrated that differences between St. 
Petersburg and Tiflis regarding the reorganization of the Armenian Church remained. As 
Izmirlian was heading back to Echmiadzin to complete his consecration, the viceroy was 
content that there were no radical changes that could have upset the improving relations 
of his administration with the Armenians. The Dashnaks were fading in importance and 
their newly adopted socialist agenda would further damage their prestige, particularly in 
religious circles. Thus, maintaining amicable relations between the Armenian Church and 
the viceroyalty was a matter of time. However, Stolypin did not share the optimism of the 
viceroy as he still felt dissatisfied about the status of the Armenian Church, the Ottoman 
Armenian dominance in the elections and the Dashnak influence on the matters of the 
church. By 1909, Stolypin had learnt that making administrative changes regarding the 
status of the church or any imposition on the Catholicos was quite complicated because 
these moves could easily be perceived as acts of oppression. However, it was less so with 
eliminating the Dashnak influence on the Armenian Church. The recently initiated mass 
trial provided Stolypin a useful means to sort this out for good.  
 
 
The New Catholicos Izmirlian (1909–1910) and the Impact of the Dashnak Trial on 
the Armenian Church  
 
When Izmirlian arrived at the Echmiadzin station in late June 1909, he was beset by 
Armenian clergymen led by the current deputy, Surenian; some local Tsarist officials; 
and local Armenians. After the newly introduced obligatory visit to the Tsar, Izmirlian’s 
address to the crowd was in a sense a counter-move. He stated that ‘their aim was to 
defend the interests of the Armenian Church and the nation and to keep unshakable rights 
                                               
500 Nicholas II to Vorontsov-Dashkov, 29 May 1909 [11 June 1909], RGIA, f. 919, o. 2, d. 2468, l. 56. 
124 
 
of the Catholicos of all Armenians in the limits of law.’501 Aware of the intentions of 
some of the higher bureaucracy in the capital concerning the Armenian Church, Izmirlian 
was experienced enough to know that this could complicate Russia’s relations with the 
Armenians. Given his history of conflict with the authorities and ties with the 
Dashnaktsutiun, he would do whatever he could to resist any changes aimed at restricting 
his rights as the Catholicos. 
The discussions throughout 1908 about making changes concerning the status or the 
privileges of the Catholicos showed Stolypin how difficult this was. As the viceroy, the 
Foreign Minister, and others pointed out, any changes to these aspects of the church 
would risk offending Armenians. However, there was another way by which the 
Armenian Church could be a more regime-friendly institution. This was the ongoing trial 
of the Dashnaktsutiun, which also included various Armenian clergymen. Despite the 
viceroy’s warnings about the complications of such a direct action, a mass trial had 
already begun in late 1908 upon instructions from the capital.  
As the trial of the Dashnaktsutiun was shaking the Caucasus, a series of speeches 
initiated by the rightists in the State Duma in December 1908 helped publicize the ties of 
the Armenian Church with the Armenian revolutionaries for the Russian public. In fact, 
these speeches targeted all of the non-Russian nationalities in the Caucasus and blamed 
them for their separatist activities. The Russian Armenians were one of the main targets 
in this campaign. Responding to an earlier speech of Baron Nolde, who dismissed the 
accusations of Armenian separatism in the region, Purishkevich started to bombard the 
viceroy with criticism. Starting his life in the fringes of the Empire, Purishkevich 
completed his education in Novorossiysk and Odessa. As one of the founders of the 
Union of the Russian People, his negative views on the minorities in the empire and the 
support for the Romanov dynasty were well known and perhaps owing to his familiarity 
with the corners of the empire, he made critical remarks about the Armenian Church.
502
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Purishkevich argued that the Armenian Church ‘was the centre of Armenian separatism’ 
as attested by the history of the institution. As opposed to the views held by Vorontsov-
Dashkov and Izvolskii, Purishkevich pointed out that the Armenian Church was a 
nefarious organization and it was futile for the government to adorn it with privileges or 
boost its prestige to obtain the loyalty of the Armenians. The church, along with cultural 
societies of the Armenians, would buttress the Armenian separatists, namely the 
Dashnaks, in the way of financial help and moral support.
503
 Another rightist, Nikolai E. 
Markov (Markov-II), also emphasized the subversive actions against the Russian 
administration demonstrated by the Armenian Church, which was ‘evolving into a secular 
state authority.’504 
The speech met with bitter resentment from the Tsarist Armenians and the viceroyalty. 
Ranging from various cultural societies to the Armenian Church several Armenians 
bombarded the viceroy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs with telegrams of complaint 
in the first weeks of January 1909.
505
 The deputy to the Catholicos, Surenian, wrote to 
Stolypin that the Armenian clergy and Armenian people had always demonstrated 
unconditional loyalty to Russia and these malicious accusations had to be stopped. 
Stolypin himself opposed Purishkevich’s ideas and he also made it known to the viceroy 
that the Tsar sincerely thanked the Armenian Catholicosate and believed in its loyalty to 
Russia.
506
 
Nevertheless, as mass arrests, raids, and interrogations intensified during 1909 as part of 
the Dashnak trial, the Armenian clergy became an open target for Lyzhin’s operations. 
One of the key characters on this subject was the former procurator of the Echmiadzin 
Synod, Frenkel, who occupied that post between 1903 and 1908.
507
 Acknowledging the 
links between Echmiadzin and the Dashnaks, Frenkel claimed that the last assassination 
attempt on his life in 1907 was carried out by the terrorist units of the Erevan committee 
of the Dashnaktsutiun with the ‘blessing of the Echmiadzin clergy.’508 Thanks to their 
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influence on the Armenian Church and Khrimian, Frenkel noted that the Dashnaks used 
Echmiadzin for their purposes. Important posts within the Church such as the Echmiadzin 
Synod and the chancellery of the Catholicos were captured by the Dashnaks while old 
clergymen were terrorized and some lost their posts.
509
 The most well-known Armenian 
seminaries, Kevorkian in Echmiadzin and Nersesian in Tiflis, were also under Dashnak 
influence.
510
 
According to the statement of the former procurator, there were several influential 
Armenian clergymen with intimate links to the Dashnaks. Corresponding to the progress 
in the Dashnak trial, a drive against the revolutionary affiliates within the Armenian 
clergy was launched. One of the high-profile names among the arrested Armenian 
clergymen was Archimandrite Koriun. Born and christened as Vahan S. Saakiants in the 
Ottoman city of Van, he soon took the clerical name Koriun as he began living in the 
Echmiadzin monastery. Koriun served as the secretary of the Catholicos and in 1905, he 
was assigned to Elizavetpol, where his association with the Armenian revolutionary 
movement both against the Russian government and the Azeris raised eyebrows.
511
 
Frenkel claimed that Koriun was in charge of organizing the Dashnak armed 
organizations in Elizavetpol, where he awarded the Dashnak fighters with land of the 
Armenian Church paving the way for the emergence of a ‘whole quarter of Dashnaks’ in 
the region.
512
 
Koriun had already been arrested and brought to trial in military court in 1907 but he was 
acquitted of the charges after an appeal process.
513
 This decision did not satisfy various 
Tsarist bureaucrats in the South Caucasus and under various protests he was again 
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arrested in November 1908.
514
 The archimandrite was now accused of being one of the 
ringleaders of the Elizavetpol Central Committee of the Dashnaktsutiun along with Ter-
Nikolai and Ter-Sogomonov.
515
 The intelligence suggested that Koriun, a man ‘even 
feared by the local Russian authorities’, was involved with the assassination of several 
members of the police and the gendarmerie as well as the Armenians who did not submit 
to the authority of the Dashnaktsutiun.
516
 In May 1909, the 42-year-old clergyman was 
found guilty for his affiliation with the Dashnaktsutiun, and he was sentenced by the 
military court to hard labour for 8 years, and stripped of his title and clerical rights.
517
 
Meanwhile, he was also included in the trial of the Dashnaktsutiun as new evidence about 
his association with it kept coming.  
Another high-profile clergyman on Frenkel’s list was Garegin Satunian, the head of the 
Tiflis eparchy, who was also the head of the commission of donations during the 
Armenian-Azeri clashes.
518
 According to Frenkel’s statement, in the meantime, Satunian 
was responsible for organizing the Dashnak fighting organization in early 1906.
519
 
Meanwhile, it was reported from Tiflis that the Holy Synod at Echmiadzin was still in the 
hands of Dashnak sympathizers like Bishop Mesrop Ter Movsesian. The reports added 
that another influential clergyman with Dashnak sympathies, Tigranian, remained in 
Echmiadzin to keep the Dashnak threat alive on the clergy.
520
 As the party began to lose 
its power during the trial, another charge was needed for its influence on the church. 
Soon, immediate removals of suspected clergymen began. One of them was a member of 
the Echmiadzin Synod, Iusik Zohrabian, who according to Frenkel, ‘was dreaming of 
independent Armenia all his life.’521 Archimandrite Egishe Aharonian, a member of the 
Karabagh Consistory, and priest Agop Sarikian of Vladikavkaz were also considered 
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suspects. As they were charged with taking part in the activities of the Dashnaktsutiun, it 
was requested by St. Petersburg that until the end of the trial these clergymen had to be 
removed from their posts.
522 
Without delay, on the suggestion of the deputy, Surenian, 
Echmiadzin Synod soon approved the dismissal of all these clergymen by the end of 
1910.
523
 
 
 
Reorganization in the Armenian Church under Izmirlian 
 
As the clergymen whose links with the revolutionaries were weeded out from the 
Armenian Church, the debate between St. Petersburg and Tiflis continued concerning its 
governance. A key item was the post of procurator, the representative of the Russian 
government in Echmiadzin Synod. If the Armenian Church were to be an obedient 
institution, the role of procurator was of paramount importance as he could observe what 
was going on in Echmiadzin for the Russian authorities and even influence the members 
of the Synod. Apart from observing the activities of the Echmiadzin Synod, the 
procurator was expected to inform the ministries of justice and internal affairs as well as 
the viceroyalty about legal issues and supervise the elections. 
For the viceroy, former procurator Frenkel’s performance had a lot to do with the friction 
between the Catholicos and the Echmiadzin Synod, and hence the Russian administration 
and the Armenian Church.
524
 The viceroy blamed the ‘untactful actions’ of procurator 
Frenkel for the emergence of all misunderstandings.
525
 True, the aging and ailing 
Khrimian was under the influence of some revolutionary types between 1905 and 1907; 
however, rather than a ‘fault-finding and petty’ procurator, like Frenkel, what the Synod 
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needed according to the viceroy was a ‘serious and a vigilant’ jurist who ‘would possess 
not only outstanding service and moral qualities but also exceptional knowledge of 
Armenian language, the history of the Armenian Church and its canonical laws.’526 
Such a bureaucrat as a procurator would indeed make things easier for the Russian 
authorities. In 1909, a suitable candidate was found in Melik-Ohandzhanian as he was 
appointed as the new procurator. However, as the representative of the Russian 
government, the procurator needed a better status and salary to make an impact on the 
members of the Echmiadzin Synod. The viceroy repeatedly wrote to Stolypin about an 
increase in the procurator’s salary.527 
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Internal Affairs still was discontented with the regulations 
governing the elections because it could not change them as it wanted. In May 1910, 
Aleksei N. Kharuzin expressed this discontent to the governor of Erevan, Tizengauzen. 
According to Kharuzin’s sources, the candidates in the elections of 1908 were under 
Dashnak pressure and they were predetermined long before the formal election results, 
which made the closed ballot method useless.
528
 The governor pointed out one single fact 
behind this: the dominance of the Ottoman Armenian delegates over the Russians, which 
put more weight on the preferences of the Ottoman delegates, among whom the Dashnaks 
were influential.
529
 Both Kharuzin and his superior, Stolypin, knew that their hands were 
tied on this because of the ecumenical significance but looked for other practical changes 
to supervise the activities of the Armenian Church and any uneasy elements within it. 
One of these changes was the use of the churches for political meetings, which had been 
a source of acrimony for some time. During the elections for councils under the 
Armenian Church in 1910 it happened again. It was reported that party meetings in 
churches created fights between the parties, which included indecent swearing and 
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threats, hardly appropriate for a holy place.
530
 Already annoyed by the role of the 
Armenian political parties in the church affairs, Stolypin stated that the churches should 
be used only for religious purposes and these political meetings in the churches had to be 
outlawed.
531
 Soon, in November 1910, it was forbidden to organize political meetings in 
the Armenian churches in the Russian Empire.
532
  
Despite these practical changes, Stolypin was still unhappy that his grander proposals 
about the administration of the Armenian Church had not materialized because of the 
opposition demonstrated by the viceroy and various other ministries. In the absence of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs’ proposals, there were violations of law by the members of 
the Echmiadzin Synod and the Catholicos according to Stolypin and Kharuzin.
533
 To 
conduct a thorough review of the problems noted by Stolypin, an experienced bureaucrat 
from the Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions, Aleksandr V. Petrov 
was sent to Tiflis.
534
 The ailing Izmirlian was quite bitter about this open lack of 
confidence in his administration and the restrictions on his actions as he was entertaining 
the idea of leaving the post.
535
 However, the fate did not let Izmirlian leave on his own as 
he died of a heart attack in December 1910, leaving another year for debate between St. 
Petersburg and Tiflis as to the future of the Armenian Church.
536
 
 
The Armenian Church and Its Privileges in Education  
 
Izmirlian’s funeral was carried out in a more relaxed atmosphere as a token of improved 
relations between the Russian administration and the Armenian Church. The Dashnaks 
still sent a big wreath of red cloves but, more importantly, in an unprecedented fashion, 
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the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church were present along with other high-
ranking bureaucrats of the Caucasian viceroyalty.
537
 As soon as the funeral ended, the 
Armenian Church began preparations for the elections, which were to be held in late 
1911. Meanwhile, there was activity among Russian officials in St. Petersburg and Tiflis 
regarding the situation of the Armenian Church.   
Between November 1910 and December 1911, during a series of conferences led by 
Stolypin on the Interdepartmental Conference on ‘the Question of the Organization of 
Education for Inorodcheskoe, Inoslavnoe and Inovernoe Population’, the issue of 
minority schools was taken up. Prior to this conference, the head of Department of 
Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions, Kharuzin complained that the Catholicos still 
had still too much control over the schools and he was violating the laws regarding 
them.
538
 Despite the anxiety displayed by the representative of MVD, who believed that 
any privilege given to the Armenian Church could lead to separatist tendencies, the 
representative of the viceroyalty stated that the nationalist strivings of Armenians were 
directed against the other nationalities in the region not against the Russian 
administration.
539
 
The viceroy saw that the Armenian Church could be brought to the regime’s side not by 
coercion but by maintaining mutual interests. He reported to the Tsar that Armenian 
parish schools taught Russian language, Russian history, and geography of the Russian 
Empire as mandatory subjects and further changes would be made.
540
 Moreover, more 
and more Armenian children were enrolled in the Russian state schools rather than their 
parish schools. The number of Armenian students enrolled in the Russian state schools 
(both elementary and secondary) was surpassing the Armenian parochial schools, both 
elementary and secondary.
541
 Keeping such a privilege of the church intact was 
reasonable and it would strengthen the loyalty of the Church to the Russian 
administration.  
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The views of the viceroyalty were upheld at the end of the conference and the Armenian 
Church retained its right to administer parish schools as the only non-Orthodox church. 
However, the seminaries under its control were considered to have an excessive number 
of students. In addition to reducing the number of students in these institutions, the 
students coming from abroad would be more closely monitored and a strict religious 
education would be allowed. In line with the viceroy, the assistant Minister of Education, 
Lev A. Georgievskii believed that unlike the Catholic Church, the Armenian Church was 
on the side of the government now.
542
  
As the issue of schooling continued to occupy an important place in the agenda, Petrov—
from whom Stolypin was expecting a full report about the Armenian schooling—arrived 
in the Caucasus. Upon arriving in the region, he immediately saw how deeply the 
Armenians were attached to their parish and higher schools, and their autonomy. More 
importantly, what vexed Petrov were the ideas and the teaching methods employed in 
these schools, in which an ancient map of Armenia or an Armenian national painting 
could be used. The situation was even worse in the higher Armenian education in the 
academies and seminaries, which produced the local teachers who would then reproduce 
these national ideas in the parish schools. According to Petrov, contrary to the resolutions 
held in the inter-ministerial conference, these institutions were religious only in name 
when in fact they were providing general education.
543
 
Petrov noted that for the Armenian clergy and the laity, the school affairs boiled down to 
‘the creation of their own national schools of all types, from the lowest to the highest, 
with almost full removal of educational supervision [by the government] from them’. To 
Petrov’s dismay, the viceroyalty did not object to this.544 In his report to the Department 
of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions, Petrov argued that leaving Armenian 
religious schools without government supervision would be a mistake.
545
 Instead of 
granting privileges, the schools under the Armenian Church should be run according to 
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the general rules for other schools in the Caucasus.
546
 Petrov’s recommendation of a ‘full 
reorganization of the Armenian schools’ alluded to increased centralization which would 
enable the government to have more control over this critical issue.
547
 Aware of the 
importance of the Armenian schools for the Armenians, Petrov stated that in the short 
term ‘constructive-organizational’ measures instead of ‘inhibitory-inspectional measures’ 
would be more useful for eliminating Armenian nationalists from Armenian schools. In 
the long run, expanding Russian schools, the advent of more Russian settlers in the 
region, and increased activities of the Russian charitable-educational societies would also 
attract Armenian students to enrol in Russian schools and hence minimize the problems 
concerning Armenian schooling.
548
 
Petrov’s observations during his time in the Caucasus confirmed the suspicions held by 
Stolypin from 1907 onward. The privileged status of the Armenian Church and the 
Catholicos was seen by both as the main barrier to increased centralization and a more 
rigorous control of the Armenian Church by central government. Not entirely happy 
about the stance of the viceroyalty on this, Petrov also included his opinions on the 
upcoming Catholicosate elections, for which he advocated what Stolypin had demanded 
earlier for the elections of 1908. According to Petrov, the Catholicos must speak Russian, 
and be a Russian subject, and the Russian Armenians’ vote share must increase.549 As the 
preparations for the elections continued and rumours of candidacy were in the air, the 
premier was gunned down in Kiev in September 1911.  
 
The Elections of 1911 
 
Until his assassination, Stolypin managed to minimize the Dashnaks’ influence on the 
Armenian Church and made some practical changes to the administration of the church. 
However, this was a far cry from the ideal he had wanted since 1907. His successor, 
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Aleksandr A. Makarov, immediately wrote to the viceroy in October 1911 about the 
upcoming elections in December. Not content with the dominance of the Ottoman 
Armenians, Makarov noted that the proportion of Russian Armenian delegates needed to 
be increased, which would be in line with the interests of both the Russian government 
and the Russian Armenians.
550
 To Makarov’s dismay, this was not realized. Because of 
its importance for the Armenians, more fundamental changes to the privileges and rights 
of the Catholicosate were very difficult to implement, particularly considering the 
opposition shown by the viceroyalty and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under such 
circumstances, the character of the new Catholicos was considered extremely important 
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
The most controversial candidate was Malachia Ormanian, whom the Dashnaks 
immensely hated for a long time. As the former Patriarch at Istanbul (1896–1908), 
Ormanian was unpopular among the revolutionary elements that saw him as a close 
associate of Abdulhamid II, and for this, an attempt on his life was made in 1903. The 
Dashnaks were relieved when Ormanian finally had to step down as the Patriarch 
immediately after the revolution of 1908.
551
 Favoured both by the Russian government 
and the Russian press, Ormanian was thought to have opportunities to challenge Durian 
and Surenian in the elections.
552
 However, he was excluded from the elections because of 
pressure from the Armenian National Assembly in Istanbul and the Dashnaks, who were 
quite strong among the Ottoman Armenians.
553
 
As a result, the race was left to the deputy of the Catholicos, Surenian, and the former 
Istanbul Patriarch, Durian, who were already the favourites. Surenian was the main 
preference of the conservatives while Durian was supported by the Dashnaks, who were 
convinced that Durian would get the majority of the votes in the second round. In the first 
round of the elections, Surenian and Durian got the most votes, as expected.
554
 However, 
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a large protest was held before the voting process. Arguing that the exclusion of 
Ormanian from candidacy was illegal, 28 delegates possessing 32 votes walked out.
555
 
According to the election laws, it was illegal for the delegates to walk out without 
voting.
556
 The election process went on and contrary to the expectations of the Dashnaks, 
Surenian unexpectedly got the most votes in the second round by getting 58 for and 30 
against whereas Durian got 57 for and 32 against.
557 
This situation created yet another feud between St. Petersburg and Tiflis. It was now 
Makarov, the successor to Stolypin as the Minister of Internal Affairs, who claimed that 
the elections had to be held again because of the protest. Like his predecessor, Makarov 
was also bitter about the Ottoman Armenian dominance in the elections. Since the 
protestors were mostly Russian Armenians, the elections reflected the wishes of the 
Ottoman Armenians. In addition to the issues about the protest, the character and past of 
the final candidates would be items of debate. 
From a hereditary noble family, Surenian started his education in Tiflis gimnaziia but his 
illness forced him to opt for a monastic life. Afterward, he worked in various parts of the 
Caucasus as a clergyman.
558
 Most notably he was the head of the Tiflis eparchy between 
1894 and 1904.
559
 When Khrimian, the former Catholicos, died, he was the deputy to the 
Catholicos and the chairman of the Echmiadzin Synod.
560
 However, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs had reservations about the stance of Surenian during the conflict between 
the Armenian Church and the Russian government between 1903 and 1907. Several 
reports indicated that Surenian took part in the opposition movement against the Tsarist 
decision to confiscate church properties. More strikingly, Surenian did not offer his 
condolences to Prince Golitsyn after the failed assassination attempt by the Hnchaks.
561
 
Surenian was also depicted in the Tsarist reports as ‘weak-willed and easily 
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impressionable.’562 In conjunction with these reservations, it was claimed in the right-
wing newspaper Russkoe znamia that Surenian was affiliated with the Armenian 
revolutionary movement, especially the Dashnaks.
563
 
Durian was not approved by St. Petersburg as well. According to the reports, when he 
was the Patriarch in Istanbul, he was believed to be supported by the Dashnaks, who were 
still supporting him.
564
 He was reported to be a ‘protégé and adherent of the 
Dashnaktsutiun.’565 Moreover, Durian’s close relations with the Ottoman government did 
not please Makarov, who believed that the elections had to be held again. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs firmly believed in the annulment of the elections because of the incident 
in which the delegates walked out of the elections. If Surenian or Durian became the 
Catholicos, that would hamper the aims of the government and lead to ‘the strengthening 
of the predominance of the separatist lay elements of the Armenian nation under the 
church hierarchy.’566 
Nevertheless, if the elections were not ratified, it was far from certain that the new 
elections would produce a desirable result for the government. Ormanian, who was 
favoured by Makarov, still did not have the backing of the Ottoman Armenians, without 
which an election victory was impossible. Procurator Melik-Ohandzhanian supported this 
view as he emphasized that Ormanian, as the former Patriarch of Istanbul was opposed 
mainly by the Ottoman Armenians, which gave clues about his ‘heartless personality’ and 
lack of action against the horrors his flock endured.
567
 
However, for Vorontsov-Dashkov, the annulment of the elections could harm improving 
relations between the Armenians and the Russian administration for which he worked so 
hard. As a reply to Makarov, he argued that if the elections were not ratified, Ottoman 
Armenians could easily protest the new elections and not recognize its legitimacy. This 
move could also hurt the religious feelings of the Armenians in general. As he pointed 
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out in the Council of Ministers’ meeting in August 1908, such a policy could lead 
Armenians to look for a new seat outside of the Russian Empire, which was harmful for 
Russian interests.
568
 Moreover, Vorontsov-Dashkov also believed that a possible 
annulment would be a very ‘dangerous precedent’ for future elections as any discontented 
group would walk away to interrupt the elections.
569
 Finally, the viceroy asked Makarov 
to present the case to the Council of Ministers if he had further reservations.
570
 The 
viceroy also wrote to Kokovtsov arguing that the annulment of the elections would result 
in the election of some Ottoman Armenian (such as Khrimian and Izmirlian) unknown to 
the Russian authorities—unlike Surenian, who was born and raised in the Russian Empire 
and had been on good terms with the viceroyalty.
571
 
As happened earlier, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened in this delicate matter. 
When Makarov continued to insist on his position concerning the illegitimacy of the 
elections and characters of the candidates, and even branded Surenian as ‘anti-Russian’, 
Sazonov was supporting the viceroy’s position. He soon asked for the opinion of his 
ambassador at Istanbul, Charykov.
572
 Charykov’s first recommendation was not to 
recognize the elections because most of those who walked away were high-ranking 
Armenian clergymen without whose support Surenian would be in a difficult situation 
after taking the post.
573
 Later, however, the ambassador had a change of heart, mainly 
owing to the attitude of the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul, Arsharuni, who wrote to 
Charykov that the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul was for the ratification of the 
elections. More importantly, Arsharuni noted that as a born and raised Russian subject, 
Surenian knew the situation of the Church in the Russian Empire very well. He was fully 
confident that Surenian would fit the bill and asked the Russian authorities to ratify the 
elections.
574
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Another dimension of this decision regarded its impact on the attitude of Ottoman 
Armenians toward Russia. For the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, the ratification of 
the elections would be an indication of how deeply the Tsar cared about the Ottoman 
Armenians along with Russian Armenians.
575
 Pointing out the favourable depiction of the 
conditions of the Russian Armenians in the Ottoman Armenian press at the time, 
Charykov wrote that ‘these mentioned articles were the new symptoms of the turn to a 
rapprochement with Russia which was taking place among the Turkish Armenians.’576 
Contrary to Sazonov and the viceroy, who considered the elections ‘legal and favourable 
for the interests of the government’, Makarov still argued that from a strictly legal 
standpoint, the elections were illegal and he did not believe that the results were 
favourable for Russian interests. As previously, Makarov’s disapproval was about the top 
two candidates’ suitability for the post and the Ottoman Armenian dominance of the 
elections by which the wishes of the Russian Armenians (most of whom walked out 
anyway—21 out of 26 Russian Armenian delegates abstained) would be ignored.577 As 
did his predecessor, Makarov advocated that domestic priorities should come first. 
Charykov again warned about the harmful implications of the annulment of the elections 
on the Ottoman Armenians and the Russian interests. In fact, annulment of the elections 
would be interpreted by the Ottoman Armenians as ‘formal chicanery’ by the Russian 
authorities to elect Ormanian as the Catholicos, who was ‘unconditionally unacceptable 
for the Turkish Armenians.’578 According to Charykov, considering the critical situation 
of the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire and its thorny relations with Persia, the 
sympathies and confidence of the Ottoman Armenians were essential for Russia in early 
1912. He agreed with the conclusion reached by Vorontsov-Dashkov arguing that the 
annulment of the elections would lead to more anti-Russian propaganda.
579
 
By February 1912, Sazonov wanted to end this discussion by writing a detailed report for 
Makarov, considering all the information he had. Supporting the viceroy’s view, Sazonov 
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disagreed with Makarov’s claim about the legitimacy of the elections because the protest 
of a group of delegates would not be a sufficient basis for the annulment of the elections. 
Regarding the strategic aspect of the elections, in agreement with Charykov, the foreign 
policy aspect of this issue was the most important priority for Sazonov as Armenians’ 
growing sympathies for Russia were vital for the empire’s position in the Ottoman and 
Persian empires. A possible annulment of the election of Surenian, the choice of most 
Russophile moderates among the Armenian delegates, would easily damage the 
Armenian sympathies. Sazonov also believed that Surenian would be good enough for 
the post (much better than Dashnak’s candidate Durian) and even his much criticized 
‘weak-willed character’ could be used for the interests of the empire if manipulated 
properly. His participation in the anti-government protests after the confiscation of 1903 
was also not considered a serious problem as during this period almost all Armenian 
political or religious leaders took part in these protests.
580
 
In the end, as had happened in 1908, the views of the viceroy and Sazonov prevailed and 
Surenian was approved by Nicholas II as the next Catholicos in March 1912.
581
 By early 
1912, Russian foreign policy imperatives regarding the fate of the Ottoman Empire were 
much more influential than they were four years earlier, when the main priority under 
Stolypin was the internal reorganization. Vorontsov-Dashkov and Sazonov knew that the 
domestic and foreign policy aspects were interconnected and a simple erroneous policy 
could easily damage the upward trend in the relations between Russia and the Armenians. 
Makarov, much less influential than his predecessor, failed to change the outcome as 
Surenian was making his preparations in Echmiadzin to set off to St. Petersburg for his 
consecration. 
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Conclusion 
 
On 16 June 1912, at the Nikolaevskii train station, several members of the Armenian 
community of St. Petersburg were expecting their newly elected Catholicos.
582
 As had 
happened with the former Catholicos Izmirlian, Surenian was expected to appear in the 
presence of the Tsar to be formally consecrated. A few days later, Surenian was received 
by the Tsar who stated in the consecration ceremony that he expected that the Catholicos 
and his church would work for the benefit of Russia.
583
 As part of the ceremony, the Tsar 
awarded Surenian (now Kevork V) the diamond crest on the capuche as the symbol of his 
ecclesiastical title, the special rescript, and the imperial edict.
584
 Following the ceremony, 
the new Catholicos made several statements to the Russian press about the loyalty of 
Armenians to Russia and how Russia could help the Ottoman Armenians.   
By 1912, the Armenian Church began to play the role of intermediary for the Russian 
interests regarding the Ottoman Armenians. The head of the church, Kevork V, was 
arguably the most regime-friendly catholicos in the last three decades as the Armenian 
Church began to be a facilitator for Russian policies—as opposed to the problems it 
created under the late Khrimian. Furthermore, the influence of the Dashnaktsutiun on the 
Armenian Church was seriously curtailed. How did this transition happen? The starting 
point was the arrival of Vorontsov-Dashkov, who immediately saw an ally in the 
Armenian Church in the midst of the chaos in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, one of 
his first recommendations was the annulment of the confiscation decree of 1903, which 
he considered a disastrous decision.  
Vorontsov-Dashkov was aware of the influence of the Dashnaktsutiun in the region, 
which extended to the Armenian clergy. However, a direct attempt on the church or the 
Catholicos would only make things worse. As soon as the region was pacified and 
authorities took the necessary measures to stop the activities of the Dashnaks, the 
Armenian Church would not pose any real problem. The recently adopted socialist 
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programme of the party in 1907 would also push the Armenian clergy toward the Russian 
administration since it was quite hostile to the Armenian Church. Therefore, given 
enough time, the Armenian Church, a key institution to promoting stability in the region, 
would side with the viceroyalty, as it had traditionally done, to maintain its privileged 
status.  
However, this was not how things were seen from St. Petersburg. Led by Stolypin, many 
officials considered the privileged status of the Armenian Church as the root of the recent 
problems. For Stolypin, the Catholicos, adorned with various privileges and elected for 
life, was using his freedom to the detriment of Russian interests, even to the extent that he 
was accommodating revolutionaries. From 1907 on, Stolypin tried to convince the 
viceroy of a full reorganization of the Armenian Church. According to his vision, the 
Armenian Church needed to be stripped of its privileges and the Catholicos should be a 
regular head of a Church like other non-Orthodox churches. Moreover, the ideal 
Catholicos of Stolypin was a Russian subject and a Russian speaker, which for him were 
the signs of loyalty. To ensure this, the premier also suggested the equalization of the 
votes of the delegates from abroad (the Ottoman Armenians in particular) and the 
Russian Armenians at the expense of the Catholicos’ ecumenical significance. To sum 
up, for Stolypin, Catholicos had to be first and foremost a controllable useful agent in 
domestic affairs while foreign policy concerns could wait.   
Stolypin’s insistence grew as Khrimian passed away in late 1907 and new elections were 
on the horizon. Vorontsov-Dashkov opposed all of the proposals Stolypin put forward 
claiming that these measures would result in discontent among both Russian and Ottoman 
Armenians, who would interpret them as acts of oppression. Moreover, speaking Russian 
and being a Russian subject were hardly the essential credentials for a good Catholicos. 
Thanks to the backing of Izvolskii and others, Vorontsov-Dashkov’s views prevailed and 
it was decided that for more thorough changes, the aftermath of the elections would be a 
more opportune time.  
Nevertheless, the elections of 1908 confirmed the suspicions of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The presence of the Dashnaks in the elections and the dominance of the Ottoman 
Armenian votes, as well as the new Catholicos, who had been close to the 
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Dashnaktsutiun, were vexing Stolypin as he voiced these concerns to the viceroy.  By 
1909, Stolypin was aware that making major changes concerning the rights and the status 
of the Armenian Church was a very complicated matter. What he could accomplish so far 
was to abolish some of the honorary awards for the new Catholicos and the introduction 
of the new practice for the newly elected Catholicos to arrive in St. Petersburg before his 
consecration in Echmiadzin and pledge loyalty to the Tsar.   
Meanwhile, another grand undertaking in the South Caucasus gave St. Petersburg an 
opportunity to eliminate the revolutionary elements within the Armenian clergy. This was 
the Dashanktsutiun trial, by which many Armenian clergymen who were suspected of 
being affiliated with the party were removed from their posts. Although Vorontsov-
Dashkov found this direct action rather excessive, the Dashnaks were losing their 
organizational capability in the region and the influence on the Armenian Church affairs. 
There were also some minor changes such as the ban on the political meetings in the 
Armenian churches, which also aimed at keeping the political influence of the 
revolutionary parties on religious affairs at bay.  
When Izmirlian died in late 1910, Stolypin was hardly satisfied because the status and the 
rights of the Catholicos, the election procedures, and the educational privileges of the 
Armenian Church were mostly intact. In the interim, the educational privileges of the 
Armenian Church became an item of debate. The reports sent to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs indicated that owing to the autonomous status of the Armenian Church, the 
schools under its control were promoting Armenian nationalism. To stop this, more 
supervision and centralization, even at the expense of stripping the church of its 
educational rights, were needed. Vorontsov-Dashkov again opposed the proposals of St. 
Petersburg as he argued that there was no need to pursue such risky policies, especially 
when Russia’s relations with its Armenian subjects were improving considerably. The 
Armenian parish schools, which had already been surpassed by the Russian schools, did 
not pose any threats and they could be left to the Armenian Church to run, as a mere 
token of better relations while some changes in the seminaries could be made. Thanks to 
the support of the Ministry of Education, the viceroy ensured that the Armenian Church 
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could keep its right to administer parish schools as the only non-Orthodox Church by 
1911.  
The elections of 1911 were the final manifestation of the differences between St. 
Petersburg and Tiflis about the governance of the Armenian Church, even after the 
assassination of Stolypin. This time it was triggered by the protest of some of the 
delegates who were upset by the exclusion of their favourite candidate from the elections. 
Makarov’s efforts to annul the election results were countered by Vorontsov-Dashkov 
and Sazonov, who knew that such a decision would risk damaging Russia’s relations with 
Russian and Ottoman Armenians. It was particularly Sazonov, who pressed for the 
ratification of the election results since the Ottoman Armenians had become very critical 
for Russian foreign policy interests by early 1912. Despite the pressure from St. 
Petersburg from 1907 on, the prudent approach of the viceroy regarding the Armenian 
Church, always a key ally of the Tsarist administration in the Caucasus for him, was 
producing results. Under the new Catholicos, Kevork V, the Armenian Church would 
once again become a useful ally for Russia both at home and abroad as Russia became 
more involved with the fate of the Ottoman Armenians in the years to come.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VICEROYALTY AND THE ARMENIAN 
BOURGEOISIE (1907–1912) 
 
The National Question in the Russian Empire by 1907 
 
‘The fate of the Georgian language interests a Georgian, no matter where he lives. It 
would be a sign of profound ignorance to say that Georgian culture concerns only the 
Georgians who live in Georgia. Take, for instance, the Armenian Church. Armenians of 
various localities and states take part in the administration of its affairs. Territory plays 
no part here…Hence, the administration and control of all affairs of national culture must 
be left to the nations concerned. We proclaim in favour of cultural-national autonomy for 
the Caucasian nationalities.’585 The author of these serious lines on the theoretical aspects 
of the national question was surprisingly Stalin. Along with Shaumian, he was considered 
one of the experts on the subject by Lenin. Among the Mensheviks, the Georgian 
members, such as Filip Makharadze and Nikolai Chkheidze, often played a key role in 
the party’s position on the national question. There was a reason why the Caucasus 
produced so many experts on the national question. The region was full of a gamut of 
nationalities harbouring animosities against each other for a variety of reasons.  
The importance of the national question had been felt already during the revolution of 
1905, when the peripheries of the empire displayed their discontent with the regime. 
Apart from the Caucasus, the Poles, Ukrainians, Finns, and Jews were up in arms against 
the Tsarist regime, which also had a difficult time quelling the disturbances in the 
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capital.
586
 Although the start of the constitutional era with the promises of the October 
Manifesto and the inauguration of the Tsarist Duma was hopeful, soon these hopes faded. 
The deputies of the national parties such as Hromada, Kolo, and the Bund—and later the 
Dashnaks—sat in the Tauride Palace to express their national aspirations; however, they 
soon realized that the First and Second Dumas would not produce the result they wanted. 
Their speeches were met with indifference and at times contempt. What was worse for 
them was that this trend was reflected by the Stolypin led government as well as the 
rightist parties.
587
 
In the socialist circles of Europe, however, the debates about the national question went 
on. While some, like the Bund, believed in the need for highly complex schemes of extra-
territorial cultural autonomy, for others socialism and democracy would automatically 
solve the problems of nationalities.
588
 For Lenin, the issue of nationalities had a practical 
use for the struggle against Tsarism. In a tactical move, he supported the idea of national 
self-determination, ‘never forgetting that such support [to national movements] was 
conditional and temporary in order to crush the common enemy.’589 However, the 
influence of the socialist parties in Russian political life was increasingly reduced as 
Stolypin consolidated his power. 
Speaking after the dissolution of the Second Duma, the premier made it clear how his 
policy regarding the nationalities would be formulated. ‘The imperial Duma, which was 
established for the greater stability of the Russian state, must also be Russian in spirit. 
The other peoples which belong to our Empire shall have representatives for their needs 
in the Imperial Duma, but they shall and will not appear in such numbers as to enable 
them to tip the scales on purely Russian matters.’590 Among the nationalist segments of 
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the Russian bureaucracy, there was also a widespread conviction that the revolutionary 
outburst was the work of non-Russians, which played a part in these new 
arrangements.
591
 
Indeed, the premier did what he promised. The non-Russian subjects of the empire, 
comprising more than half of the population, were represented only by half of that ratio in 
the Third Duma.
592
 According to the new arrangement, the South Caucasus, mainly 
owing to its record for revolutionary activity and a heavily non-Russian population, could 
only have seven deputies, one of whom had to be a Russian.
593
 The reduced 
representation of the nationalities and the absence of major socialist parties like the SRs 
resulted in the rising influence of parties such as the Octobrists and the Unionists, whose 
dislike of the national aspirations of non-Russian subjects was well known. Speeches in 
the State Duma like that of Purishkevich on the separatist tendencies of the non-Russian 
peoples of the empire, including the nationalities in the Caucasus became more 
commonplace. Purishkevich went as far as arguing that these nationalities in the 
Caucasus in general and Armenians in particular would aspire to separatism no matter 
what was done by the Tsarist government.
594
 
A practical man, Stolypin knew that this was a delicate question so he refrained from 
going to such extremes and instead he effectively tried to ignore the national question in 
the borderlands of the empire. In doing this, what he often did was to highlight the 
importance of Russian political and cultural primacy rather than openly attack the 
national minorities like Plehve did.
595
 Particularly in places like Poland or Finland, where 
the interests of the conservative Russian elements (his support base) were vested, the 
government generally supported the Russian element against the non-Russians.
596
  
Instead, Stolypin focused on the economic and social problems of the empire by 
undertaking two grand schemes, agrarian reform and the reinstitution of zemstvos in key 
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areas, which would also address the real needs of the people and gain their loyalty. In 
addition, another attempt was made to encourage Russian settlement in the fringes of the 
empire sparsely populated by the Russians. However, this was a very demanding task and 
would only be accomplished in the long term. One of the areas in which it failed 
miserably was the South Caucasus, where the meagre Russian population was noted as a 
negative factor in the assessment of the viceroy.
597
  
These solutions were met with bitter criticism from the Russian political parties, 
especially the national and socialist parties. Most of them demanded autonomy of various 
kinds within a federal structure. Parties such as the Kadets and SRs did not aim at 
federalism; their solution of full-scale democracy was also detrimental to the authority of 
the Tsar. Like its predecessors, Stolypin’s administration did not have a uniform policy 
on the nationalities and thus circumstantial policies regarding the national question were 
preferred. The strategy varied from region to region depending on the danger a national 
question posed to the imperial interests.
598
 
 
 
The Conflict between St. Petersburg and Tiflis on the National Question 
 
From the day of his appointment to the post of viceroy, Vorontsov-Dashkov was disliked 
by some circles in St. Petersburg. His wide executive powers, age, and liberal views were 
the main reasons for this and it grew as the conflicts between the nationalities and general 
disorder in the region continued. His general approach to the disturbances was considered 
lenient as his critics began to voice their dissatisfaction more often in the capital. By 
1907, the region was stabilizing but there was still some friction between St. Petersburg 
and Tiflis. In reply to his critics, Vorontsov-Dashkov reported to the Tsar that there was 
no serious separatist movement in the Caucasus as of 1907. The major exceptions to this 
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were the Dashnaks, who were ‘dreaming of the establishment of an Armenian republic, 
tied to the Russia on federative grounds,’ and the Georgian Socialist-Federalists, who 
envisioned a Georgian republic but the influence of these was limited.
599
 
Stolypin did not share the viceroy’s optimism, especially on the Armenians as his stance 
on the Armenian Church and the Dashnaktsutiun demonstrated. Agreeing with his 
minister, the director of the police pointed out that the Ottoman Armenian immigrants 
who arrived in the region in the last decades still posed a danger to the security of the 
region. From these landless and economically deprived people, many joined the ranks of 
Armenian revolutionary parties, who fought not only against the Muslims but also against 
Russians for the dream of ‘a great and independent Armenia.’600  
The viceroy got more confident as the recovery in the region took place. Dismissing the 
criticisms from the right, the viceroy believed that ‘the Caucasus was ‘terra incognita’ 
for St. Petersburg’ and what the central government and the public knew about the region 
was limited to the articles written by the likes of Menshikov.
601
 Opposing the labelling of 
entire nations as ‘revolutionary’ or ‘separatists’, the viceroy thought that once the 
revolutionary elements were eliminated and economic stability took hold, the 
nationalities of the South Caucasus would be content if their national demands were met 
to a certain extent. Therefore, he allowed the teaching of local languages in the first 
classes and did not meddle too much in the local press.    
He knew how outright oppressive policies regarding the nationalities had resulted under 
his predecessor and why it did not work. As Baron Rosen stated, what the previous 
intolerant policies achieved was to unite the nationalities of the South Caucasus in their 
common hatred of the Russian rule.
602
 Vorontsov-Dashkov knew that a balanced 
approach was necessary for the interests of the Russian rule considering the different 
characteristics and the aspirations of the national movements of the Georgians, Azeris, 
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and the Armenians. The evolution of the relations between these groups and the 
viceroyalty took different paths between 1907 and 1912.   
 
 
The Viceroyalty and the Georgians (1907–1912) 
The Georgian National Movement and the Russian Administration by 1907 
 
As part of the nationalities question in the South Caucasus, the Georgian case proved to 
be a problem for the Tsarist regime in the post-1905 era. Despite being predominantly a 
feudal society, the Georgians had supported the Menshevik movement en masse against 
the Tsarist establishment.
603
 Georgians mainly inhabited the provinces of Tiflis, Kutaisi, 
and Batumi oblast, where ‘the largely mono-ethnic character of the [Georgian] 
workforce’ found itself facing the strong Armenian bourgeoisie and Russian 
administration that were seen as the main cause of their grievances.
604
  
Under such economic and social circumstances, embracing all the strata within the 
Georgian society, Menshevism had a strong appeal on the Georgian national movement. 
Its focus on the importance of labouring classes, to which most Georgians belonged, and 
its internationalist approach appealed to their national grievances against the Armenian 
bourgeoisie and Russian administration.
605
 The Georgian support for internationalism 
within Menshevism was also related to the amalgamation of the Georgian Church into the 
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Russian Orthodox Church, which curbed its national character and political 
significance.
606
 
The anti-Armenian element in the Georgian national movement continued to exist after 
the revolution of 1905.
607
 The Georgian Mensheviks could easily benefit from their 
depiction of the Armenians as bourgeoisie exploiting the Georgian labourers. A Dashnak, 
Pasdermadjian noticed this as he pointed out that ‘in the eyes of Georgian socialists, 
every Armenian was a bourgeois and every Georgian is a member of proletariat.’608 Apart 
from the animosity held by the labourers and the peasants, the déclassé Georgian nobility 
still had to witness the primacy of the Armenian industrial and commercial classes, who 
were buying their properties in their traditional capital Tiflis.
609
 
Nevertheless, as Riga and Lang argue, it was the anti-Russian aspect of the Georgian 
national movement that was more dominant than the anti-Armenian rhetoric.
610
 It was the 
Russian imperial policies that had brought about the current difficulties the déclassé 
Georgian nobility, professionals, and proletariat were facing against the Armenian 
bourgeoisie.
611
 In addition, the Russian government was the biggest landowner in the 
regions where the Georgians lived, therefore giving both rural and urban Georgians the 
motivations to antagonize the Russian administration.
612
 
Led by Noe Zhordania, the Georgian Mensheviks had a considerable significance among 
Russian Mensheviks, even influencing them, especially their stance on the peasantry.
613
 
A former student at the theology seminary in Tiflis, Zhordania had been in Western 
Europe, where he maintained contacts with the leading European socialists such as 
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Plekhanov, Kautsky, and Parvus.
614
 Under his leadership, the Georgian SD deputies were 
adding the woes of Stolypin in St. Petersburg and Vorontsov-Dashkov in Tiflis.  
When the Second Duma was disbanded, a handful of Georgian deputies found 
themselves in Siberia along with other SDs. The deaths of Japaridze and Lomtatidze in 
Siberian prisons as well as the arrest of poet Akaki Tsereteli for satirising the governor 
created much resentment among the Georgians.
615
 In the post-revolutionary period, the 
main aim of the Georgian SDs was cultural and regional autonomy for Georgians in a 
socialist framework.
616
 As Jones argues, ‘internationalism and egalitarianism of Marxism 
was a better guarantee for Georgian national aspirations than outright independence.’617  
Vorontsov-Dashkov thought that there were both revolutionary and economic dimensions 
to the problems that the Caucasian administration had experienced in the revolutionary 
period. The efforts of the Georgian revolutionaries caused the Caucasian administration 
to react with force, which in turn, resulted in more repression, particularly in the Guriia 
region and unsatisfactory relations with the Georgian population. The economic factor 
was also at work since the predominantly peasant Georgian population was suffering 
from poor economic prospects, which contributed to their antagonism to the 
authorities.
618
 The viceroy also noted the negative results of cultural restrictions on the 
use of Georgian, which only created hostility among the Georgians against the Tsarist 
regime.
619
 
 
The Georgian Clergy’s Demands for the Restoration of the Georgian Autocephaly 
 
In this period, when attempts were made to put the Armenian Church under firmer Tsarist 
control, the Georgian Church also emerged as a new centre of opposition against the 
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Tsarist regime. Having lost its status of autocephaly in 1811, the Georgian Church was 
later absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church. To administer its affairs, the Exarchate 
of Georgia was established.
620
 The demand for the restoration of the autocephaly and the 
former properties of the Georgian Church appeared in 1905–1906 within the broader 
context of Georgian opposition to the Tsarist regime. As Werth points out, during the 
revolution of 1905, various national entities under the Orthodox Church voiced some 
demands about language etc., but the Georgian case was calling for ‘full ecclesiastical 
independence.’621   
These demands of the Georgian clergy created resentment among the Tsarist bureaucracy 
and were met with more repression.
622
 Although Vorontsov-Dashkov reported to the Tsar 
that the Georgian clergy began to attach less importance to the issue of autocephaly and 
were ready for concessions by 1907, his assessment turned out to be too optimistic.
623
 
The demands went on and as had happened with the Armenian clergy near 1903, the 
Georgian clergy, who were supporting the restoration of the autocephaly, were now being 
blamed for developing links with SDs and separatism.
624
 The autocephaly movement, 
supported by the people and the majority of the clergy, was seen as revolutionary 
movement ‘dreaming of an independent Georgia from the Caspian to the Black Sea.’625  
In 1906, the leading clergymen of the autocephalist movement, most notably Bishop 
Kyrion, had appealed to the Holy Synod for the restoration of autocephaly but to no 
avail.
626
 Instead, a new Exarch of Georgia, Nikon, who opposed the autocephalist 
movement, arrived in Tiflis in 1906. Two years later, in May 1908, Nikon was murdered 
in Tiflis, which enabled the Russian government to put more pressure on the suspected 
autocephalists.
 
Soon, Kyrion was dismissed by the orders of the Tsar and was exiled to 
Sangskar desert and the Holy Synod at St. Petersburg was preparing to take certain 
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measures against the members of this movement.
627
 The grievances of the autocephalists 
were soon heard even in the Vatican.
628
 
The autocephalists continued their activities and in November 1910 a new congress of 
Georgian eparchies convened to discuss what needed to be done to promote the claims of 
the Georgian Church.
629
 Apart from the usual demands for autocephaly, the participants 
discussed the restoration of former Georgian churches and monasteries, which were 
allegedly appropriated by the Armenian Catholicosate, now on friendly terms with the 
regime.
630
 The discontent of the Georgian clergy was also displayed in practical matters. 
The students in Georgian parochial schools were taught in Russian and Georgian 
clergymen were not assigned to higher posts of influence. In 1910–1911, the authorities 
did not allow the publication of the ecclesiastical journal of the Georgian Exarchate in 
Georgian.
631
  
Vorontsov-Dashkov, contrary to his earlier dismissal, found by experience that the issue 
of ecclesiastical autocephaly for the Georgian national movement was in fact ‘the most 
crucial question’ so he wanted to ensure that it was not to be used for active political 
opposition to the government.
632
 One of the ways to do this without hurting the national 
feelings of the Georgians was to transform this question into a purely theoretical one that 
could only be discussed among the high clergy members. Instructed by the viceroy, the 
Exarch Innokentii succeeded in turning the pleas of autocephaly into a theoretical debate 
instead of a full-fledged political opposition as happened with the Armenian Church.
633
  
When the conflict over the confiscation of church properties and privileges of the 
Armenian Church arose earlier, the viceroy, despite the opposition of Stolypin, had 
insisted on keeping its privileges and its relatively autonomous status. His basic premise 
was that the Armenian Church, when obedient, could be used for expanding the Russian 
                                               
627 Werth, ‘Georgian Autocephaly,’ 74; Vardosanidze, 7-8; Lang, A Modern History of Georgia, 177-78. 
628 Lang, A Modern History of Georgia, 177-78. 
629 Subjects under review in the eparchial conference of the clergy of the Georgian eparchy in December 
1910, 16 November 1910 [29 November 1910], doc. no. 8, in Vakhtang Guruli, ‘Documents Important for 
the History of the Georgian Church,’ Saarkivo moambe 8 (Winter 2010): 137-40. 
630 Ibid. This friction between the Armenian Church and the Georgian Church continues even today.   
631 Diakin, 675-76. 
632 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Vsepoddanneishii otchet za vosem let upravleniia Kavkazom, 8. 
633 Ibid. 
154 
 
influence on Russian and Ottoman Armenians. This was not the case for the Georgians 
and their church, as the only significant Georgian population resided in the Russian 
Empire. More importantly, unlike the Armenian Church, the Georgian Church was 
absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church after the Russian conquest.  
As part of the Russian Orthodox Church, asking ecclesiastical autonomy was unthinkable 
given the number of non-Russians incorporated in the Russian Orthodox Church and its 
importance for St. Petersburg. Thus, the conflict with the Armenian Church could be 
sorted out relatively easily since there were grounds for collaboration. In the Georgian 
case, the calls for ecclesiastical autonomy or restoration of the properties of the Georgian 
Church were interpreted by Tsarist authorities as a complementary sign of national 
political autonomy demands, which were voiced already by the Georgian national 
movement.  
 
 
The Georgian National Movement and the Viceroyalty (1909–1912) 
 
In the post-revolutionary period, the poor situation of the Georgian countryside provided 
more recruits to the Georgian opposition to the regime. In addition, the redemption 
payments were still intact, making anti-Tsarist agitation very feasible. In the cities, the 
Georgians also found that the majority of the industrialists and merchants were Russian, 
European, or Armenian. Their traditional capital, Tiflis, was full of Armenian trading 
companies, whereas the mining complexes at Alaverdi, a key copper source for the 
empire, were run by the French and the Batumi oil works, which were taken over from 
Rothschild’s by Deterding’s Royal Dutch.634 Hence, Georgian Menshevism, despite 
losing its organizational efficacy in the region because of the measures taken by the 
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viceroyalty, still had the support of the Georgian masses whose national struggle also had 
a class dimension.
635
  
As with other revolutionary organizations, the Georgian SDs were also under severe 
pressure from the Tsarist police. In 1909, Zhordania was busy with his trial while 
Ramishvili took an administrative exile to Astrakhan. Other prominent Georgian political 
leaders were arrested.
636
 Meanwhile, the Georgian representation in third Duma was 
dominated by SDs like Nikolai Chkheidze, who was the main spokesman of the SD 
faction.
637
 The Georgian influence on the Mensheviks was still considerable. For 
instance, when Georgian SDs, along with the Bund, led the demand for inclusion of 
national-cultural autonomy to the official party policy in 1912, the Menshevik congress 
in Vienna had to approve it.
638
 Hence, the Georgian national movement was considered 
by the Tsarist bureaucracy as an integral part of the broader Russian socialist movement.  
From 1907 to 1912, the policies of the viceroyalty and the central government could not 
distort the mass support for the Georgian SDs.  
The viceroy had to accept that ‘the socialist propaganda’ succeeded among the Georgians 
mainly because of structural reasons. The chronic agrarian problems caused by the 
relationship between the Georgian peasantry and the landowning classes still persisted, 
which contributed to this success.
639
 Acknowledging the sources of the economic and 
social dimensions of the Georgian discontent, the viceroy believed that the extension of 
zemstvos and the agrarian reform project into the region would help gain Georgian 
loyalties. Although his initiative regarding the zemstvos failed, upon the insistence of the 
viceroy, the redemption payments were finally abolished in 1912, which was believed to 
improve the conditions of the peasantry.
640
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Despite all of the success of the SDs in the Georgian national movement, the viceroy was 
dismissing the allegations of separatism among the Georgians.
641
 More importantly, 
Vorontsov-Dashkov noted that the Georgians, just like the Armenians, were living in the 
midst of Muslims and for that reason they would eventually side with the Russian 
administration.
642
 Like his premier, the viceroy believed that the Georgian national 
movement would soon lose its appeal with the reforms and effective policing.  
By 1912, the Georgians posed a curious case in the context of the nationalities question in 
the South Caucasus. With its déclassé nobility and a huge peasantry, the Georgians 
demonstrated signs of discontent in all areas ranging from its Church to its active support 
of Menshevism. The landowning Georgian nobility, the traditional ally of the Tsarist 
regime, went on witnessing the worsening of its economic fortunes because of the 
diminishing returns on the land while its Armenian neighbours as well as the Russians 
and foreigners were dominating commerce and industry. As they were losing their estates 
to these groups, a score of the sons of failed Georgian nobles, as Social Democrats, 
continued to lead the Georgian national movement, which mainly saw the Russian 
administration as the source of their economic and social declining fortunes.  
There was a segment of Georgian nobility that remained faithful to the Russian 
administration and was rewarded with posts in the viceroyalty and the Caucasus corps of 
the imperial army, but their influence on the Georgians was limited. The mass support 
was lent to the Georgian SDs, who were leading the national movement primarily against 
Russian rule. Since they had influenced all segments of the Georgian community, 
persecution of this movement did not eliminate Georgian dissatisfaction, although it 
slowed down their activities. 
On the other hand, the demands of the Georgian clergy for autocephaly became more 
pressing as the Georgian national movement got stronger during the revolution of 1905. 
In contrast to the Armenian Church, the Georgian clergy served under the administration 
of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy Synod would loath the idea of giving 
autonomies to the national churches—particularly after the regime started to recover from 
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the impact of the revolutionary unrest. Given the number of nationalities under the 
hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, this was not feasible. 
The Georgians were complaining that they should have ecclesiastical autonomy just like 
Armenians, Muslims, and Catholics.
643
 However, the Georgian population was mainly 
distributed in the South Caucasus and there were no significant Georgian populations in 
the neighbouring Persian and Ottoman Empires, unlike the other two nationalities, the 
Armenians and the Azeris. Therefore, their relationship with the Russian authorities had 
little significance concerning Russian foreign policy. This was clearly not the case with 
the Armenians and Azeris. It should be noted that the suggestion by Stolypin to restrict 
the privileges of the Armenian Catholicos and to turn him into an ordinary head of a 
Church was aborted because of the potential damage it could inflict on the Russian 
foreign policy interests.  
The viceroyalty addressed these sources of discontent among the Georgians toward the 
Russian administration, most of them structural, by purging the Georgian Church of its 
nefarious characters, undertaking agricultural and administrative reform projects, and 
accommodating a certain segment of the Georgian population to the local administration. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov admitted that the Social Democrat–led Georgian movement was still 
the leading political power among the Georgians but it had lost organizational power in 
the region. On top of this, once his reforms improved the economic and political 
condition of the Georgian nobility and the peasantry, who would then refrain from 
antagonizing the Tsarist administration, the national movement would be further 
weakened. Thus, by 1912, the Georgians became a less pressing concern for the Tsarist 
administration, especially among the growing fears of the Muslim movement. 
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The Viceroyalty and the Azeris (1907–1912) 
 
When the revolutionary upsurge began in 1905, the Azeris were arguably the least 
politically conscious nationality in the South Caucasus. However, after the experience of 
the revolutionary period, especially the hostilities with the Armenians, this was to 
change. The bloody clashes made the Azeri intelligentsia and bourgeoisie, centred mainly 
in Baku, aware of the new situation and the need to act. The first attempt was made with 
the formation of Himmat in 1904 and Difai in 1905 as a part of the Azeri national 
movement both against the Armenians and the Tsarist regime. After the end of hostilities 
in 1906, Difai was integrated to include Himmat. Advocating for the enlightenment of the 
Muslim masses of the South Caucasus, Himmat focused its energies on action rather than 
ideological propaganda.
644
 More importantly, despite its use of socialist vocabulary, the 
zeitgeist of the time, the main enemy for the Himmat party was Russian rule rather than 
capitalism.
645
 However, under the Stolypin’s instructions, Vorontsov-Dashkov was very 
adamant about eradicating the revolutionary movement in the region and Himmat was 
soon added to the casualty list. Losing its operational power in 1907, Himmat went 
underground. 
The Tsarist constitutional experiment also influenced the political awareness of the 
Azeris, who were now in closer contact with the other Muslims of the empire. 
Particularly more politically aware Crimean and Volga Tatars helped Azeris discuss the 
important issues of the day such as the need for Muslim modernization in education, 
commerce, and religion, and increased cooperation among the Muslims of the empire. 
Soon, the June coup d’état exerted increased pressure on the Muslim movement, which 
ended with the reduction of their representative powers.  
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The Impact of Persian and Ottoman Constitutional Revolutions on the Azeri 
National Movement 
 
Although the Azeri national movement was hampered by the recovery of the Tsarist 
regime, it found two new homes in which to flourish in the following years. The Persian 
and Ottoman constitutional movements provided the Azeri intelligentsia excellent 
training grounds. Both movements started mainly against the autocratic rule of the Sultan 
and the Shah but soon after the proclamation of the constitutional regimes, other demands 
followed. Most of these demands were related to the long-lasting problems regarding the 
Muslim challenge to modernity. While some circles believed in the need for outright 
Westernization, some others believed in the compatibility of Islam with modern values. 
In the circles in Istanbul and Tabriz, Azeri intellectuals contemplated the ways to 
transform their societies in the face Tsarist oppression and the stiff competition with the 
Armenians. Issues such as women’s education, spread of primary schools, and language 
reform were commonplace. 
From the start of the constitutional movement in 1906, the Caucasian element played an 
important role. It was the support from Tiflis and Baku that helped the capitulation of the 
Persian court and eventually the establishment of a Constituent National Assembly in 
1906.
646
 When the civil war broke out in 1908, various Muslim parties, the majority of 
which were led by Himmat, as well as the Armenian (mainly the Dashnaks) and the 
Georgian parties stepped in.
647
 The main base of the Persian constitutional movement 
was Tabriz, where the dominant population was the Azeri Turks. It was the heart of 
northern Persia, where the Russian interests were heavily vested. Soon, the Russian-
trained Persian forces, along with a Cossack brigade defeated the constitutionalist forces. 
Meanwhile, the viceroy was not happy about the participation of Russian subjects in this 
conflict as he reported to St. Petersburg.
648
 This sentiment was also shared by the central 
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government.
649
 A complication in the Persian frontier would put the ongoing recovery in 
the Caucasus at risk. The most serious threat in this regard was the involvement of the 
Muslim political parties owing to a considerable Azeri population in the bordering 
regions of Russia and Persia. 
On the one hand, what happened across the southern border was circulated in the Baku 
press and Azeri intellectuals were discussing the events. Some were advocating unity 
among the Russian and Persian Azeris.
650
 The intelligentsia in Baku was interested in 
knowing the views of émigré intellectuals in the Persian Empire such as Mehmed 
Resulzade. A journalist sent to Persia to report about the constitutional movement, 
Resulzade’s activism made him stay there. He founded the influential newspaper Iran-i 
Nou (New Iran) in August 1909, where he expressed his ideas about the future of the 
Azeris under Russian rule.
651
 On the other hand, the Azeri revolutionary groups, which 
were mostly eliminated in the Russian Empire, found new grounds to survive in a very 
critical region. As the conflict between the Shah’s forces and the constitutionalists 
persisted, the impact on the Persian constitutional movement on the Azeri national 
movement remained an important factor. The interest shown in the Persian constitutional 
movement by the Azeris in the South Caucasus was seen as detrimental to the 
pacification process in the South Caucasus by the Russian authorities in the Caucasus. 
When the Azeri intelligentsia was preoccupied with the struggle of the constitutionalists 
and the Shah’s forces, the news from Istanbul reached the South Caucasus. Thanks to the 
efforts of the CUP, sultan Abdulhamid II agreed to re-establish the constitutional regime. 
The committee was already in contact with the Caucasian Muslims and had many 
members among them.
652
 The constitutional regime was hampered by the counter-
revolution in April 1909, but its eventual defeat by the CUP forces signalled the toppling 
of Abdulhamid II and the reinforcement of the CUP’s position in Ottoman politics.  
The environment in Istanbul was quite inviting to the Azeri intellectuals, who were under 
pressure from the Tsarist police. Soon, many of them left for Istanbul, where they 
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participated in the political discussions of the day. One such example was Ahmed 
Agaoglu. Born into a noble family, Agaoglu studied in St. Petersburg and Paris, where he 
became familiar with the ideas of progress and enlightenment. After returning to the 
South Caucasus, he wrote, and held editorial posts, in the influential newspapers in the 
Caucasus and the European journals. Moreover, as a member of the Baku City Duma, he 
also took part in the educational modernization efforts among the Azeri population, for 
which he corresponded with the Ottoman intellectuals.
653
 
When Agaoglu left Baku for Istanbul after the news of the revolution in the Ottoman 
Empire, he soon became an influential figure in the CUP circles. His letters from 
Istanbul, reflecting his views on what needed to be done for Muslim modernization, 
began to appear in Kaspii in 1909.
654
 He was also an important part of the debates about 
Turkism, which called for better ties with the Turks of the Russian Empire. His writings 
on cultural and political Turkism gave the Azeri intellectuals in Baku reason to think 
about what could be done in the South Caucasus while the Tsarist secret police had 
suspicions of Agaoglu for harbouring pan-Turkist aspirations.
655
  
Another important Azeri émigré in Istanbul was Huseyinzade Ali. When Huseyinzade 
came to Istanbul to study at the medical college, he joined the CUP so his links with the 
political currents in the Ottoman Empire were well-established. After his return to Baku 
in 1904, he edited the newspapers, Hayat and Fuyuzat before immigrating to Istanbul. 
His influential writings on Muslim modernization and political Turkism made a serious 
imprint in the CUP circles.
656
 In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Azeri 
intelligentsia had witnessed three different revolutions in the Russian, Persian, and 
Ottoman empires. The revolutionary parties of the Azeris lost their Russian organizations 
but found new homes in Ottoman and Persian empires, where they gained valuable 
political experience. The combined effect of these revolutions was a very lively 
intellectual environment for political debates centred in Baku to ponder what needed to 
be done for the advancement of the Azeri population which was lagging behind its 
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neighbours as well as bigger questions about the future of Russian Muslims and the 
Muslims of the neighbouring empires. The issues of cultural and educational importance 
such as the modernization of Muslim schooling, spreading literacy, or a more expansive 
publication of newspapers and journals, were taken up by the Azeri intelligentsia 
supported mainly by the wealthy Azeri industrialists. 
 
 
The Azeri Cultural and Educational Revival  
 
When the empires of the East were being shaken by the revolutions, the Azeris began to 
contemplate what was wrong with their situation and the remedies for it. The most 
commonly highlighted theme in the writings of Agaoglu or Resulzade was the 
socioeconomic inferiority of the Azeris and how to sort this out. By 1907, the Azeris 
were the most populous and the least literate group in the region. Most of them were 
peasants, and those who worked in the cities (for instance in the Baku oil industry) were 
predominantly employed as low-skilled workers (54 percent) whereas foreigners, 
Russians and Armenians, held most of the skilled jobs.
657
 This was what Altstadt terms 
‘the first native, urban, industrial Muslim proletariat in the world.’658 Many of the Azeris 
were from politically fragile northern Persia in search of even the lowest-paying jobs.
659
 
In the local bureaucratic employment patterns, there was a similar picture. Particularly in 
the city of Baku, the concentration of economic activity attracted increasing numbers of 
Russian residents to the city who often occupied these posts.
660
 Only in the City Duma, 
were the Azeris not underrepresented, perhaps as a result of appeasement by the 
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viceroy.
661
 Particularly disturbing for the Tsarist officials was the special situation of 
Baku and the crime rates among the Muslims. Despite some improvement resulting from 
the efforts of the viceroy between 1909 and 1912, Baku was by far the most problematic 
city in the region, while the Muslims topped the crime rate statistics (both proportionally 
and in absolute terms) in most of the regions they inhabited.
662
 Unlike the Armenians and 
Georgians, they were not recruited for the army, a disappointment for some Azeris and an 
indication of how they were perceived by the Tsarist bureaucracy.
663 
A common answer for improving the socioeconomic situation of the Azeri population 
was schooling. From the millionaire oil tycoons to the SDs, most Azeris were in 
agreement that they needed to enlarge and modernize their schools. This was actually an 
important item on the agendas of the Russian Muslims, particularly after the efforts of 
Ismail Gaspıralı and his new method movement. The movement, despite some resistance 
from the traditionalists and the Russian government, was a great success and helped the 
modernization and expansion of Muslim schooling in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth
 
centuries.  
In the South Caucasus, the new method schools only began to expand after 1905 owing to 
the difficulties created by the Caucasian administration.
664
 Apart from the Azeri 
intelligentsia, an important vein of the Azeri educational drive came from the wealthy 
Azeri industrialists that provided the financial backing. One of these industrialists was 
Tagizade, who was the wealthiest Azeri oil man and a philanthropist. A man with a very 
modest background, his success in the oil business made him one of the most influential 
Muslims in the region. Made an honorary state councillor by Nicholas II, Tagizade 
channelled all of his energy to Azeri cultural reforms after selling most of his oil fields.
665
 
His support for this cause enabled the opening of the schools for girls and children and 
the establishment of educational charities to spread literacy like Nesr-i Maarif, which was 
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founded by Tagizade in 1908 and directed by Agaoglu.
666
 In addition to schooling, 
Tagizade was also a patron of theatres, libraries, and operas run by Azeris, who produced 
the first Muslim opera libretto in 1907 (Leyla and Mecnun) in the region.
667
 Thanks to 
these efforts, the literacy rates for Azeris significantly increased among males and 
females between 1897 and 1913.
668
  
Another channel was the growing press and Azeri bourgeoisie and intelligentsia teamed 
up to found newspapers and periodicals. More than 60 periodicals in Azeri Turkish were 
published between 1907 and 1915, a huge leap forward.
669
 In these periodicals, Azeris 
discussed how to achieve modernization, begin a cultural revival and catch up to their 
Armenian neighbours and although some of the most influential Azeri intelligentsia went 
abroad because of pressure from the Tsarist police, the Azeri press continued to bring the 
discussions in Istanbul and Tabriz to Baku.  
Apart from the press, these demands were voiced in another important public venue, the 
State Duma. The Azeri deputies, along with the empire-wide Muslim political movement 
led by the Ittifak, had been active in the first and second Duma, where they attempted to 
make the common demands on behalf of the empire’s Muslims. The use of language in 
state institutions had always been a controversial issue and had taken severe criticism 
from the right-wing members in the first and second Dumas. To the Muslim demands for 
instruction in their native language, a deputy from the right would yell ‘Go to Turkey!’670   
Although the number of Muslim deputies in the Third Duma dropped to 10—a huge 
reduction—they continued to use the parliament as a means to publicize their demands. 
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Their main concerns were again about linguistic and religious liberties.
671
 An Azeri 
deputy, Hasmamedov, stated in his speech at the Duma that the road to cultural 
development was closed to Muslims because of the educational system. The existing 
schools were unsatisfactory for two reasons: the native tongue was not used and the 
Muslims had fewer schools vis-à-vis the Christians. The Muslim population even lacked 
a pedagogical institution to train its religious teachers.
672
 With its more right-wing 
profile, the Third Duma rejected these pleas with utter contempt. 
The demands for the expansion of schools and other means to combat illiteracy were 
themselves not opposed by the Tsarist administration. However, as the schools were 
established and literacy rates went up and more lively Azeri press was brought about, the 
Tsarist administration knew that different demands about cultural and educational matters 
would follow. As expected, soon the demands for education in native languages, more 
religious liberties, the introduction of self-government methods like zemstvo, and more 
investment in the South Caucasus followed.  
The Azeris, as a part of the broader Muslim modernization in the Russian Empire, were 
adapting to the challenges of the post-revolutionary period. In the first few years of the 
recovery, the viceroyalty and the central government were busy with eradicating the 
revolutionary movement and they were not too concerned with the Azeri demands about 
cultural and educational matters and even supported their campaigns to spread literacy. 
However, when the revolutionary movement began to wane in the South Caucasus, two 
other revolutions broke out in the neighbouring Muslim empires. The political debates 
about Turkism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in the circles in Istanbul and Tabriz were 
now discussed in the cafés in Baku. From Stolypin to the ordinary Okhrana agent in 
Baku, the Tsarist bureaucracy’s perception of the Muslims in the South Caucasus was 
gradually changing for the worse.   
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The Threat of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in the South Caucasus  
 
An important political movement that influenced the Tsarist decision-making process at 
home and abroad was related to pan-Islam and pan-Turkism, which began to appear more 
on the political scene near 1910. From 1905 to 1911, the Muslims of the Russian, 
Ottoman and Persian Empires experienced a very unique period, where, among other 
things, they discussed one essential issue: the Muslim challenge to modernity. The 
Russian Muslims were under the rule of the Romanovs, the Ottoman, and Persian 
Empires were under severe pressure from the European powers. As a panacea to this 
decline, apart from modernization, many advocated the need for increased political, 
economic, and cultural coordination among these Muslims. For some ideologues 
however, political unity was essential and could only be achieved through pan-Islamism 
or pan-Turkism. 
During his reign, Abdulhamid II had constantly tried to reach out to other Muslims by 
virtue of his title, the Caliph.
673
 His pan-Islamist policies were used as leverage against 
the European powers that had significant numbers of Muslim subjects rather than an 
aggressive expansionary plan for which the Ottoman Empire did not have the means.
674
 
Similar policies of the CUP to improve the solidarity among the Muslims, particularly 
with those of Russia and Persia, have also been labelled as pan-Turkist since the CUP 
was highlighting the Turkish identity along with the Muslim identity.
675
 However, the 
real aim of the CUP’s policies has been an item of debate.676 
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For the Russian bureaucracy, the pan-Islamist movement and its doctrine were vague but 
its ultimate aim was considered to be the political unity of Muslims.
677
 Among the Tsarist 
bureaucracy and certain political parties from the right, some already had suspicions 
about the pan-Islamist threat. One source of these suspicions was the situation of the 
Russian Muslims and their demands. Led by the Volga and Crimean Tatars, the Russian 
Muslims were asking more political, cultural and religious liberties after the revolution of 
1905. Given the considerable Muslim population of the empire, this was a serious matter.  
Once the general strength of the revolutionary organizations was broken and the 
Stolypin-led government became more confident, the central government became more 
concerned with developments regarding the Russian Muslims. This increased when the 
CUP began to dominate Ottoman politics after the counter-revolution of 1909, owing to 
the connections between the CUP and the Russian Muslims. From 1910 on, the combined 
effect of the internal situation of the Russian Muslims and the external aspect of their ties 
with the Ottoman Empire began to change the perception of the Russian Muslims as a 
threat for the Tsarist bureaucracy. This was particularly important for a border region like 
the South Caucasus, where the Tsarist officials increasingly had a different perception of 
the Azeris.  
These allegations about pan-Islamist sentiments of the Muslims in the Caucasus were not 
new. In the Caucasus, an Armenian publicist, Chalkhushian, attributed the Muslim efforts 
of solidarity against the Armenians from 1905–1906 to the pan-Islamist movement, 
which, according to him, were carried out by Ottoman agents in the region to turn the 
already backward Muslims more fanatical, to the detriment of Armenians and the Russian 
Empire.
678
 In a similar fashion, in July 1908, Vorontsov-Dashkov pointed out to Stolypin 
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that it was because of the threat of pan-Islamism that the Armenian revolutionaries were 
in action between 1905 and 1906.
679
  
In the capital, extreme right-wingers like Purishkevich or the columnists in Russkoe 
znamia performed this feat quite often. To the accusations of Purishkevich regarding the 
pan-Islamist aspirations of the Russian Muslims, a Kazan Tatar deputy, Sadri M. 
Maksudov responded in December 1908 that the Russian Muslims always had been loyal 
to Russia and there was no such teaching of pan-Islamism ‘not only among the Russian 
Muslims but also in the entire Muslim East.’ Maksudov went on by saying that the 
Russian Muslim efforts for development were not ‘fanatical and anti-cultural’ but a 
progressive European movement and the roots of the pan-Islamist insinuations were in 
Europe, where some Islamophobes created this chimera.
680
  
The assurances of Maksudov and other Muslim deputies did not eliminate the suspicions 
of many high-ranking officials in St. Petersburg. As Stolypin was informed about the 
pan-Islamist movement and he was aware of the potential dangers it might bring about. In 
1909, in a letter to the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, Lukianov, he stressed his 
convictions about the necessity to fight with the Islamic threat that was ‘especially 
dangerous for the Russian throne.’681  
By 1910, the intelligence reports and other observations of the local administrators about 
the pan-Islamists kept growing. Suspicions over these were mixed with the religious and 
educational demands of the Russian Muslims from the government, which forced 
Stolypin to organize a special commission in Kazan to discuss these issues. At the end of 
this meeting, Stolypin underlined the developments caused by ‘the Muslim question’, 
mainly brought about by the efforts of the Volga Tatars in religious, educational, and 
political areas. Some of the participants were less convinced about the extent of this 
problem, but it was concluded that the movement among the Muslims, especially among 
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the Volga Tatars, was conflicting with the Russian imperial interests.
682
 More 
importantly, according to Stolypin, these efforts were in line with the pan-Islamist 
movement.
683
  
In June 1910, another congress of the missionaries in the same city repeated the pan-
Islamist threat in the Russian Empire.
684
 In October 1910, Stolypin wrote to the head of 
the Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions, Kharuzin, that the leaders of 
the Young Turks decided to disseminate their pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist propaganda to 
Russian Muslims; as a result several agents were sent to Crimea, Turkistan, and the 
Caucasus disguised as pilgrims and traders. Stolypin further instructed that the police and 
the gendarmerie needed to be vigilant about such characters and all other measures to 
stop this movement had to be taken.
685
 The grievances of Stolypin about the Ottoman 
origins of the pan-Islamist threat in the Russian Empire forced him to ask Sazonov to 
make a diplomatic effort to close down the Turkish journal, Tearuf-i Muslimin (1910-11), 
which Stolypin believed to be spreading pan-Islamist ideas among the Russian 
Muslims.
686
 Sazonov’s proposal was rejected by the Ottoman government but the Tsarist 
concerns continued. 
Although Stolypin and Vorontsov-Dashkov were usually at odds on the formulation of 
the policies concerning the Russian Armenians, they agreed on the threat of the pan-
Islamist movement. Vorontsov-Dashkov was particularly alert to increased pan-Islamist 
activity, one of the targets of which was the Caucasus. To prevent the activities of the 
pan-Islamist emissaries, all governors and the police were ordered to observe the 
activities of these emissaries and their contacts in the local population as well as the 
activities of the Ottoman consulates in the Caucasus.
687
 Soon in late December 1910, the 
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Ottoman consul in Tiflis, Cafer Bey was under the radar of the viceroyalty as the consul 
was reported to be the contact point for the pan-Islamist emissaries. After his attempts to 
turn the local Muslims against Russia, the viceroy wanted him out.
688
 
To growing Russian fears about the pan-Islamist movement in the South Caucasus, more 
suspicion was added by the involvement of Germany. As the German influence on the 
Ottoman Empire grew, so did the fears of the Russians about the German backing of the 
pan-Islamist movement. When Sazonov met Emperor Wilhelm in October 1910, for 
Sazonov, the most interesting part of their conversation was about the German naval 
power and the question of pan-Islamism. Sazonov complained about the harm that pan-
Islamist propaganda could bring to Russia and warned that Russia would take action 
since the movement had taken on a political character with revolutionary colourings. 
When Sazonov remarked that Wilhelm’s attitude, as the patron of the Muslims, and the 
possibility of the emergence of a ‘Berlin Caliphate’ could cause further agitation among 
the Russian Muslims, Wilhelm dismissed these concerns and declared that Germany had 
no such plans.
689
 Not convinced by Wilhelm’s assurances, Sazonov expressed his worries 
to the British about the German support for pan-Islamism.
690
 
Indeed these suspicions of a pan-Islamist threat under the patronage of Germany were 
known from the days when the Kaiser Wilhelm called himself ‘a friend of Muslims’ as he 
visited Jerusalem and Damascus. The Kaiser also had told ‘Nicky’ about how explosive 
this plan could be for the British.
691
 Although the toppling of his friend Abdulhamid II by 
the CUP in 1908 changed the course of such an action, the German influence over the 
Ottoman Empire, mainly by way of the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and a 
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huge loan from the Deutsche Bank in December 1910, continued to increase. Wary of the 
impact of railways so close to her borders and potential implications in northern Persia, 
the Russians were also anxious about the revival of the use of pan-Islam by the Germans.  
In January 1911, Stolypin underlined his general views about the state of the pan-Islamist 
movement to the Council of Ministers. Blaming the Ottoman government as the chief 
instigator, Stolypin believed that the CUP was aspiring to ‘the unification of the Muslims 
of the whole world for the formation of a united Muslim state.’ To stop the growing pan-
Islamist sentiment and its propaganda among the Russian Muslims, Stolypin 
recommended various religious, educational, and administrative measures.
692
 The same 
theme also was on the agenda for the Council of Ministers in late January 1911, with a 
special reference to the conditions of Baku. Discussing the application of the Ottoman 
government to open a consulate in Baku, Stolypin noted the increasing number of 
‘Turkish nationalists’ under Ottoman patronage and ‘strengthening of pan-Islamist 
propaganda’ in the region.693 In the same document, Baku was dubbed as ‘the centre of 
Islamism in the Caucasus’ and a consulate in such a risky place would be a hotbed of 
these Ottoman agents. However, believing that a refusal would endanger diplomatic 
relations with the Ottoman Empire, also endorsed by the viceroy, the Council of 
Ministers went ahead and accepted the application.
694
  
In the following months of 1911 various reports were sent to the viceroy about the 
activities of ‘pan-Islamists’ in the South Caucasus. The correspondence between the key 
branches of the gendarmerie kept on warning the viceroyalty that the pan-Islamist agent 
network was expanding in the South Caucasus with a view to win the Azeris for 
unification with their brethren across the border.
695
 Moreover, the viceroyalty was getting 
more anxious about the Muslim press in the Caucasus as the number of articles preaching 
pan-Islamist ideas was rising, not only provoking the Muslims but also other nationalities 
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against the Russian government.
696
 A further set of instructions to prevent the infiltration 
of the pan-Islamist emissaries focused on the monitoring of the Muslim press and Qurans 
from Ottoman lands and tighter surveillance of suspicious visitors from the Ottoman 
Empire.
697
  
These measures did not seem to work as the reports kept stressing the pan-Islamic threat. 
A report by the chancellery of the viceroyalty in September 1911 noted that the region 
was pacified after the persecution of political parties in the region like the Dashnaktsutiun 
and the most prominent danger in the region was now pan-Islam, directed by the Ottoman 
agents.
698
 The military intelligence was also pointing out that a score of Ottoman officers 
from Erzurum were sent to the Caucasus to prepare the local Muslims for an uprising in 
case of a Russo-Ottoman war.
699
  
This trend went on into 1912. The border regions with considerable Muslim population, 
like Kars, were particularly thought to be under threat of pan-Islamist penetration. Not 
surprisingly, the Ottoman consul in Kars, Hasan Bey, was considered to be the main 
figure to orchestrate the pan-Islamists in the area according to Russian intelligence.
700
 
The Kurdish population in these border areas was also feared to be manipulated by the 
propaganda of the pan-Islamist emissaries.
701
 In May 1912, the Russian consulate in 
Erzurum reported that the CUP was preparing for a holy war in the Caucasus.
702
 By 1912, 
in all major cities of the South Caucasus, wherever they looked, the top Tsarist officials 
were seeing pan-Islamist emissaries in various forms. 
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The Perception of the Growing Pan-Islamist Threat by Tsarist Officials and Its 
Impact on Russian-Azeri Relations by 1912 
 
As Bennigsen argues, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were not political movements with 
a concrete political ideology. As by-products of the Muslim challenge to modernity, they 
were rather vague frameworks calling for more solidarity and cooperation among 
Muslims.
703
 There were some ideologues and politicians with sympathies for them as 
political movements in the sense that the Russian authorities saw them, but their impact 
was far less influential on the Russian Muslim political movement and the Ottoman 
government and certainly not the driving force behind both.
704
 As Meyer and Reynolds 
note, the Russian perception of the pan-Islamist threat was far more than what the actual 
situation was.
705 
However, this was not how the ministers, the viceroy, and the Okhrana 
chiefs viewed the level of the pan-Islamist threat, which, in turn, reflected on their 
dealings and relations with the Azeris and the Ottoman Empire.   
Why was there such an exaggerated Russian perception of a pan-Islamist threat in the 
empire and the Caucasus? An important reason was related to the growing politicization 
and the modernization of the Russian Muslims after 1905. After the end of the revolution, 
Russian Muslims were demanding more political, cultural, and religious rights. They 
were aiming at modernizing their education, reaching to the wider Muslim world and 
organizing themselves as a political force. Given their numbers and the general 
conservative standpoint of the Stolypin administration, the Russian Muslims were raising 
suspicions for the Tsarist bureaucracy. The attitude of the Orthodox Church and the right-
wing parties in the State Duma toward the political movement of Russian Muslims also 
added to the emergence of the negative perception by both the public and the 
government.
706
 Moreover, the traditionalist Muslim clergy who were critical of the 
reformist direction of the Russian Muslim politics also contributed to this negative 
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perception.
707
 Soon, almost all political or cultural demands by the Russian Muslims 
began to be associated with pan-Islamism, which, for suspicious Tsarist minds, 
increasingly became anything affiliated with the Russian Muslim movement.
708  
Another major contributing factor was the CUP’s policies toward the Russian Muslims. 
Being a border region, the South Caucasus was seen as an ideal place for the CUP to 
increase its cooperation with the Muslims of the region. The CUP’s calls for increased 
cooperation with the Russian Muslims, improved communication networks and the 
Russian Muslim presence within the CUP aggravated Russian fears. The CUP, for its 
internal and external aims wanted to use the solidarity with its fellow Muslim brethren as 
leverage against the Russian Empire, although this would increasingly be so after 1912. 
As Reynolds argues, pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism was not the rationale of Ottoman 
policies but rather ‘the instruments of the policies.’709 Nevertheless, from the revolution 
of 1908 to 1912, the increased Ottoman interest in the Russian Muslims contributed to 
the growing Russian fears of pan-Islamism. In the case of the Russian Muslim political 
movement, almost all actions of the Ottoman government concerning the Russian 
Muslims were seen as part of their pan-Islamist agenda and, naturally, all Ottoman agents 
who were in touch with the Russian Muslims were pan-Islamist emissaries for the Tsarist 
authorities. 
In March 1912, deputy Maksudov made another critical speech in the State Duma about 
the Tsarist policies regarding the Russian Muslims on the grounds of pan-Islamism. He 
noted that the arrests of mullahs and teachers and raids on Muslim establishments on the 
charges of pan-Islamism were directed at obstructing Muslim progress and all its cultural 
aspirations were labelled with the word ‘pan-Islamism’. Calling the pan-Islamist 
movement a ‘product of hostile fantasy and a creation of political missionaries’, 
Maksudov dismissed the existence of such a movement that called for the unification of 
all Muslims from India to Africa—a feat which even Alexander the Great and Napoleon 
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failed to achieve. This was a myth the missionaries and the scholars of the non-Muslim 
states created and it was used against the Russian Muslims.
710
 
Maksudov was right in suspecting that the attitude of the Russian government toward the 
Azeris changed from 1907 to 1912. By 1907, they were the least revolutionized, the least 
literate and least urban, and the most populous major nationality in the South Caucasus. 
However, from then on, they were building upon the legacy of the broader Russian 
Muslim political movement in the revolution of 1905. The consequent revolutions in the 
neighbouring Muslim empires added another dimension to the Tsarist view of Azeris. In 
addition to their interaction with the Persian and Ottoman revolutions, the number of 
Azeri newspapers and periodicals were soaring, their schools were being modernized, 
and the Azeri intelligentsia was interested in the empire-wide Muslim question, which 
was revolved around the political, cultural, and religious demands of Russian Muslims.  
The Russian government and the viceroyalty were becoming more suspicious about the 
political aspirations of the Azeris, which they increasingly believed to be influenced by 
the pan-Islamist movement. From 1910 onward, most of the Azeri political, cultural, and 
religious activities, as well as the Ottoman and German moves in the South Caucasus, 
were seen as part of the grander pan-Islamist movement. From the top levels of Tsarist 
bureaucracy in St. Petersburg and Tiflis to local governors and police branches, the pan-
Islamist threat was increasingly noted. By 1912, the general views of the Russian 
officialdom about the dangers of the pan-Islamist movement came closer to the Armenian 
press, which was going on about it since the revolutionary period when the Armenian 
publicist Chalkhushian defined pan-Islam as ‘the devil’ behind the Armenian-Azeri 
clashes of 1905–1906.711 Against the accusations of the Armenian press, Azeri 
intellectuals like Agaoglu wrote rebuttals arguing that the Armenians were doing this on 
purpose to damage the image of the Russian Muslims and preserve their ‘privileged 
position’ in the Russian Empire.712  
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By 1912, among the three major nationalities in the South Caucasus, the Azeris were 
considered as the most potentially troublesome according to viceroy. With their nascent 
national movement, numbers, and the logistic advantage of being on the border area with 
two Muslim empires, the Muslims of the South Caucasus were thought to be the most 
explosive nationalities of all and the most likely candidates for separatism by Vorontsov-
Dashkov.
713
 Although the pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist propaganda did not produce what 
they wanted in the region for now, the authorities had to be vigilant to prevent its 
success.
714
 Similarly, when Stolypin became chairman of the Council of Ministers, he 
had considered the Armenians, owing to the Dashnak strength, presented the most 
imminent threat for the stability in the region. Then, as the Dashnaks were eliminated as a 
political force, Stolypin’s chief concern about the South Caucasus gradually became the 
pan-Islamist threat and this remained until his death.   
By 1912, the Azeris were now the most pressing threat in the region, replacing the 
Armenians, who were seen as the most troublesome nationality in the region under 
Golitsyn administration. This gradual change was in line with the improved relations 
between the Russian administration and the Armenians. Now, against the growing danger 
of the pan-Islamist movement in the South Caucasus, the Russian Armenians were seen 
in a more favourable light by the Tsarist bureaucracy—particularly because its unstable 
elements (i.e., the Dashnaks) were weeded out and the other pillars of political power, the 
Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie, were ready to cooperate. The viceroy 
was contented that the Armenians, like the Georgians, had no option but to ally 
themselves with the Tsarist regime without which they would be absorbed by the Muslim 
population.
715
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The Viceroyalty and the Armenian Bourgeoisie (1907–1912) 
The Viceroyalty and the Armenian Bourgeoisie by 1907 
 
Travellers to the South Caucasus often sang praises of the region’s natural beauty. The 
urban life in the region, on the other hand, did not impress the same travellers as much. 
Even Baku, with its enormous wealth, disappointed European visitors. Nevertheless, 
there was one common sight in all the major cities in the South Caucasus that attracted 
the attention of the travellers: the economic dominance of the Armenians. The Armenian 
urban element was the driving element behind this. The small shopkeepers, the growing 
professional class, and the merchants were the visible facade of this element. Then, there 
was the high industrial and financial class that produced very famous names like the 
Mantashevs, Liazonovs, and Gukasians. In Tiflis, they were buying out the Georgian 
nobles and building landmarks in the heart of the city. In Baku and Batumi, Armenian 
oilmen were successfully competing with the likes of the Nobels, Rothschilds or state-
backed Russian oil companies.  
Since the Russians captured the region in 1828, this element had various reasons to be on 
good terms with the Russian administration. For both sides, this arrangement generally 
worked until it was hampered by the policies of Golitsyn and the climax of anti-Tsarist 
resistance between 1903 and 1906. However, once the properties of the Armenian Church 
were given back and the October Manifesto was in place, many urban Armenians felt that 
they could go back to the old equilibrium. From the day he came to Tiflis in 1905, the 
viceroy believed that the urban Armenian element needed to be won over for the interests 
of the Russian administration. Along with the Armenian Church, this economically 
strong element could help the viceroyalty handle its relations with its Armenian 
population, who were considered by the viceroy as ‘conservative and practical by 
nature.’716  
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s efforts to annul the confiscation act and end the hostilities between 
the Armenians and Azeris were important in gaining the loyalties of the Armenian 
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population at large and the Armenian bourgeoisie. As the stability in the region improved 
and the national discontent over the church became less intense, the viceroy knew that the 
Armenian bourgeoisie would be more eager to keep its interests by allying itself to the 
Tsarist regime.
717
 The new political setting after the revolution of 1905 allowed the 
Armenian bourgeoisie to demonstrate its influence in the State Duma. Since the 
Dashnaks boycotted the First Duma, all of the Armenian deputies from the South 
Caucasus were from the Armenian bourgeoisie and sat with the Kadets. Although 
eclipsed by the Dashnaks in the elections for the Second Duma, the urban Armenian 
element was consolidating its economic power as the region stabilized.  
Soon, this economic prowess was used for political and cultural influence. The urban 
Armenian elements were again a formidable power in local politics with their numbers in 
the City Dumas. As a sign of their urban influence, the Armenians had the highest ratio of 
hereditary and personal honourable citizens (potomstvennye and lichnye pochetnye 
grazhdane) and general urban population in the South Caucasus.
718
 Although the majority 
of the Armenians were peasants, the Armenian bourgeoisie was the dominant leading 
force in economic and cultural life among the Russian Armenians as
 
it led in the 
improvement of Armenian schooling, publication of newspapers and periodicals, and 
organization of charities. These were accommodated by the policies of the viceroy, who 
was keen on having two conservative elements of the Armenian political scene—the 
Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie—on his side. By 1907, there was only 
one problem in this new setting: the Dashnaks and their increased power among all 
sectors of Armenian society owing to their efforts between 1903 and 1907. 
 
The Russian Crackdown on the Dashnakstsutiun as a Part of the Rapprochement 
 
In the initial phases of its existence, the Dashnaktsutiun originally had adherents mainly 
among the lower middle classes and peasants. However, its base diversified between 
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1903 and 1906. During this chaotic period, many members of the Armenian bourgeoisie 
found the Dashnaks as the most capable organization to protect their interests. This 
became more widespread during the Armenian-Azeri clashes. Many wealthy Armenians 
found it quite practical to fund the Dashnaks for the security of their lives and properties. 
The Dashnaks won over many urban Armenians because of the leadership they 
demonstrated against Tsarist policies and the Azeris. 
In such an atmosphere, the well-to-do Armenians had to endure paying taxes to the party 
and forgot about the earlier expropriations and assassinations by the Dashnaks.
719
 
However, as the regime recovered and the revolutionary organizations were weakened by 
Tsarist persecutions, wealthy Armenians became more vocal in expressing their 
grievances about the methods of the Dashnaks.
720
 More importantly, the Dashnaks 
officially added socialism to their programme in their fourth annual congress in Vienna in 
1907. These elements in the Armenian bourgeoisie wanted the Dashnaks to fight for their 
original cause—the liberation of ‘Ottoman Armenia’—and leave matters to them in the 
South Caucasus.
721
 Instead, the Dashnaks were making overtures to the Second 
International and tarnishing their image with both the Tsarist and the Armenian 
bourgeoisie of the South Caucasus. As a result, the Dashnaks began to lose support from 
the Armenian bourgeoisie.
722
 
This was what the viceroy was expecting. The next step came with the trial of the 
Dashnaktsutiun, masterminded by St. Petersburg and directed by Lyzhin. Many top-level 
officials in the capital believed that the viceroy’s methods with the Dashnaks were too 
lenient and the trial was a way to crush the Dashnak organization and its supporters. 
Among the party affiliates were the members of the Armenian bourgeoisie, who 
developed sympathies for the party when it was spearheading the Armenian resistance 
against the Tsarist policies and the Azeris. The trial process did not spare many of them 
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as many wealthy Armenians, as well as professionals, were arrested on the grounds of 
active participation in the party or assisting it.  
The central government and the Lyzhin did not specifically target the Armenian 
bourgeoisie and they basically saw the bourgeoisie as a useful element for the Tsarist 
establishment once it was cleansed of the revolutionary elements. This was quite similar 
to the view of the viceroy. The basic difference was their preferred method of weeding 
out the revolutionary elements among the Armenian bourgeoisie. Those in St. Petersburg 
believed that by arresting all the suspicious individuals affiliated with the Dashnaks they 
would both destroy the organization and instil fear among the entire Armenian society in 
the South Caucasus. The party was so entangled with the Armenian population in the 
region that the trial process ended up with the arrests of many influential public figures; 
men of industry, commerce, and finance; and urban professionals. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov believed that these arrests and the ensuing fear were destroying the 
scheme that he wanted to establish. In a more stable political and economic environment, 
which the viceroy succeeded in bringing to the region after 1905, the Armenian 
bourgeoisie would be very willing to replace the Dashnaks as the leading Armenian 
political power in the South Caucasus. Apart from the political conflict, the socialist 
leanings of the Dashnaks, and their earlier distasteful measures against the Armenian 
bourgeoisie, there were the other obvious reasons why they would gradually reject 
supporting them in the Russian Empire. The viceroy noted that these people were arrested 
during the trial process to prove the revolutionary aspirations of the entire Russian 
Armenian population and without his consent. The use of normal judiciary processes on 
the party organization on a limited scale could have done the job.
723
 Instead, the natural 
allies of the regime in the viceroy’s new arrangement were in prison, thereby 
undermining the confidence of them in his administration and the economic stability in 
the region. 
Personally, the viceroy had already demonstrated his views on the importance of the 
Armenian bourgeoisie by appealing to the Ministry of Justice for the detainment of the 
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well-known merchant, Melik-Azariants. The arrest of such influential individuals, he 
believed, was creating a negative sentiment among the Armenians against the regime.
724
 
Despite his protests, Melik-Azariants and another wealthy Armenian merchant from 
Rostov-on-Don, Ivan M. Shaposhnikov, were suspected of being the main financial 
backers of the party and both remained in prison. Nevertheless, the first wave of the trial 
process, although disliked by the viceroy because of the complications it brought, served 
the purpose of eliminating the Dashnaks within the Armenian bourgeoisie. Despite some 
grievances related to the trial, the Armenian bourgeoisie was now free of Dashnaks and 
was becoming the dominant political force among the Russian Armenians and had 
various reasons to be on the side of the Tsarist regime.  
 
 
The Economic Dimension of the Rapprochement  
 
As the process of elimination of the Dashnak elements within the Armenian bourgeoisie 
went on, the viceroy was making sure that the Armenian bourgeoisie’s economic interests 
were safe. The oil industry was the starting point especially considering a general slump 
in global oil prices. The existence of a strong labour movement in the sector, an 
important legacy of the revolution, was disturbing both the viceroyalty and the 
industrialists. Soon, the growing demands of the workers were followed by the 
complaints of the industrialists.
725
 The falling oil prices from 1908 onward made this 
collaboration between the industrialists and the Tsarist administration even more 
intense.
726
 As a result, Stolypin urged the viceroy to crush organized labour, which the 
viceroy carried out.
727
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The Armenian oil tycoons were on the government’s side when the labour movement was 
crushed. With the end of the political conflict, Armenian oil tycoons continued to thrive 
in Baku and Batumi as well as in their foreign operations. The Mantashevs, despite the 
death in 1911 of Aleksander Mantashev, the founder of the dynasty, kept expanding their 
oil operations in Baku and Batumi as well as investing in the Caucasian commercial 
bank, which was the only bank in the region to be included in the St. Petersburg 
Exchange.
728
 Another Armenian oil man, S. Liazonov, established companies in Europe 
to attract foreign capital to Baku for his companies. The Armenian commercial might in 
Baku was safe as the figures for the top-level merchants demonstrated.
729
 
In the professional jobs in the oil industry, the Armenians also had a good position, hence 
more reasons to support the Tsarist efforts for the stability.
730
 The Armenian economic 
success in Baku was not limited to the oil sector. The Armenian commercial might in 
Baku was safe as the figures for the top-level merchants demonstrated.
731
 In smaller-scale 
shops and the urban professions in Baku, the Armenians also kept doing well after the 
regime’s recovery.732  
In Tiflis, like in the pre-revolutionary days, the Georgian intelligentsia continued to rant 
about the Armenian economic superiority in their traditional capital.
733
 The Georgian 
nobility continued to lose their estates to the Armenians. Fearing that this Armenian 
economic dominance could incite the Georgians, the viceroy had to intervene in some 
cases, like the sale of Baratov’s estates to the well-known Armenian merchant, 
Aramiants.
734
 Nevertheless, the Armenian economic success went on in Tiflis. 
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In the first place, the Armenian industrial presence in Tiflis had been strongly felt. Thirty-
eight of 72 industrial companies in the city were owned by Armenians. The vodka 
factories of the brothers Sesian, the leather factory of Adelkhanian (where Stalin and his 
father worked), brick factories of Martirosian, and the copper works of Melik-Azariants 
were some of those plants.
735
 When some of the Armenian capitalists founded the 
Merchant Bank of Tiflis in 1912 with a capital of 5 million roubles, the Georgians could 
only respond with the formation of Tiflis Nobility Land Bank, with 147.300 roubles 
worth of capital.
736
 
One of the dimensions of the rapprochement was the viceroy’s economic vision for future 
of the South Caucasus and the suitability of the Armenian industrialists and financiers as 
well as the professional classes for it. Vorontsov-Dashkov actively supported the 
establishment of private banks and companies in the region to attract more capital.
737
 His 
efforts to introduce zemstvo in the region, commercialization of the agriculture, and other 
means of attracting capital to the region would bring more benefits to the most urban, 
literate, and commercial nationality.
738
 With its economic strength and more-extensive 
networks, the Armenian bourgeoisie was a good fit for his economic vision in the region. 
One of the leading Specifists, Ishkhanian, observed this. The economic policies of the 
viceroy were the next steps of capitalist development in the Caucasus. According to 
Ishkhanian, only the Armenians [bourgeoisie] ‘to a certain extent’ possessed the qualities 
to survive in this capitalist transformation led by foreign capital, whereas the leading 
elements of the Georgians and Azeris, the landowning classes, would be doomed. This 
Marxist account of the economic side of the Tsarist view of the nationalities question 
underlined why both the Russian administration and the Armenian bourgeoisie had 
mutual interests against the more feudally structured Georgians and Azeris.
739
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As the Dashnak organization was hit by the trial and lost power, the Armenian 
bourgeoisie filled the power vacuum among the Russian Armenians. Putting order and 
stability in the region as their priority, which was now maintained by the Tsarist anti-
revolutionary drive, the Armenian bourgeoisie was becoming the dominant element 
among the Russian Armenians once again. An important part of this was the 
accommodation of their economic interests by the economic policies of the viceroy, 
which were primarily calling for expansion of capitalist development in the region. The 
viceroy believed that the region would prosper with the establishment of more banks and 
industrial enterprises to make use of the region’s natural resources and commercialization 
of agriculture. These projections suited the traits of the Armenian bourgeoisie far better 
than the politically dominant Georgian and Azeri classes. 
 
 
The Rise of the Armenian Bourgeoisie as a Political Force in the South Caucasus 
 
The elimination of the Dashnak organization in the South Caucasus and the compatibility 
of the economic interests of the Armenian bourgeoisie and the viceroy’s economic 
policies paved the way for the Armenian bourgeoisie to consolidate its political power. 
Empire-wide, one of the venues through which they could make their voice heard was the 
State Duma. However, like all national minorities, the Armenian representation was 
curtailed. In the Second Duma, there was a Dashnak domination of the Armenian 
deputies from the Caucasus. In the Third Duma, there were only two Armenian deputies 
from the Caucasus: Ivan Saghatelian, a Dashnak who sat with the Trudoviki and Moisei 
S. Adzhemov, who was with the Kadets. Therefore, the State Duma was not the ideal 
place for the Armenian bourgeoisie to help their political ascent. Instead, they 
concentrated their power in the local politics, in the City Dumas and upravas, where they 
had always been a major force thanks to their economic strength. 
185 
 
In the minor cities of the South Caucasus with considerable Armenian population, such as 
Erevan and Elizavetpol, the Armenian bourgeoisie was understandably influential and 
could outclass the other nationalities for seats in the City Dumas. The real competition 
was in Tiflis and Baku where the populations were divided between the major 
nationalities and bigger economic and political interests were at stake. In Baku, thanks to 
the half-Christian rule, the Armenians, along with the Russian elements, were influential 
in the City Duma although the Azeris still had the majority.
740
  
In the administrative capital of the region, the Armenians found a more suitable ground. 
The Armenian population in Tiflis was considerably larger than in Baku and the 
economic competition was not as fierce. Traditionally a local political force in the Tiflis 
City Duma and uprava, the Armenians made up 72 percent of the voting franchise for the 
Tiflis Duma by 1902.
741
 Between 1870 and 1916, nine out of 11 mayors were 
Armenians.
742
  The Armenian domination was especially frustrating to the Georgians 
who called the Tiflis City Duma ‘Sololaki Parliament’ hinting at the Armenian 
domination.
743
 
The mayors, elected by the City Dumas, were of political importance in local politics and 
could help further the interests of the Armenian bourgeoisie in its consolidation of 
political power. In 1909, the former deputy to the mayor, Aleksandr I. Khatisian, became 
the new mayor of Tiflis. Born into a high civil-servant family in Tiflis in 1874, Khatisian 
studied medicine in Moscow and Kharkov universities and then went to Germany and 
France for further education. Returning to Tiflis in 1900, he was elected as a member of 
the City Duma in 1902, a member of the uprava in 1906, and the deputy to the mayor in 
1907.
744
 In 1909, because of his illness, the mayor, Vasilii N. Cherkezov (a Georgian), 
left his post to his deputy Khatisian, who won the mayoralty elections in September 1910. 
The Georgian nationalist newspapers were not happy that an Armenian won the post of 
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mayor of Tiflis as they wrote that ‘even if Khatisian could illuminate the city by the sun 
at night and make the streets out of marbles, we would nevertheless be against his 
election since he was an Armenian.’745 
Khatisian had sympathies for the Dashnaktsutiun, mainly because of the role it assumed 
for the Russian Armenians between 1903 and 1907. From 1906 onward when he first 
became deputy and then mayor of Tiflis, he considered himself as ‘an intermediary 
between the authorities and the revolutionary parties (i.e., the Dashnaks). His sympathies 
for the Dashnaks and perhaps his brother Konstantin’s more conspicuous links to them 
put Khatisian under the radar of the Okhrana branch in Tiflis, which reported him as a 
Dashnak sympathizer in its struggle with the Tsarist regime.
746 
 
The viceroy believed that the common Armenian sympathy for the Dashnaks in their 
struggle between 1903 and 1907 needed to be understood. More importantly, when the 
party organization was crushed in the South Caucasus, the members of the Armenian 
bourgeoisie would be natural supporters of his administration. Since Khatisian was not a 
conspicuous activist of the party and the viceroy fully trusted him as mayor, the Okhrana 
reports pointing out his Dashnak sympathy did not prevent his rise as mayor of Tiflis.
747
  
The good relations of Khatisian with the viceroyalty were also annoying the Armenian 
SDs. For Spandarian, an eminent Armenian SD, Khatisian had no firm political views as 
he depicted the mayor as a pragmatic character: ‘The favourite of the wife of the viceroy 
and all Russian administration, blessed by the Catholicos and the Exarch of Georgia, 
congratulated by the Okhrana and investigated by the police; drinking to the health of the 
Russian army while at the same time he was a Dashnak, Social Democrat and Kadet.’748 
Indeed, Khatisian was a pragmatic man and represented the compatible urban Armenian 
element for the new course of the Tsarist policies in the South Caucasus. Having 
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appreciated the Dashnak efforts between 1903 and 1907, he saw what was coming as the 
Tsarist regime recovered. He understood what Stolypin and the viceroy had in mind for 
the Russian Armenians and the Dashnaks were not a part of it. The Dashnaks could go 
back to their original aim, to help the Ottoman Armenians, while the Armenian urban 
element could be on good terms with the viceroy and handle the Russian Armenian 
affairs. He knew that the viceroy’s policies would accommodate the Russian Armenians, 
the Armenian bourgeoisie in particular, and this could be used to address the cultural, 
educational, and political demands of the Russian Armenians. After 1909, his efforts 
facilitated these demands and the translation of economic power of the Armenian 
bourgeoisie into local politics. 
From 1909 on, the Armenian bourgeoisie was the leading power in the City Duma in 
Tiflis, with Khatisian as the mayor, his other brother Georgii, (a lawyer), as a member of 
the Uprava, and another Armenian, Aleksandr M. Argutin-Dolgorukii, as his deputy. 
Because of the generous donations by the Armenian industrialists, Armenian educational 
establishments expanded. For instance, Mantashev bankrolled the new building of the 
Nersesian Seminary in the outskirts of Tiflis in 1912 and the Armenian Benevolent 
Society of the Caucasus.
749
 Another charitable institution led by the Armenian 
bourgeoisie, Baku Cultural Union (founded in 1906), was also active in the organization 
of Armenian schools and theatres. Although there were suspicions of nationalist ideas in 
these organizations, they went on operating.
750
 
The viceroy did not mind the expansion of Armenian schooling and the campaign for 
literacy, even with hints of national themes in the theatres and books. The Russian 
Armenians were going for the state schools instead of their community schools, which 
were closing down because of the lack of students. Therefore, a liberal approach rather 
than a restrictive one was a better choice for improved relations with the Armenian 
subjects of the Russian Empire.
751
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Apart from the primary schooling and literacy campaigns, led by Khatisian, the Armenian 
bourgeoisie was supportive of the idea of the establishment of a university in Tiflis.
752
 
The idea itself was not new as the Caucasus yearned for a university, although there were 
some like Velichko who had reservations about it and argued that a university in Tiflis 
would be an ‘academy of Armenian intrigue.’753 When the idea was introduced again in 
1912, these reservations were still intact in St. Petersburg as Kokovtsov, not very fond of 
the idea of a university in the Caucasus, asked the viceroy whether a university in Tiflis 
would be an area of influence for the Dashnaks.
754
 The viceroy responded that this was 
far from the truth. Counting on the ‘bourgeois-conservative Armenians,’ Vorontsov-
Dashkov noted that the Georgian youth would be a bigger problem in a university. For 
the viceroy, a university in Tiflis, far from being a centre for separatism, would bolster 
the knowledge of written Russian of the locals, whose knowledge of Russian was mostly 
limited to spoken Russian.
755
 
For the Tsarist authorities, the understanding between the Armenian bourgeoisie and the 
viceroyalty also had a Muslim connection. While the Tsarist authorities feared a growing 
pan-Islamist movement, for the Armenians it was the numbers of the Muslims that 
shaped their political agenda. A report in 1911 underlined that the Armenian leaders gave 
up on the idea of an autonomous Armenia as they believed that it would eventually be 
absorbed by Muslims, which was shared by the viceroy, who believed that this was 
essentially why the Armenians would not support separatism in the South Caucasus.
756
 
With the start of the Dashnak trial, the Armenian bourgeoisie was becoming the dominant 
force among the Russian Armenians. With the understanding it had with the viceroyalty, 
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it was able to use its economic power in local politics, which in turn was used to meet the 
demands of the Russian Armenians. By dominating the press in the South Caucasus, 
bankrolling the expanding Armenian schooling and charitable institutions, the Armenian 
bourgeoisie was also a key cultural element among the Armenians in the region. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov’s vision of the role of the Armenian bourgeoisie once the Dashnaks 
were gone was becoming real as the policies of the viceroy continued to facilitate the 
growing influence of the Armenian bourgeoisie on their community. With the help of a 
useful intermediary, Khatisian, the viceroy achieved what he wanted regarding the 
Armenian bourgeoisie by 1912.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
When Stolypin became Prime Minister, he knew how vital the national question was. 
Five years of experience proved him right: the last word he kept repeating on his 
deathbed after the assassination in the Kiev opera was ‘Finland’, a region where the 
Tsarist policies of nationalities had created nothing but discontent in the last decade.
757
 
The South Caucasus was another chronic problem in this regard and this was felt in the 
revolution of 1905. The newly established viceroyalty needed to regain the loyalties of 
the local population if it was to maintain stability in this economically and strategically 
important border region.  
Vorontsov-Dashkov had been in the Caucasus earlier and he had an idea about the 
national conflict among the local population. When he came to the region as the viceroy 
in 1905, however, the main problem was that the national grievances were now held 
against the Russian state and this had to be fixed. For the viceroy, once the region was 
free of the revolutionary organizations, these grievances could be gradually sorted out by 
more accommodating measures. Unlike his predecessor Golitsyn and the right-wingers 
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like Purishkevich, he was not fond of repressive measures that could hurt the national 
feelings of the local population. This relatively liberal approach in cultural and 
educational matters, coupled with a sound economic development, would help improve 
the relations of the Russian administration with the nationalities.  
However, the relations of the Russian government with the major nationalities in the 
region took different paths from 1907 to 1912. The social composition of the Georgians 
was feudal and the traditional ally of the Russian regime, the Georgian nobility, was still 
losing its wealth and political power, which it attributed to Russian policies. The 
Georgian peasantry was equally miserable. The common denominator of these two 
groups’ discontent was broader economic phenomena of diminishing returns on the land 
and the growing importance of commerce and industry, where they lagged behind the 
Russians, foreigners, and Armenians.  
The viceroy was aware of this structural problem and believed that the introduction of 
agrarian reforms as well as administrative ones like the zemstvo could improve things. 
The expectations of the viceroy were not fulfilled as some of these reforms could not 
even be introduced and some of them simply needed more time to make an impact. 
Therefore, the Georgian national movement still retained its mass support despite the 
Tsarist persecution of its leaders like Zhordania. 
More interestingly, the Georgian clergy became more vocal after 1907 about its demands 
for ecclesiastical autonomy. Giving away such privileges to a national group within the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s hierarchy was not really an option and it ended with the 
persecution of eminent members of the pro-autocephalist Georgian clergy, adding 
another source of national discontent among the Georgians. By 1912, both the agrarian 
and the religious sources of the Georgian discontent were in place and hence the 
continuing influence of the Georgian Mensheviks, who were a part of the broader 
Russian Social Democratic Movement, as well as the Socialist International. Knowing 
that there were no short-term solutions, the viceroy still believed in reforms and 
contended that the Georgian national movement did not pose as much of a threat to the 
Russian rule as the Azeris in the region. 
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Before the revolution of 1905, there were not many reasons for the Tsarist administration 
to be concerned about an Azeri national movement. However, the revolution of 1905 
changed the picture as they became a part of the empire-wide Muslim political movement 
and experienced the bloody clashes with the Armenians. In the aftermath, like other 
Muslim groups of the empire, the Azeris were becoming more interested in having 
greater political, cultural, and religious rights as well as modernizing their community. 
Another legacy of this period was the emergence of the first Azeri revolutionary 
organizations like Himmat and Difai, which were a source of concern for the viceroyalty.  
However, the main fears of the viceroyalty about the Azeris had roots in the neighbouring 
Muslim empires. When their nascent revolutionary organizations were crushed, they 
found two excellent training grounds in the Persian and Ottoman constitutional 
movements. This ongoing revolutionary experience and the increased interaction of the 
Azeri intelligentsia with their Persian and Ottoman counterparts were adding to the fears 
of the Russian officials. Soon, the top-level Tsarist bureaucracy was getting more and 
more anxious about an empire-wide problem among the Russian Muslims: the pan-
Islamist movement.  
From 1910 onward, the Tsarist perception of the pan-Islamist threat, believed to be 
directed by the Ottoman government with the aim of turning the Russian Muslims against 
Russia, grew exponentially. Being a border region, the South Caucasus was considered 
by the central government and viceroyalty to be overrun by the pan-Islamist emissaries 
who were preaching anti-Russian propaganda among the Azeris. By 1912, the 
increasingly politicized Azeris were now a part of the Muslim political movement in the 
Russian Empire and the Ottoman-led pan-Islamist threat. Because of their numbers, 
emerging national identity, and the existence of neighbouring Muslim empires, they were 
now the most potentially troublesome nationality in the South Caucasus, complicating 
both internal and external interests of the Russian Empire.  
Given the nature of the relations between the viceroyalty and the Georgians and Azeris, 
the Tsarist Armenians were gradually seen in a more positive light by the Russian 
administration, which needed allies in this turbulent region. Between 1907 and 1910, the 
regime had dealt with the Armenian national movement by rearranging of the Armenian 
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Church and the trial of the Dashnaktsutiun. The remaining pillar of Armenian political 
life was the Armenian bourgeoisie, who wanted to take the lead in Armenian affairs in 
the region, the articulation to the new environment was not a difficult feat as their 
interests coincided with those of the Tsarist regime in the region. Once the ‘unwanted 
Dashnak tutelage’ was gone, the Armenian bourgeoisie, composed mainly of merchants, 
urban professionals, and industrialists, filled the political void among the Russian 
Armenians with the encouragement of the viceroyalty.
758
  
This conservative and practical group, as the viceroy saw them, was also compatible with 
the viceroy’s economic policies in the region, which called for the elimination of the 
labour movement and attraction of more capital into the naturally rich region. The 
Armenian urban element, with its commercial and financial links both domestically and 
internationally, fitted the bill. When the expansion of the banks and commercialization of 
agriculture began, the Armenian bourgeoisie benefitted more than its Georgian and Azeri 
rivals. Therefore, this political rapprochement paid off economically.  
Soon, rising economic fortunes and good relations with the Tsarist administration helped 
the Armenian bourgeoisie improve its position in local politics, which were used to 
further their interests and address the demands of the Russian Armenians. Apart from the 
cities with predominantly Armenian population, the Armenian bourgeoisie was 
consolidating its influence on the City Dumas in Tiflis and Baku. The cordial relations of 
the Tiflis mayor, Khatisian, with the viceroyalty epitomized how the relations evolved 
from 1907 to 1912. Not only was he considered a useful figure for the Armenian loyalties 
for the Russian rule, his sympathies for the Dashanktsutiun did not vex the viceroy, who 
considered the Armenian discontent against the Tsarist policies between 1903 and 1907 
understandable in some aspects.  
By 1912, the Armenian bourgeoisie was the leading political and economic force among 
the Russian Armenians and became more influential in cultural matters through its role in 
the press and its financial support for Armenian schooling. Given the Muslim numerical 
superiority and the scattered Armenian population in the region, coupled with the 
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favourable results of the understanding with the viceroyalty, the Armenian bourgeoisie 
and the Armenians in general did not harbour separatist sentiments toward Russian rule 
in the South Caucasus according the viceroy. Along with the tamed Armenian Church, 
they provided the viceroyalty solid allies in this difficult region. Until 1912, this alliance 
yielded benefits to both parties in the domestic arena but with the complications in the 
Ottoman Empire that year, it would also prove to be a key dimension in Russian foreign 
policy for the Ottoman Armenians.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RUSSIA AS THE PATRON AND DEFENDER OF ARMENIANS: THE 
QUESTION OF ARMENIAN REFORMS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ITS ARMENIAN 
SUBJECTS (1912-1914) 
 
Introduction 
 
In early October 1912, the representatives of Armenian charitable and cultural 
institutions, the Armenian press and some other Armenian circles in Tiflis gathered in the 
diocesan building. What brought them there was their common concern for worsening 
conditions of the Ottoman Armenians, whose fate became even more uncertain with the 
declining fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians of Tiflis already knew about 
their hardships and how Patriarch Arsharuni’s complaints to the Porte did not bear any 
fruit. Trusting in the improved relations between the Russian Armenians and the Russian 
administration, the representatives decided to hand the Catholicos a petition asking for 
help from the Tsar for the Ottoman Armenians, who ‘always looked up to Russia with 
hope as a patron and defender of all oppressed Christians in the East.’759 A few days later, 
the First Balkan War broke out and brought a new dimension to the relations between the 
Russian government and its Armenian subjects.  
From 1903 to 1912, the evolution of the relations between the Russian administration and 
the political pillars of the Russian Armenians was chiefly based on the priorities of the 
domestic policy. This was understandable as the region was a wreck hit by the revolution 
and national animosities with inefficient Tsarist bureaucracy. By the end of the Dashnak 
trial in 1912, the party organization was decimated in the South Caucasus and its 
affiliates within the Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie were mostly 
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weeded out. The reconfigured Armenian Church, with a regime-friendly Catholicos at his 
head, was at the disposal of Russia.  
The Armenian bourgeoisie was thriving both economically and politically owing to its 
understanding with the viceroyalty. Unlike their neighbours, Georgians and Azeris, 
among the Russian Armenians, no serious political agent with anti-government agenda 
remained in 1912. Improved relations with its Armenian subjects facilitated Tsarist 
recovery in the South Caucasus. As the Ottoman Empire’s future became uncertain after 
successive defeats, these cordial relations would also be relevant for the Russian foreign 
policy interests.  
In the aftermath of the revolution of 1905, the primary concern of the central government 
was to maintain domestic stability. After the humiliating defeat at the hands of the 
Japanese and the turmoil created by the revolution, this was a sensible thing to do. As the 
recovery continued, Stolypin’s insistence on the maintenance of internal economic and 
political development and avoidance of major international conflicts brought about a 
balanced approach in foreign policy, which would be bolstered by the appointment of 
Stolypin’s brother-in-law, Sazonov as the Foreign Minister.  
True, there were times when the Russians were talking about a possible war with the 
Ottomans in 1908 or they actually intervened in the Persian Empire for the Shah against 
the constitutionalists to protect Russian interests in northern Persia. However, the former 
idea was dismissed after deliberations and in the latter case; some Cossack brigades were 
enough to do the trick.
760
 Aware of the situation of the army and the navy, the main 
actors of the Russian foreign policy knew that they had to avoid major confrontations. 
In the strategic planning of the Russian military in 1910, the Japanese front was 
considered the biggest military threat. Two years later it was replaced with Europe and 
the Near East as the empire’s weakest positions.761 The assassination of Stolypin in 
September 1911 and the start of the Ottoman-Italian war began to change the picture. As 
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the Ottoman forces were losing against the Italians, the closure of the Straits in April and 
May 1912 added to the fears of not only the Russian military planners but also the 
Russian commercial circles. Although the fall in the trade surplus in 1912 was mainly 
caused by bad harvests (demonstrated by the differentials between the grain and non-
grain exports), some statesmen and the public believed that it was primarily the closure of 
the Straits. Coupled with the fears of a possible German control of the Straits, Russia 
declared that it could accept neither the closure nor the domination of the Straits by 
another Great Power.
762
 
Soon after hostilities with the Italians ended, another conflict broke out in the Balkans in 
the fall of 1912. By then, the main priority of the Russian foreign policy on the Ottoman 
Empire was again about the Straits, for which the Russian preference was the control of 
the Straits by a weak Ottoman Empire—a continuation of its policy in the nineteenth 
century.
763
 However, the Ottoman army’s defeats signalled that the control of the Straits 
could be lost. There was a panic moment in Russian diplomatic circles when the 
Bulgarian army was marching to Istanbul and the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, 
Mikhail N. Girs, was given the authority to call the Russian Black Sea fleet to prevent a 
possible Bulgarian occupation of the city.
764
  
The Ottoman army went on losing and this made the total collapse of Ottoman Empire a 
real possibility in the eyes of the Russians. Various reports from top-level Russian 
bureaucracy, with varying tones of optimism, pointed out that in such an eventuality, 
Russia had to be ready with its army and Black Sea fleet. However, in most of these 
reports, it was stressed that Russia was not ready to pick up its fair share of the spoils of 
the Ottoman Empire if it disintegrated.
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Russia was not ready militarily but the possibility of an Ottoman collapse forced them to 
be more active regarding the Ottoman Empire. One way of doing this was to address the 
grievances of the Ottoman Armenians, for which Russia remained generally indifferent 
since the Berlin Congress. As the successive wars of the Ottomans waging were 
complicating the situation of the Ottoman Armenians, the opportunity presented itself 
when the representatives of Russian Armenians, mainly the members of the Armenian 
bourgeoisie, began to appeal to the Catholicos to ask for active Russian support for their 
co-religionists across the border. Soon, Russia emerged as the main supporter for the 
Armenian reforms in the Ottoman Empire, which became the dominant factor in the 
relations between Russia and its Armenian subjects. Aside from cultural and economic 
demands, these main reforms in question were mostly administrative that called for 
increased Armenian representation in local administration, the appointment of a general-
governor selected by the great powers, reorganization of the gendarmerie by European 
officers and the supervision of the reforms by the Great Powers.  
 
 
From the Initiation of the Armenian Reforms until the End of the First Balkan War 
(September 1912- May 1913) 
Russia and the Revival of the Armenian Question 
 
Why in late 1912 did Russia show such an interest in the Armenian reforms, for which it 
had been quite unenthusiastic for so long? Unquestionably, it was not for the 
humanitarian reasons that the secretary at the Russian Embassy, Andre N. Mandelshtam, 
pointed out.
766
 Many scholars described this angle of the Russian foreign policy as a 
means for its territorial expansion in Eastern Anatolia. In other words, Russia’s support 
was a disguise for outright annexation of Ottoman Armenia when the Balkan Wars 
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created a suitable condition.
767
 Other scholars like Kirakosian argued that the Russian 
project for reform was envisioning an autonomous Armenian under Russian protectorate, 
which would be also in line with the expansionist aims of Russia in the Near East.
768
  
During the initiation of the Armenian reforms in late 1912, however, the Russian 
correspondence with the Armenian political leaders and the Catholicos, as well as 
interdepartmental Russian correspondence demonstrate a rather cautious approach instead 
of an aggressive one. A more active line as far as occupation could only be possible if the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed, which the Russian foreign policy did not favour by late 1912. 
Ideally, for Russian foreign policy interests, the Ottoman Empire needed to hold on until 
Russia was militarily ready to compete for the spoils of its demise.  
Instead of an aggressive strategy eyeing for occupation or the creation of a Russian 
protectorate, the Russians were investing in the Armenian question for its domestic and 
international interests which could help them whether the Ottoman collapse became a 
reality or not. With the diplomatic support they gave for the reform project, the Russians 
would consolidate the sympathies of the Ottoman Armenians and solidify its good 
relations with the Russian Armenians.  
On the other hand, Germany was considered by the Russians to be in a more convenient 
position to benefit from a possible Ottoman breakdown owing to their increased influence 
on the Ottoman Empire in the last decade. Even if the Ottoman Empire survived, its 
transformation into a feeble state that was actually controlled by Germany was very 
undesirable for Russia. The German interest in Eastern Anatolia as well in Persia had 
already been complicating Russian interests. This became more intense after the Potsdam 
agreement of 1911, which allowed for an extension of the Berlin-Baghdad railway to 
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Tehran and increased German expansion in the Ottoman Empire, which had crucial 
commercial links with the Persian Empire as the fourth biggest importer of Persian 
goods.
769
 With the Ottoman defeats in the First Balkan War, the Russian fears were 
aggravated as they believed that the German influence on the eastern provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire would also grow. On top of the German presence in Persia, this was a 
serious threat for Russian interests in the South Caucasus.
770
 The Russian role in the 
Armenian reforms was a means to prevent this. 
Another key aspect of Russian policy towards the Armenian reforms was about its own 
relations with the Russian Armenians and how the complications in Eastern Anatolia 
could affect them. The First Balkan War required the transfer of some of the Ottoman 
army corps to the front, which added to lack of security in the region. Both St. Petersburg 
and Tiflis were worried that a revolutionary uprising among the Ottoman Armenians 
could spread to the South Caucasus and threaten the stability they obtained with much 
difficulty.
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From the starting point of the revival of the Armenian question in 1912, the Russian 
authorities, particularly Sazonov, repeatedly stressed the importance of this link and 
noted that Russia would not remain indifferent to such a situation and would intervene 
militarily. By maintaining such a position, the Russian authorities had two aims in mind. 
Not only did they seem to care for the Ottoman Armenians and gain their sympathies, 
they would also strengthen their improved relations with the Russian Armenians, who 
would appreciate the Russian support for their brethren.
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The Role of the Armenian Church and the Russian Armenian Bourgeoisie in 
Russia’s Interest in the Revival of the Armenian Question in Late 1912 
 
Not noted for his interest in political matters before his election as the Catholicos, Kevork 
V became a pivotal figure in the initiation of the Armenian reform process.
773
 Concerned 
about the situation of the Ottoman Armenians, the Catholicos had already spoken to the 
Russian press about it when he was in the capital for his obligatory visit to the Tsar in 
June 1912.
774
 In the meantime, several petitions from the Ottoman Armenians as well as 
the Armenians from other parts of the world kept coming to the Catholicos that urged 
him to demand support from Russia for the Ottoman Armenians.
775
  
The most critical petitions came from the Ottoman Armenians. Having failed with their 
complaints to the Porte, the Armenian Patriarchate and the Armenian National Assembly 
in Istanbul directed their petitions to Echmiadzin. A report from Patriarch Arsharuni in 
September epitomizes the general mood of these complaints. According to the Patriarch, 
the situation of the Ottoman Armenians had not improved since 1908 and particularly the 
Armenians in the provincial regions were in a wretched condition. He asked the 
Catholicos to do whatever he could do to stop this ‘systematic persecution.’776 
Content with the general state of affairs in the South Caucasus, prominent members of 
the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie were getting anxious about the condition of the 
Ottoman Armenians, especially after the start of the First Balkan War. The newspapers, 
echoing the views of the Armenian bourgeoisie, were also focusing on the conditions of 
the Ottoman Armenians and Russia’s responsibility for them. The Armenians of Tiflis 
were outraged by the news and soon their concerns were conveyed to the Catholicos with 
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a petition by the editor of Mshak, Arakeliants, and chairman of the Armenian 
Benevolence Society in the Caucasus, Samson Arutiunian.
777
 
The Catholicos immediately wrote to Vorontsov-Dashkov about this. Describing the 
hopeless situation that the letters from Istanbul depicted, Kevork V informed the viceroy 
that what they were asking from the Russian people and the Tsar was ‘defence and 
patronage.’ Appealing to ‘the defender of the Christians of the East,’ the Catholicos 
added that the Russian Armenians were also expecting assistance from the Russian 
government for the Ottoman Armenians as they had done to the Christians in the 
Balkans.
778
 
The tone of urgency in the letter of Kevork V gave the viceroy a lot to think about. 
Summarizing the relations between the Russian government and its Armenian subjects 
since the time of Peter the Great, the viceroy highlighted the importance of the 
Armenians to Russia in a letter to Nicholas II. Describing how he turned around the 
government’s poor relations with the Russian Armenians after his arrival in 1905, 
Vorontsov-Dashkov assured the Tsar of the loyalty of its Armenian subjects. Moreover, 
the viceroy emphasized the growing Russian influence on the Ottoman Armenians, most 
of whom believed that ‘only Russia could protect their lives, honour and the properties 
from the brutalities of the Kurds. It was time to go back to the traditional Russian policy 
of protecting the Turkish Armenians.’ Such a diplomatic act would augment the loyalty 
of Russian Armenians to their Tsar, ‘under whose aegis they would sincerely express 
gratefulness of the entire Armenian nation.’779 
The viceroy believed that if the initiative for the protection of the Ottoman Armenians 
was taken by another great power, then the Russian prestige among the Christians in Asia 
Minor would suffer. A Russian initiative would attract the sympathies of the Ottoman 
Armenians, which inevitably would facilitate their assistance to Russian military 
operations in the region. However, any implications of dismemberment of the Ottoman 
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Empire had to be avoided because annexing the region called Turkish Armenia, ‘which 
was in fact inhabited by the wild Kurds, could be only harmful for them [Russia] by 
creating a huge concern for governing a country with a fanatic population who were 
inimical among themselves.’780 Nicholas II agreed with the suggestion by the viceroy 
‘regarding the desirability of the defence of the Turkish Armenians’ and fully approved 
the proposal that ‘the first initiative of this defence should come from the Russian 
government.’781  However, it had to wait until the end of the conflict in the Balkans since 
it would yield no benefits when the Ottomans were being defeated.’782  
The meeting of the representatives of the Ottoman Armenians with Girs in mid-
November also helped shape the Russian urgency on the matter. An influential Armenian 
deputy, Krikor Zohrab, and Mardikian visited Girs, to whom they claimed to talk as the 
representatives of the ‘Armenian Patriarchate and the Armenian nation.’ They believed 
that ‘they saw no way out other than appealing to the only state, which could save them 
from the terrible situation the Ottoman Armenians were enduring.’ According to them, 
only radical measures like permanent Russian occupation of the Armenian provinces like 
what Austria-Hungary did to the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 
could remedy the situation. Apparently, all the Armenian parties were in solidarity for 
such a solution. Afterwards, these views were confirmed to Girs by the Patriarch, who 
asked for intervention of the Tsar on behalf of the Armenians.
783 The Patriarch’s 
statement also highlighted that Kevork V had a high prestige among the Ottoman 
Armenians. This was music to the ears of the Russians, who could use the Catholicos’ 
influence to their advantage.
784
 
As the defeats in the Balkan Wars went on, the situation in Eastern Anatolia was 
worsening.  Evgeni E. Vyshinskii, the military agent of the Russian consulate at Erzurum, 
after his travels in Eastern Anatolia wrote in November 1912 that the situation was 
chaotic and Russia had to act. Claiming that ‘annexation to Russia was the constant 
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dream of all Turkish Armenians,’ he noted that the solution to the Armenian question was 
either a Russian occupation or a reform project primarily supervised by Russia.
785
 
Meanwhile, growing pro-Russian sentiment among the Ottoman Armenians was reported 
by Girs and the Russian diplomatic corps in Eastern Anatolia. For instance, a dispatch 
from the vice-consul in Van stated that ‘all Armenians were now on the side of Russia, as 
they sincerely wished the advent of our troops or reform under the control of Russia.’786 
Another from Bayezid read: ‘Armenians, without distinction of party, are very hostile to 
Turkey in their relations and very much wish a Russian protectorate and Russian 
occupation of Armenia.’787 Girs also approved of Vorontsov-Dashkov’s proposal on 
going back to the traditional policy of protection but Russia had to act fast not to lose the 
leading role. What needed to be done was to assure the Catholicos and the Armenian 
Patriarch that Russia could play the role of protector when needed.
788
 Although Girs saw 
a possible Russian annexation of the Armenian provinces ‘premature,’ he warned that if 
the reforms did not yield the expected results, ‘they should be ready for the possibility of 
their troops entering into the region.’789  
More cautious than his ambassador, Sazonov was aware of the state of affairs in Eastern 
Anatolia and how explosive it could be for Russian interests, especially given the Balkan 
conflict. However, to make the Armenian question an item of debate at that time would 
not produce the desired results.
790
 For Sazonov, an active Russian intervention or ‘even 
armed occupation of Asia Minor’ did not correspond to the current aims of the Russian 
government and that was why nothing other than general assurances could be given to the 
Armenian clergy and representatives.
791
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Having received the Russian promise of support, the Catholicos led the Russian 
Armenian effort for the Armenian reforms. The Armenian National Bureau (established 
in Tiflis in October 1912 under the auspices of the Catholicos) held a meeting to finalize 
its aims. Encouraged by the viceroy, the Armenian National Bureau would be responsible 
for assisting the Catholicos for the Armenian reforms, coordinating various Armenian 
bodies, especially those in Istanbul, and carrying out propaganda in the Russian public 
and official circles.
792
 Among its members were Mayor Khatisian, the newly released 
Dashnak poet Tumanian, and the editor of Mshak, Arakelian. 
From the 1890s on, in addition to the publications of the Armenian political groups, like 
Pro-Armenia of the Dashnaks, there were societies in Britain and France, such as the 
Friends of Armenia and the Armenian United Association of London, which constantly 
propagated for the need for reforms for the Ottoman Armenians. Although the consulates 
of the Western European powers in Eastern Anatolia were aware of the problems in the 
region, they were not interested in pursuing a proactive policy regarding the Armenian 
question until 1912 when a renewed interest in the question in Europe emerged, both 
officially and publicly.
793
 
To benefit from this renewed European interest in the Armenian cause, an Armenian 
National Delegation was formed to coordinate the Armenian efforts in Europe. Boghos 
Nubar Pasha, the wealthy son of a well-known Prime Minister in Egypt and the founder 
of the Armenian General Benevolence Union, was proposed by the Catholicos to lead the 
Armenian National Delegation and he took up the job in December 1912. His contacts in 
Europe and his popularity among the Armenians made him an ideal candidate. 
Accompanied by prominent Armenian personalities in Europe, Boghos Nubar Pasha 
started his work in the European circles.  
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The repeated appeals for help kept coming to the viceroy from the Catholicos in 
December 1912.
794
 Sazonov, as a reply to Catholicos, wrote to the viceroy that the 
Russian government was aware of the misery of the Ottoman Armenians caused by the 
Kurdish oppression and the lack of personal and property security. The Russian 
government was working out solutions to these problems; however, the timing was not 
opportune for a more active policy. Sazonov made it clear that there was no concert 
among the Great Powers on the Armenian question and any active interference in the 
midst of the Balkan conflict could create more complications. Under these circumstances, 
Sazonov asked the Armenians to be very cautious and stay united and not to intricate 
Russian policies.
795
 Reiterating Sazonov’s words, Vorontsov-Dashkov asked the 
Catholicos to use his authority on his flock to prevent any unrest and reminded him that 
‘the European powers would not give Armenians anything and they had to tie their hopes 
to Russia.’796  
As for the increasing number of petitions requesting various forms of Russian support for 
the Ottoman Armenians, the Russian diplomatic corps abroad were instructed in a 
circular by Sazonov to respond with a uniform response: ‘Traditionally favourable 
toward the Armenian people, Russia now closely undertakes their interests to the heart. 
Russia is ready to render them all possible assistance, allowing itself to choose the most 
fitting time and means to advance the issue of betterment of life and security of the 
Armenians living in Turkey.’797 
These words of caution did not stop the Catholicos. He immediately wrote to the viceroy 
repeating the Ottoman Armenians’ situation and the need of immediate action by Russia. 
In the words of Catholicos, ‘the Armenian question was put into solution by the European 
diplomacy 34 years ago, but until now it remained unsatisfactory. If Armenians were 
ignored now, then this would be a sign of the absolute extermination of the whole 
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nation.’798 Another delegation composed of prominent Armenians (Khatisian, Samson 
Arutiunian, and Archbishop Mesrop, the rector of the Ecclesiastical Academy) was 
instructed by Kevork V to give the viceroy the petition of the Russian Armenians.
799
 ‘A 
sort of Russian protectorate over Turkish Armenia, not in the form of occupation by the 
Russian troops’ was suggested by the delegation as a solution to the current situation.800 
The Catholicos repeatedly considered presenting his case to the Tsar himself, but this was 
refused, possibly as part of cautious Russian policy at the time.
801   
The Catholicos was assured of active Russian help in this matter. In return, he was asked 
by the viceroy to tell Boghos Nubar Pasha to create ‘a favourable mood in which the 
sponsorship of Armenian reforms would be reserved for Russia.’802 In line with the 
cautious policy that Sazonov spoke of earlier, the Catholicos complied and instructed 
Boghos Nubar Pasha not to participate in the ambassadors’ conference in London and to 
limit his activities to propagating about the need to implement the reforms under Russian 
control in European political circles.
803
  
Leaving the foreign policy aspect aside, the situation across the border put the viceroy in 
a difficult position domestically given the demands of the Catholicos and the Russian 
Armenian bourgeoisie. After the visit by the delegation, the viceroy informed Sazonov 
that the Armenians unanimously did not believe in the promises of reforms made by the 
Ottoman government. Both Russian and Ottoman Armenians held the view that ‘the only 
salvation for the Ottoman Armenians could be obtained if the initiative, as well as the 
control of the Armenian reforms, came exclusively from Russia.’ However, the viceroy 
warned that there was an impression among the Armenians that the Russian government 
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was not taking decisive steps about it and quite soon it would be impossible to stall their 
demands by usual promises of patronage of the Ottoman Armenians without any real 
indicators.
804
 Nevertheless, consistent with their earlier attitude, Nicholas II and Sazonov 
restated the necessity of waiting until the conclusion of the conflict in the Balkans.
805
  
In the meantime, two delegations from Russia were sent to Istanbul to find out the 
attitude of the Ottoman Armenians. One of them was the delegation of the St. Petersburg 
Armenian Society, which held various meetings with the representatives of the Armenian 
political parties, the Armenian Patriarchate, and public figures.
806
 Their main impression 
was that a more active Russian involvement was demanded by all parties although their 
preferred terms of action varied. For example, the former Patriarch, Ormanian, believed 
that an autonomous Armenia in the form of Lebanon would the best option while Russian 
occupation was not undesirable considering the decent condition of the Russian 
Armenians.
807
 At about the same time, another Russian delegation was in Istanbul. 
Among the members of this delegation were Miliukov, Guchkov, Papadzhanov and 
Adonts. Miliukov, who had earlier declared in the State Duma that Russia could not stay 
indifferent to the misery of the Ottoman Armenians as it did in 1896, believed that the 
Ottoman Armenians were trying to demonstrate to Russia that they had no separatist 
tendencies and only aspired to the security and enlightenment of the Russian 
Armenians.
808 
From late 1912 on, the Russian interest in the Ottoman Armenians grew in line with the 
Armenian demands. Instructed by St. Petersburg, the viceroyalty assured the Catholicos 
and the representatives of the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie that Russia would support 
the Ottoman Armenians but this had to wait until the end of the hostilities in the Balkans. 
Grateful for the Russian support, the Catholicos and the Armenian National Bureau was 
told to act prudently to avoid any complications. In the meantime, among the Ottoman 
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Armenians, the sympathies for Russia were also growing due to the support they were 
willing to provide, which also helped to solidify the good relations of the Russian 
administration with its own Armenians.
809
 While the positions of the Armenian Church 
and the Armenian bourgeoisie were quite obvious, the case of the Dashnaks was a more 
complicated one in this new course. 
 
 
The Attitude of the Dashnaks toward Russia during the Revival of the Armenian 
Question  
 
In the last months of 1912, when the Armenian reforms were being brought up again by 
Russia, the Dashnaks were in a critical state. They had lost their hopes for the Persian 
constitutional movement and became less active in Persian politics.
810
 In the Ottoman 
Empire, their alliance with the CUP officially ended in summer 1912 since the Dashnaks’ 
demands for reform had not been met. The Ottoman opposition parties were not to their 
taste either but they had sincere doubts about a feasible collaboration with the CUP in the 
future.
811
 
In the Russian Empire, their organization was cracked down during the trial process. 
However, the curious end of their trial was followed by changes in the international 
situation, which in turn, would be instrumental in the change in Russian foreign policy 
regarding the Armenian question, as well as its possible implications on the Russian 
Armenians. The Russian initiative on the Armenian reforms put the Dashnaktsutiun in a 
tough spot. This was the same government that destroyed its organization in the South 
Caucasus and put many of its members to prison a few years earlier. Nevertheless, the 
way the trial ended was being interpreted as a watershed for better relations with Russia.   
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Acknowledging the dire condition of the Ottoman Armenians, the party had doubts, quite 
understandably, concerning the nature of Russian intentions and their possible 
consequences.
 
In principle, the Dashnaks were supporting the Armenian reforms, which 
they believed to be an improvement. Therefore, they agreed to act in solidarity with the 
other Armenian political parties to facilitate the reform process.
812
 The Dashnaks also 
appealed to the Catholicos to ask for Russian support for the Ottoman Armenians. In this 
delicate period, the Dashnaks were cautious not to irritate Russia, despite some of their 
members’ scepticism about Russian intentions. In the end, it was decided not to carry out 
any action against the Russian authorities.
813
 
The change of relations between the party and Russia was remarkable. At individual 
level, the influential members of the Dashnak intelligentsia, such as poet Tumanian, were 
the epitomes of this change of heart. Tumanian was included in the Dashnak trial, sat in 
prison and finally was acquitted in the final session of the trial. However, a few months 
after his release, Tumanian portrayed Russia as the saviour of the Armenian people on 
the pages of Orizon, the organ of the Eastern Bureau of the Dashnaks.  
In an article in October 1912, he elaborated on the reasons for a Russian intervention on 
behalf of the Ottoman Armenians. Tumanian believed that for Russia, Armenians were 
‘the faithful vanguards’ and apart from the cold relations in the last three decades, 
Russian-Armenian relations were good and in the future it would be the same. In the 
Russian Empire, for Tumanian, the Armenians ‘lived under the influence of the best 
people in the world, under the aegis of the best literature. Turkish Armenia was one of the 
closest spheres of influence of only Russia, which as in the past had wished to put an end 
to the difficult situation as it did at the moment.’ To the critics of Russia, who asserted 
that Russia was doing this for its own interests, Tumanian stated that ‘it was even better 
that the interests of a strong Russia and Armenian people coincided.’ This was why 
Russia would help the Ottoman Armenians and this was why all his ‘hopes and 
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sympathies were tied to Russia.’814 In another article, he argued that Armenians were the 
victims of rivalry among the European states as they tried to obstruct Russia’s expansion 
to the Near East. ‘Historical circumstances demonstrated that the Armenian people had to 
be with the Russian people and had to tie all its hopes to the success of the Russian state’ 
since the European powers would defend the Ottoman Empire against Russia, thereby 
blocking the fair solution to the Armenian question.
815 
 
According to a police report in November 1912, considering Russia as the only hope for 
the Ottoman Armenians, the Dashnaktsutiun gradually moved away from terror and 
ordered its committees to ‘hold even joint operations with other Russian revolutionary 
parties’ until the Catholicos’ petition was answered.816 One of the founders of the party, 
Simon Zavarian, in his letter to Tumanian recommended stopping party activity against 
Russia at the moment and pointed out the need to attract the attention of the Russian 
government and society to the necessity of active defence of the Turkish Armenians.’ 
According to the reports, this was approved by Tumanian and ‘met with great sympathy 
among the Armenian society.’817 
In a party meeting in Istanbul in December 1912, party members were told not to get 
involved in activities against Russia since it responded to the demands of the Catholicos 
and began to act for the reforms. Although there were some anti-Russian speeches in the 
meeting, the main sentiment was that of sympathy toward Russia. Zavarian again spoke 
of ‘the sincere intentions’ of the Russian government and if the Russians kept their 
promises of support, then ‘the Armenians would decorate not only their homes but also 
their churches with the portraits of the Tsar and the current ministers.’818 In the 
meantime, the Dashnak units in Persia were also instructed not to act against Tsarist 
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forces.
819
 Echoing the pro-Russian sentiment, a Dashnak circular from Paris stressed that 
the party remained friendly to Russia at that time.
820
 
In early December, the Tiflis committee of the Dashnaktsutiun asked for help from the 
Catholicos for the unification of the Caucasian and Ottoman Armenians. Repeating the 
instructions he got from the viceroy, the Catholicos answered that no measure could be 
taken regarding the Ottoman Armenians until the end of the First Balkan War and he 
could not lend Dashnaks any material assistance. However, he told them that he had been 
informed by Patriarch Arsharuni that ‘the Armenians in Erzurum, Bitlis and Van were 
arming and in case of necessity, the party could send some 1000 volunteers to these 
regions.’821  
Aware of the unpredictable actions of revolutionary organizations like the Dashnaks, the 
Russian authorities advised them to be quiet in this delicate moment. When the main 
Dashnak representative in St. Petersburg, Hagop Zavriev, met Girs, he was told that for 
the sake of the reforms, ‘in the eyes of Europe, the Armenians needed to present 
themselves as the victims of the arbitrary Turkish rule not political revolutionaries.’ 
Therefore, at that point, ‘The Armenians should not bully the Turks, undertake rebellion 
and pressure the European powers for political demands.’822 
Convening in the Armenian National Assembly in Istanbul in early 1913, all Armenian 
parties, including the Dashnaks decided to act in solidarity for the Armenian reforms.
823
 
In the meeting, an influential Dashnak with an anti-Russian attitude, Sharikian, stated that 
the Dashnaks understood the need for solidarity in this process and they abandoned their 
territorial aims for the sake of reforms.
824
 According to Girs, these compromises were the 
indications of ‘a truce if not a reconciliation between the Armenian political parties.’825 
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The meeting decided to continue relations with the Ottoman government and seek 
guarantees for reform.
 
 
The Dashnaks remained inactive against Russia in early 1913 when the Armenian public 
mood was hopeful of Russian support for the Ottoman Armenians.
826
 By then, there were 
two main currents in the party. The first of them, led by Zavarian and the editor of 
Droshak, Varandian, advocated a Russian protectorate over Turkish Armenia. The 
second group was aiming at a fair constitutional system in the Ottoman Empire and 
argued that Russian intervention would be useless.
827
 It was believed that a potential loss 
of the party’s influence among the Armenians was the reason for the opposition of some 
of its members to Russian intervention.
828
 There were also discussions about the form of 
Russian support. The general line of the party was for an autonomous Armenia with the 
support of Russia but it opposed direct Russian occupation.
829
 
Contrary reports stressed the anti-Russian views of some Dashnaks. For instance, in a 
meeting in February 1913, Sharikian made his sceptical views known again and claimed 
that Russia posed as the defender of the Armenians; however it did so to ultimately annex 
Turkish Armenia for its own benefit. The meeting was dominated by anti-Russian 
delegates who believed that a possible Russian annexation would bring more 
oppression.
830
 Another meeting in Bulgaria in February 1913 also reflected the same 
mood where it was stated that an autonomous Armenia was possible only under Ottoman 
rule.
831
 Other reports also attested to the lack of confidence among some of the Dashnaks 
in the ultimate aims of the Russian policy.
832
 
Despite the disagreements concerning Russia’s ultimate designs, the Dashnaks continued 
their policy of not taking any actions against Russia, as it was working for the realization 
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of the Armenian reforms. In principle, the party was expected to join revolutionary 
activities as a member of the Socialist International. However, the Dashnaks rejected the 
suggestion by the Russian SRs to participate in a strike to be held in Istanbul in May 
1913 because many of its members were hopeful about ‘a Russian intervention for 
solving the question of autonomy of Turkish Armenia.’833 The cautious policy of the 
party regarding Russia came to such a point that the Western Bureau of the 
Dashnaktsutiun proposed to cease all activity against Russia including the publication of 
anti-Russian articles in the party organs.
834
  
Meanwhile the final verdict on the charges against Lyzhin and the appeals to the General 
Council of the Cassational Department of the Ruling Senate were announced. Having 
initially diagnosed Lyzhin’s psychological troubles, the Ministry of Justice claimed that 
the enormous workload of the trial was the main reason.
835
 After spending some time in a 
mental institution, Lyzhin was declared insane by a team of psychiatrists. All charges 
against him were dropped and he was provided with a state pension.
836
  
On the Dashnak front, almost all convicts had appealed to the verdict and they were 
hopeful of the imperial pardon.
837
 Indeed, some of the convicted Dashnaks were 
pardoned by the imperial manifesto in February 1913. The party considered this as an 
imperial show-off since these were the members about whom the prosecution had already 
no solid evidence.
838
 Those who were previously sentenced to hard labour were released 
and sent to administrative exile to Irkutsk, like Amazasp Ohanjanian.
839
 Even the news of 
Lyzhin’s dismissal did not fully satisfy the Dashnaks. They believed that Lyzhin’s 
dismissal on the grounds of psychological illness and the light sentences were devised by 
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the Russian government not to lose face after the forgery scandal in the trial.
840
 For more 
good news, the Dashnaks had to wait a bit longer. 
The key questions in the meantime were about the transportation of arms and fighters into 
Eastern Anatolia, the issue of self-defence of the Ottoman Armenians and the Dashnak 
role in it.  Now that the dies were cast for the Ottoman Armenians, the first priority of the 
Dashnaktsutiun was to channel its energies for them. For the Dashnaks, the situation in 
the region was horrid and the Ottoman Armenians did not have the security of their lives 
and property. Thus, the Dashnaks began to concentrate more on the ‘self-defence’ of the 
Ottoman Armenians. The correspondence of the Russian secret police, military and 
consular reports attested to the intensification of Dashnaks’ effort to this end from late 
1912 on. An intelligence report stated that ‘the most immediate objective [of the 
Dashnaks] remained obtaining as much quantity of arms, people and money possible, 
which was essential for the fight of Armenians in Turkey.’841 
The Dashnaks began to move their arms from the Caucasus and Persia to Eastern 
Anatolia. In the Caucasus, mainly in the provinces of Elizavetpol and Erevan, the party 
was gathering previously obtained weapons to be transported across the border.
842
 
Another Russian intelligence report pointed out that in the Ottoman Empire, the 
Dashnaks were trying to increase their prestige among the Armenians and ‘forming 
armed battalions for the defence of Armenians from the Kurds as well as for the 
preparation of a rebellion against the Turks in case of a military success of the Balkan 
states against Turkey.’843 Similarly, the Hnchaks, though a less significant force in the 
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Russian Empire were also reported to be transporting their materiel from the Caucasus to 
Ottoman Armenia.
844
  
Another line of activity of the Dashnaks was about the collection of donations to fund its 
operations. By October 1912, their efforts did not produce the expected results as the 
money collected for self-defence, except for a 50,000 rouble check given by the oil-men 
Mirzoev brothers in Baku, was insufficient.
845
 Afterwards, Vramian, a prominent 
Dashnak, also worked towards collecting donations when he visited the South Caucasus 
in early 1913. However, the results were again very disappointing. Particularly important 
was the stingy attitude of the clergy and the Armenian bourgeoisie (‘commercial-
industrial elements’), who believed that the fate of the Ottoman Armenians completely 
was on Russian hands and real help could only be expected from her.
846
 
Toward spring 1913, the Dashnak effort for transportation of arms to Eastern Anatolia 
was noted by the Russian and other consulates.
847
 During his visit to the South Caucasus, 
Vramian also had explored the official Russian attitude about the transportation of 
weapons and other military equipment from Russia to the Ottoman Empire and the level 
of Russian Armenian support for a possible rebellion undertaken by the Ottoman 
Armenians. The Russian authorities declared that such actions were 
forbidden.
848Although not pressured as they were used to, the Dashnaks’ operations of 
arms transport were still under scrutiny by the Tsarist authorities, who suspected the 
Dashnaks of complicating the situation. 
In northern Persia, the Tsarist authorities raided the arms depots of the party. It created 
dissent among the Dashnaks, who lamented that ‘these weapons were exclusively for 
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self-defence against the fanatical Muslims’ and now the Armenians were left with ‘armed 
Muslim population organizing constant massacres of the Armenians.’849 Nevertheless, the 
crossings of armed Armenian groups from the Caucasus, mainly through northern Persia 
continued.
850
 The Russian vice-consul in Van, Olferev suggested a milder course about 
arms smuggling. He argued that the weapons of the Dashnaks stockpiled in northern 
Persia were given to them by the CUP when they were allied against Russia during the 
constitutional movement in Persia. The Dashnaks could be now allowed to smuggle them 
back into the Ottoman Empire.
851
 
 
 
Toward the End of the First Balkan War 
 
When hostilities in the Balkans restarted in February 1913 after Enver Pasha’s storming 
of the Porte, the Russian anxiety over instability in Eastern Anatolia intensified. Its 
potential impact on the South Caucasus was a common theme regarding the Russian 
position on the Armenian reforms. In the first phase of the reform talks, Sazonov had 
talked about a possible Russian intervention into Eastern Anatolia if the reform attempts 
failed to fix the chronic problems in the region which could lead to violence.
852
 In late 
January, Sazonov repeated the same line to the ambassador in Paris, Izvolskii, and the 
German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Pourtales, stating that Russia could not stay 
indifferent to the bloodshed in the bordering regions by virtue of its own Armenian 
population.
853
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However, as the conflict in the Balkans resumed, the situation in the region became even 
more fragile. Reports describing the miserable conditions of the Ottoman Armenians 
were coming to the Catholicos, who was worried that the resettlement of the Muslim 
refugees escaping from the Balkan Wars in Anatolia could aggravate the situation.
854
 The 
dispatches of the Russian and British diplomats in the spring of 1913 were also 
portraying the same picture.
855
 Warned by the Armenian Patriarch that ‘the threat of mass 
massacres lingering all over Anatolia,’ Girs complained to the Prime Minister Mahmut 
Sevket Pasha and asked Sazonov to take necessary measures.
856
  
The Ottoman diplomats were also aware of the situation. Based on his conversations with 
Sazonov, the Ottoman ambassador in St. Petersburg, Turhan Pasha, warned the Porte that 
any security problem in Eastern Anatolia which could provoke a Russian intervention had 
to be prevented.
857
 Similarly, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, Hilmi Pasha, also 
stressed the internal and external significance of the reforms in the eastern provinces and 
noted that unless the destitute conditions were improved, the efforts of the Armenians in 
Europe for the reforms would not stop.
858
  
As Hilmi Pasha foresaw it, the efforts of the Armenian National Delegation in the 
European capitals did not stop. However, they were getting more anxious as Boghos 
Nubar asked Izvolskii in late Feburary ‘whether the expected moment had arrived since 
the peace in the Balkans was imminent.’859 Another delegation was sent by the Armenian 
Patriarchate to explain the position of the Patriarchate and the Armenian National 
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Assembly in Istanbul to the European circles. As these delegations worked toward the 
realization of the Armenian reforms, Khatisian emerged as a leading character as he was 
reported to be directing the delegates and ‘seemed to be the representative of all 
Caucasian Armenians.’860 
Khatisian and other prominent members of the Armenian bourgeoisie made sure that their 
demands for urgent action were heard in Tiflis. Along with Bishop Mesrop, Samson 
Arutiunian, Aleksandr A. Kalantar and Papadzhanov, Khatisian paid a visit to the deputy 
to the viceroy, General Nikolai P. Shatilov, in May. Expressing their concerns about the 
deteriorating conditions of the Ottoman Armenians, the delegation asked the Russian 
government to provide the Ottoman Armenians with ‘the means for self-defence against 
the openly attacking enemy.’ More precisely, the deputation asked the Russian 
government to secretly supply arms to the Ottoman Armenians, who would use them 
exclusively for self-defence and only in extreme conditions.
861
  
The viceroy confirmed the worries of the Armenian delegation and warned that 
dissatisfaction among the Ottoman Armenians toward Russia would cause discontent 
among the Russian Armenians.
862
 Thus, the Russian government should take measures 
which would calm Armenians and assure them of their defence by Russia. By virtue of a 
significant Armenian population in the Caucasus, the viceroy argued that Russia had to 
be vigilant about the Armenian and Kurdish questions across the border and garner the 
sympathies of these two nationalities.
863
   
On the issue of arms provision, the viceroy asserted that if Russia could guarantee the 
security of the Ottoman Armenians until the Armenian question was solved, then it would 
make sense not to give them weapons since this would prevent Armenians from taking 
any active measures. However, if Russia lacked the means to protect Ottoman Armenians 
and a wholesale massacre occurred, a rejection of such a proposal would create 
discontent among the Russian Armenians and would force all Armenians to seek help in 
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Europe.
864
 The viceroy was still advocating a cautious policy but he also knew that unless 
the situation across the border was sorted out, the South Caucasus was in grave danger.  
Toward the end of the Balkan conflict, more bad news about the Ottoman Armenians was 
received by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Reiterating their position once again, Sazonov 
stated that ‘Russia had a common interest with the Turkish government to avert any 
dangerous complications in its border regions in the Caucasus’ to which Russia could not 
remain indifferent, particularly considering its considerable Armenian subjects.
 
He also 
added that the Russian authorities were doing what they could to calm the Armenians and 
avoid any complications until the end of the Armenian reform negotiations.
865
 
 
 
From the End of the First Balkan War to the Agreement on the Armenian Reforms 
(May 1913- February 1914) 
The Negotiations for the Armenian Reforms  
  
As the First Balkan War ended, the Russians intensified their efforts for the Armenian 
reforms taking into the account of the moves of other Great Powers. On the draft project, 
there were different proposals by the Armenian National Delegation and the commission 
assigned by the Armenian Patriarchate. Later a common proposal, on which Girs and 
Mandelshtam offered some final changes, was agreed upon and presented to the Ottoman 
authorities.
866
 In April 1913, to prevent this inevitable move, the Ottoman authorities had 
asked the British to send two general-governors along with officers and civil servants to 
implement reforms in Eastern Anatolia, but this was refused by the British, mainly owing 
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to Russian opposition.
867
 Sazonov explained their opposition on the basis of their 
obligations toward the Armenian representatives to whom Russia assured of the 
realization of the reforms. For this reason, ‘Russia could not play the second violin in this 
matter.’868 
In May 1913, the Ottoman government, collaborating with a commission of Armenians, 
came up with its own draft project, which was seen by Girs as a ploy for getting foreign 
intervention (mainly Russia) out of the way.
869
 The Ottoman diplomats in Europe warned 
Istanbul to implement reforms immediately to prevent foreign control in Eastern 
Anatolia.
870
 When Turhan Pasha asked Sazonov what he made of the Ottoman proposal, 
the Russian Foreign Minister stated that it was inadequate and would not satisfy the needs 
of the local population. Repeating the importance of peace in Eastern Anatolia for the 
Russian Armenian population, Sazonov again did not spare the hints of intervention for 
the security of the Caucasus.
871
 
When the ambassadors of the Great Powers met at the Austria-Hungarian embassy in 
Istanbul in July 1913, these points were discussed again. The Russian plan, which was 
primarily opposed by the representatives of the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Austria-
Hungary, also created concerns for the British and the French.
872
 One of the most 
contentious items was the establishment of a single province where the reforms would be 
carried out. The Russian proposal regarding a single province was rejected not only by 
the Ottomans but also by the Germans, the British and the French, who believed that such 
an entity could lead to an autonomous province with aspirations to annexation to 
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Russia.
873
 Another criticism was about the appointment of the General-Governor with the 
agreement of the Great Powers. For Wangenheim, the German ambassador in Istanbul, 
the Russian project would lead to an autonomous Greater Armenia ruled by a Russian 
governor.
874
  
The German opposition to the Russian plan obviously had logic to it. For German 
interests, the moribund Ottoman Empire had to survive long enough to provide the time 
for Germany to consolidate its hold there but the Balkan Wars demonstrated that an 
imminent collapse was also a possibility.
875
 As Aksakal argues, after the Ottoman losses 
during the First Balkan War, Germany was preparing for an eventual Ottoman downfall 
and a possible direct takeover instead of its former preference of setting a protectorate 
over the Ottoman Empire in the long term.
876
 For the German Foreign Ministry, Russian 
occupation of Eastern Anatolia in such a case was an annoyance, which could be 
countered by active German participation in the Armenian reform negotiations.
877
 
Aware of the inevitability of reforms, Germany took part in the negotiation process in 
order to block direct Russian influence over the supervision of reforms. The German 
Foreign Ministry was equally concerned about an Ottoman collapse and the Ottoman 
Armenians were important for their plans in that scenario. Therefore, their role in the 
Armenian reforms, with a hint of opposition to the Russian demands, would bring them 
the sympathies of the Ottoman Armenians and the Ottoman government, which could be 
useful if the Ottoman Empire could survive longer.
878
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Wangenheim believed that the Russian interest in the Armenian question was, in fact, a 
way to ‘open up the Straits question.’879 However, the take of Count Pourtales was more 
realistic. Disagreeing with Wangenheim, Pourtales noted that Russia under Sazonov 
‘showed no desire to open the Straits question by way of Armenian reforms. She hoped 
rather to make it unnecessary for her to intervene in Armenia, because unrest there might 
lead to disorder and revolution on her border.’880 Pourtales’ view was supported by 
Jagow, who asked him to tell Sazonov that Germany was not involved in an anti-Russian 
scheme but simply feared that the Russian reform project would lead to unfavourable 
consequences.
881
 Nevertheless, the German Foreign Ministry still feared that Russia 
could intervene if things went out of control in Eastern Anatolia so they decided to settle 
for a compromise on the Armenian reforms from fall 1913 onward.  
Pourtales was on the spot about the Russian policy on the Armenian reform negotiations 
as part of its grander foreign policy interests on the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of 
the First Balkan War. As the First Balkan War ended, Sazonov continued his cautious 
approach arguing that Russia was not ready militarily for a general European war, which 
could be triggered by an action like military intervention in the Ottoman Empire.
882
 In 
fact, the current situation of the Ottoman Empire was considered beneficial for Russia. 
The Ottoman Empire was neither too weak to give the Straits away, nor too strong to 
threaten Russian interests.
883
 The Ottoman possession of the Straits would block the 
capture of them by another Great Power, the bête noire of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry.
884
 Sazonov strongly stated that the Straits and a surrounding region should be 
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held either by the Ottoman Empire or Russia or ‘Russia would regard any attempt made 
by another Power to take permanent possession of them as a casus belli.’885  
Therefore, according to Sazonov, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was not desirable 
for Russia and all diplomatic efforts needed to be done to postpone it.
886
 For the Russian 
Foreign Ministry, the Russian policy on the Armenian reforms was toward this end. In 
the summer of 1913, during the negotiations between the Entente powers concerning the 
reforms, Sazonov acknowledged the importance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, which would benefit from the reforms.
887
 Moreover, having good relations with 
the Ottoman Empire was also beneficial for the relations between the Russian Muslims 
and the Russian government.
888
 Naturally, this would require a better understanding with 
the Ottoman Empire but without giving the Armenians the impression that Russia was 
not pressing hard enough for reforms. In a cunning fashion, as Grigorii N. Trubetskoi, the 
head of the Near Eastern Section of the Russian Foreign Ministry, publicly declared in 
August 1913 that ‘the pressure would be on Turkey’ about the reforms, his Foreign 
Minister sent secret instructions to Girs for a rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire on 
the same day.
889
  
Another factor in the Russian assessment of the Ottoman Empire’s fate was the Kurdish 
population there. Given the mutual suspicions held by the Russians and the Ottomans, the 
idea to gain influence among the Kurdish tribes had been echoed previously. Vorontsov-
Dashkov, along with other Russian officials, was supportive of the idea of allying some 
of the Kurdish chiefs by distributing them pensions and lands, which would minimize a 
potential threat in case of a war with the Ottoman Empire.
890
 When the reform 
negotiations started, Sazonov also instructed the Russian diplomatic corps in the Ottoman 
and Persian empires to work for expanding Russian influence among the Kurds and look 
into the possibility of uniting the Kurds without forgetting the relation between the 
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Kurdish and Armenian questions.
891
 As Reynolds notes, in addition to their role in a 
potential war with the Ottoman Empire, increased influence among the Kurds could also 
be used by the Russians as leverage against Armenian revolutionaries.
892
 Therefore, 
whether the Ottoman Empire disintegrated or not, maintaining Russian influence among 
the Kurds was seen essential by the Russians.  
Uneasy relations between some Kurdish tribes and the Ottoman government were noted 
by several Russian observers, who believed that this could be used to their advantage. By 
1913, there were many Kurdish chiefs who would be willing to serve for Russia.
893
 Soon, 
these Kurdish chiefs were distributed arms and money by the Russians to expand their 
influence in Eastern Anatolia.
894
 A particularly well-known Kurdish chief in this regard 
was Abdurrezzak Bedirkhan, whose lineage, familiarity with the Russian auhorities and 
Russian culture from his days at the Ottoman embassy in St. Petersburg made him a 
favourite for the Russians.
895
 
The Russian interest in the Kurds was interpreted by the German and British diplomats as 
a move for creating a pretext for military intervention by inciting the Kurds against the 
Ottoman Armenians.
896
 However, Reynolds argues that it was ‘the clash of St. 
Petersburg’s clashing strategic objectives’ (postponing the demise of the Ottoman Empire 
until she was ready and obtaining more influence over the Kurds) that created a dilemma, 
in which Russia was working both for the stability in Eastern Anatolia by supporting the 
Armenian reforms and disrupting it by expanding its influence on the Kurds. For 
Lazarev, this was the Russian double game which was implemented for Russia’s own 
colonial and imperialist interests.
897
 Perhaps, the Russian authorities believed that from 
the perspective of stability in Eastern Anatolia, the benefits of the Armenian reforms 
would lessen the friction between these two objectives.   
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There was very little space to manoeuvre for the Russians simply because of the 
structural conflict between the Armenians and Kurds in Eastern Anatolia. Nevertheless, 
based on their observation of several acts of cooperation between the Kurds and 
Armenians against the Ottoman government, some Russian officials suggested bringing 
the Armenians and Kurds together, which could resolve the conflict in their strategy.
898
 
However, there was a major obstacle to this plan: these cooperative elements could be 
brought together only against the Ottoman State, which could only lead to an Ottoman 
collapse, a result the Russians did not favour by 1913. This conundrum led the Russian 
consul in Bitlis, Vasilii I. Shirkov, to note that ‘the Armenian question was always the 
Kurdish–Armenian [Question], since the Armenians suffered and suffer precisely from 
the Kurds under the weakness and incapability (intentional or not, it is also a big 
question) of the Turkish authorities.’899 In other words, the deeply-rooted economic, 
social, and religious reasons for conflict between the Armenians and Kurds and the 
Russian primacy for keeping Ottoman Empire intact created a difficult situation for the 
Russian decision makers.  
Meanwhile, there was some progress in the reform negotiations. By October 1913, Girs 
and Wangenheim agreed to sort out most of their differences such as the establishment of 
two sectors instead of a single province and the status of the general-governor. However, 
it was now the Ottoman government that raised its opposition as the CUP circles were 
complaining about foreign interference. The Ottoman Prime Minister, Said Halim Pasha, 
lamented that this project was aimed at creating ‘Lebanons everywhere in Turkey.’900 
Girs was aware of this as he reported to St. Petersburg that the CUP was trying to ‘bury 
the Armenian question by all means’ and only the European guarantee could pacify the 
Armenians and bring internal peace to Turkey.
901
 The negotiations again stuck and it 
caused grave anxiety among the Russian Armenians, whose pressure on the Russian 
government created a tense situation in the South Caucasus.  
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The Russian Armenians during the Negotiation Process 
 
Not trusting in the Ottoman promises of internal reforms, the Dashnaktsutiun was hopeful 
of a reform project under the guarantees of the Great Powers. In principle, the party was 
advocating administrative self-government for the eastern provinces as an integral part of 
the Ottoman Empire.
902
 Nevertheless, the project was considered by the Dashnaks a step 
in the right direction as they were generally content with the Russian proposals.
903
 There 
were still sceptics among the Dashnaks, for whom Russia had ‘opposed to give the 
Ottoman Armenians extensive freedoms with the Armenian reforms because of the 
danger it could reflect on the Russian Armenians, who had different demands.’904 
Acknowledging how the Russian government damaged the party recently, Vramian noted 
that ‘the Dashnaks, unlike the Catholicos and Armenian merchants, had never sought 
European control, since that would involve Russia’s participation, and Russian control 
would destroy their party.’905  
Meanwhile, anxious about the Ottoman Armenians, the party continued its efforts for 
arming and collection of donations.
906
 A distinctive feature of the policy in this period 
was that the Dashnaks were now arming the local Ottoman Armenians irrespective of 
their party affiliations and addressing the whole Armenian population. The Dashnaks 
hoped that this would convince the Great Powers that this was a national movement not 
the party’s.907 In order to fund these activities, donations were being demanded, 
especially from the Russian Armenians.
908 
To sum up, the Dashnak position on Russia 
remained unchanged during the negotiation process.  
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On the pages of Tifliskii listok, an article described the change of relations between the 
Russian government and the Russian Armenians. The article stated that all the problems 
of Golitsyn’s administration had been sorted out thanks to the policies of Vorontsov-
Dashkov. Now, the Armenian perception of Russian intentions was quite favourable and 
it was time for Russia to help the Ottoman Armenians.
909
 Nevertheless, the Russian 
Armenians kept sending their delegations to the viceroy. As the First Balkan War was 
now over, they were expecting more decisive measures. An important suggestion by the 
Russian Armenians was about the permission by the Russian authorities for 
transportation of arms from the Caucasus into Eastern Anatolia.  
The Russian officials were aware of the potential entanglements of intensive arming 
among the Ottoman Armenians led by the Armenian revolutionaries. For Vorontsov-
Dashkov, historical experience showed that Russian interference in Ottoman affairs for 
the sake of Armenians brought internal and external complications (especially regarding 
the Russian Armenians and poor relations with the Ottoman Empire) rather than any 
benefits. Hence, the Russian policy should be designed not to irritate both the Ottoman 
government and the Russian Armenians. Therefore, the viceroy suggested preventing any 
open manifestation of assistance by the Russian Armenians to their Ottoman compatriots 
and persecuting those only harmful for the internal peace of the Caucasus. On the other 
hand, border crossings of the Russian Armenian volunteers heading to Eastern Anatolia 
could be allowed not to irritate the Russian Armenians. Since these Armenian volunteers 
were mainly from the ranks of uneasy elements of the Caucasus population, this policy 
would help improve the internal peace and order in the Caucasus. For the viceroy, such a 
policy would hit two birds with one stone.
910
 
Therefore, the viceroy believed that Russian permission for transportation of arms into 
the Ottoman Empire could help appease the Armenian bourgeoisie and the Armenian 
Church at a time when he was particularly concerned with keeping good relations with 
them considering the resurrection of the labour movement and its impact on the South 
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Caucasus. After the Lena shootings in April 1912, the Russian revolutionary movement 
had become more active. A simultaneous revival was also observed in the organized 
labour as the frequency of strikes went up between 1912 and 1914.
911
  
In the South Caucasus, this was particularly felt in Baku, where general strikes were held 
in 1913 with the impact of the rise of oil prices.
912
 Although these strikes were of mostly 
economic character according to the Russian officials, they still had to be cautious about 
organized labour. What St. Petersburg wanted to see was the continuation of the 5 percent 
annual growth rate between 1909 and 1913, not its disruption.
913
 This was more so as the 
general strike of 1913 in Baku caused such a fall in the output that the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry was forced to import oil until December 1913.
914
 
Supporting the viceroy’s ideas, Sazonov noted that they still had to be cautious about 
their support for the Armenians. According to Sazonov, the Armenian leaders needed to 
be told that ‘such actions of the Russian government must not be interpreted as an 
encouragement to them [the Armenians] to revolt’, which would be ‘extremely 
inopportune for Russia.’ Therefore, actions like transporting large quantities of arms by 
the Armenians to the Ottoman Empire had to be avoided.
915
 Kokovstov soon approved of 
the suggestion of the viceroy on this double-aimed policy, which would satisfy both the 
Ottoman and Russian Armenians.
916
  
 
Pan-Islam as the Most Imminent Threat in the South Caucasus 
 
With the end of the First Balkan War, the viceroyalty’s concern about the influence of the 
pan-Islamist movement aggravated as Islam began to be used more by the CUP for the 
internal cohesion of the Ottoman Empire. The CUP was also aware that they did not have 
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too much leverage against the Great Powers so they realized that improved ties and 
coordination with other Muslims, especially with the Russian Muslims could be helpful. 
The South Caucasus was a key region, where during the Balkan Wars; the Ottoman 
emissaries arrived to mobilize Muslim solidarity for the Ottoman Empire by asking 
donations, handing out pamphlets and organizing secret meetings with the locals.
917
  
Meanwhile, a new Azeri political party, Musavat (Equality), which was established in 
late 1911, began to add to the worries of the Russian administration. Led by Mehmed 
Emin Resulzade, this party stressed the importance of unity among the Muslims and the 
independence of Muslim states.
918
 Such political developments were confirming the 
suspicions of the Russian officialdom about the pan-Islamist movement and its anti-
government propaganda, which was getting stronger in the aftermath of the Balkan 
conflict. According to the reports, this was particularly dangerous among the ‘more 
fanatical and propaganda-prone Caucasian and Central Asian Muslims.’919 In Batumi, the 
Tsarist gendarmerie spotted 15 Ottoman officers, who were suspected of carrying out 
pan-Islamist propaganda in the region.
920
  
The Russian anxiety about the pan-Islamist threat grew to such a height that even the 
Dashnaks, who knew about it, had plans to use it to their advantage. In a Dashnak 
congress in fall 1913, it was proposed to send their men as pan-Islamist emissaries to 
incite the Muslim population, which would then lead the Russians to increase their 
pressure on the Muslims. As a result, the Muslims would be weakened and the Dashnaks 
would not meet any Muslim resistance in the Caucasus.
921
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By mid-1913, another concern for the Russians was the increased German activity in 
Eastern Anatolia with a view to help the CUP emissaries in the South Caucasus and 
northern Persia. The establishment of the German [special] general consulate in Erzurum 
in August-September 1913 was an ominous sign for that matter. Now, the German 
consulate in Erzurum could easily coordinate these activities with another important 
centre for German reconnaissance, the German consulate in Tiflis, led by Consul 
Friedrich Schulenburg, who was well-connected with a network of agents and contacts 
with Russian officers. The areas where the German agents were concentrated were 
Abkhazia and Ajaria, where they were suspected of organizing an anti-Russian insurgent 
movement among the local Muslim populations.
922
 
As these reports were circulating, in his report to the Tsar, the viceroy highlighted the 
numerical superiority of the Azeri population, their proximity to the neighbouring 
Muslim empires and their inclinations to religious fanaticism which made them a more 
viable candidate for potential trouble. In addition, the Balkan Wars contributed to the 
development of national consciousness among the Azeris.
923
 Although there were no 
imminent separatist actions among the Muslims, some measures needed to be taken. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov believed that the administration should not intervene in the religious 
affairs of the Muslims and their education needed to be improved. In their schools, the 
teaching personnel had to stay away from the pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist movement.
924
  
The viceroy’s account underlined the main Tsarist concerns about the pan-Islamist 
movement. The Russian perception of the pan-Islamist threat became even graver as the 
Germans intensified their activities in Eastern Anatolia, which were associated with the 
pan-Islamist network of emissaries in the South Caucasus. The net result of this was the 
worsening of the perception of the main Muslim element in the region, the Azeris, as the 
most imminent potential threat in the eyes of the viceroyalty. This was one of the reasons 
for keeping cordial relations with the Russian Armenians. The key to this was the 
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Russian patronage for the Ottoman Armenians, which according to Vorontsov-Dashkov, 
‘in all fairness, had to be provided.’925 
 
 
The Liman von Sanders Affair: From Crisis to Solution 
 
The cautious and rather consistent Russian policy on its relations with the Ottoman 
Empire took a big hit with the crisis triggered by the Liman von Sanders mission.
926
 
Demanded by the Ottoman government in May 1913, the mission included 41 German 
officers led by von Sanders, who would assume the role of army corps commander. The 
mission would oversee a comprehensive reorganization of the Ottoman army.
927
 The 
Russians were already aware of such a mission, which could be a harbinger of their 
nightmare concerning the Ottoman Empire: a German take-over.
928
 Primarily concerned 
with the status of the Straits, the Russians approached great powers during November 
1913 to prevent such an outcome.
929
 However, when the mission arrived in Istanbul, 
Russia still did not have the assurances it sought.  
Prior to the arrival of the German mission, Russia was happy to see the Ottoman Empire 
holding the Straits as Sazonov stated. However, the arrival of Sanders was interpreted as 
a means to ‘change on the ownership of the Straits’, with overtones on the fate of the 
Ottoman Empire, to which Russia could not stay indifferent.
930
 From early December 
1913 on, the Russian Foreign Ministry was informing their allies about their uneasiness 
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with increasing urgency. For Sazonov, this was the test of sincerity for the Entente 
powers and decisive measures had to be taken. Otherwise, with Liman von Sanders at the 
command of army corps, ‘the position of the German ambassador at Constantinople 
would be that of a virtual dictator.’931 
To determine the Russian course of action, a series of special conferences were organized 
by the Council of Ministers, in which the element of Russian military unreadiness in case 
of a general European war came up again. However, this time the Russians believed that 
they could not simply back off. On 23 December, Sazonov’s report to the Tsar 
highlighted the potential troubles caused by the Liman crisis. The establishment of this 
mission would be a ‘huge political defeat’ for Russia and worse, it could create the 
impression both to the allies and others that Russia would do anything to keep the peace, 
which was dangerous for Russia and the Entente. An agreement with Germany could be 
secured by taking certain measures on the Ottoman Empire. Among his recommended 
measures was ‘a temporary occupation of the Turkish ports or territory in Asia Minor like 
Trabzon or Bayezid’ in a coordinated effort with the allied powers. Sazonov knew that 
these could result in a counter-reaction by Germany, which could lead to greater 
complications; however, Russia could not let Germany control the Straits.
932
 
In another conference in early 1914, although some, like Sukhomlinov and Zhilinskii, 
declared that Russia was ready for a war, Kokovtsov’s view that ‘the war at the moment 
would be the biggest misery for Russia’ prevailed. The lack of support by the allies for a 
proactive move also contributed to a more cautious Russian policy.
933 
Nevertheless, the 
Russian position on the Straits was reiterated to all relevant parties: Russia would not 
tolerate another power in the control of the Straits and would do anything to stop it.
934
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When the crisis started, the negotiations for the Armenian reforms had already been 
obstructed by the opposition of the Ottoman government. Kokovtsov admitted to the 
European press that the negotiation process was not progressing.
935
 Dissatisfied with the 
situation, Sazonov restated his constant warning to Turhan Pasha: the reforms with 
serious guarantees needed to be carried out whereby the Ottoman territorial integrity was 
guaranteed. If not, Russia would have to intervene to prevent any disturbances on her 
border owing to the considerable number of its Armenian subjects.
936
  
As the mission arrived in Istanbul, the Russian perspective on the status of the Armenian 
reforms was shaped by its grander foreign policy interests. Admitting the critical 
situation, Girs noted that Russia could be drawn into war with the Ottoman Empire 
against its will.
937
 Meanwhile, Sazonov advocated for putting more pressure on the 
Ottoman government for the implementation of Armenian reforms. Whatever the 
outcome of this crisis would be, Russian imperial interests demanded the maintenance of 
Armenian loyalties, for which their policy on Armenian reforms was of immense 
importance.  
It was particularly more so considering the increased German propaganda among 
Armenians to turn them against Russia by the end of 1913. A key character in this sense 
was the German general consul in Erzurum, Edgar Anders, an experienced agent in the 
affairs of the region. Apart from his role in the coordination of the Ottoman emissaries 
against Russia, he was also instructed by Berlin to divert Armenian sympathies from 
Russia to Germany and use them to undertake rebellion in the Caucasus.
938
 The German 
intelligence knew that Armenian sympathies for Russia were on the rise, and nothing was 
spared to stop this as the general-consul was given a considerable amount of funds to 
ensure that ‘the Russian supremacy in Turkish Armenia was not established.’939 Another 
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consul at Mosul, Ebert Goldshtein, also did the same thing when in 1913 he visited the 
provinces of Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Van, where his main work was anti-Russian 
propaganda among the Armenians.
940
 
On the negotiations of reforms, Sazonov stressed the need for a compromise. However, 
there was a limit to this and concessions could be interpreted by the Armenians as a lack 
of willingness on the Russian side. Under these circumstances, Sazonov noted that Russia 
would ‘persist on the realization of its reasonable demands regarding the Armenian 
question’; although this carried a level of risk of conflict that Russia had to take.941 If 
pressuring the Ottoman Empire for the reforms did not work, the Russians feared that a 
rebellion in Eastern Anatolia in the spring of 1914 was a possibility. In such case, Russia 
could not stay indifferent because of this line of action would ‘transform the Armenian 
people to betrayers and open enemies of the Russian state.’ This, in turn, could result a 
surge in the combined revolutionary movement in Russia. Therefore, ‘if the Porte denied 
realization of our [Russian] demands, they had to actively prepare for the events, which 
could be followed with an offensive in the spring in the Armenian provinces.’942 This was 
a more detailed version of Sazonov’s standard warning about Eastern Anatolia. Another 
motivation for the Russians was about the commercial benefits the Armenians would 
bring when the negotiations produced results. According to Sazonov, Russia could not 
compete with other Great Powers, which had already grabbed the lion’s share in the 
Ottoman Empire by means of economic concessions and investments. Lacking this, 
Russia needed to have good relations with the Ottoman Christians, primarily the 
Armenians, to close the gap.
943
 
To show the Porte how serious the Russian concern for Armenian reforms, it was 
proposed to concentrate more Russian troops in the Caucasus.
944
 However, Sazonov 
made it clear that these military measures had to be carried out in absolute secrecy so that 
the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers were not alerted and the Armenians were not 
given the impression of an armed Russian intervention. When the Russian forces were 
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ready, the Porte would be asked to comply with the Russian demands in such a way that 
the Porte would know that a rejection would mean an immediate Russian action. As 
Sazonov put it, ‘This, in turn, could lead to extremely undesirable complications, to 
which, as it was mentioned above, they nevertheless could not stay indifferent.’945 
Girs was reporting about the opening of the deadlock on the Armenian reforms; however 
it was still murky by late December.
946
 As the diplomatic crisis went on, the constant 
unrest in Eastern Anatolia was annoying the Russians. According to the Russian 
consulate reports, an important dimension of this unrest had to do with Muslim discontent 
over the reforms, which were followed by increased anti-Armenian propaganda and 
arming led by local CUP units.
947
 Against this background, Trubetskoi noted that ‘the 
complications on the Turkish border could be caused by the rebellions in Armenia.’948 
Under these circumstances, Sazonov instructed Girs to ‘make the Porte the most decisive 
suggestion’ on the potential consequences of failing to take appropriate measures to 
prevent disorder in Eastern Anatolia.
949
 He did the same to Turhan Pasha.
950
 Girs did 
what he was told but he reported the fragility of the situation in Istanbul as he wrote to 
Sazonov that Russia had to be ready ‘for any eventuality,’ even a war against Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire.
951
 Acknowledging this, Sazonov noted that Russia had to be 
ready for events, including in the Armenian provinces, ‘which could demand their 
intervention and bring more serious complications if Russia lacked the opportunity to 
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take quick and decisive measures.’952 This view was also embraced by the Minister of 
War, Sukhomlinov, and Kokovtsov.
953
 
Meanwhile in the South Caucasus, the negative impact of the Liman affair on the 
progress of Armenian reforms was making the Russian Armenians unhappy. Aware of 
this, Vorontsov-Dashkov reminded the governors in the Caucasus that they should be 
very careful in dealing with the demonstrations organized by the Russian Armenians for 
their brethren across the border. The governors were ordered to emphasize that the 
Russian government was supporting the Ottoman Armenians. However, at the same time, 
the protestors needed to be reminded that in this internal matter of the Ottoman 
government with its Armenian subjects, Russia adopted a policy of ‘strict non-
intervention.’ The governors were instructed to take measures which would indicate that 
the Russian government was sympathizing with the situation of the Ottoman Armenians 
not to cause any discontent among the Russian Armenians.
954
 The governors were told to 
allow demonstrations unless they were disrupting internal disorder and avoid any 
measures which would complicate Russia’s relations with the Ottoman Empire.955  
Ultimately, stiff Russian opposition to the status of the mission and the diplomatic crisis 
it created forced the Ottoman government to back off. With the curtailment of the 
responsibilities of the mission and von Sanders, a frantic period at the Choristers’ Bridge 
ended. Soon, the Russian and German ambassadors convinced the Ottoman government 
to ink the agreement for Armenian reforms. According to the agreement, there would be 
two sectors with two General-Inspectors, who would oversee the local administration and 
were to be appointed by the Porte on the recommendation of the Great Powers. When the 
Ottoman Prime Minister, Said Halim Pasha, and the Russian chargé d’affaires in Istanbul, 
Konstantin N. Gulkevich, signed the agreement on 8 February, the Russian diplomatic 
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circles had a moment of relief as they averted a possible conflict which they did not really 
desire.
956
  
When the Liman crisis broke out, the Armenian negotiation process was already stuck, 
which was annoying enough for Russia. As the diplomatic crisis escalated and the 
Russians believed that the Germans had arrived to take over the Ottoman Empire, they 
simultaneously began to act more firmly on the Armenian reforms because of the 
importance of both Ottoman and Russian Armenians for their international and domestic 
interests in this highly unstable environment. The increased German propaganda activity 
and the rising fears of a pan-Islamist campaign in the South Caucasus and across the 
border organized by Istanbul added another dimension to their level of firmness. Further 
complications were avoided with the compromise on the status of the mission and soon 
the reform agreement was signed, which marked a critical point for the relations between 
Russia and the Armenians, many of them believed that a new era was opened for them.  
 
 
From the February Agreement to the Outbreak of the First World War (February 
1914- July 1914) 
Russia’s Take on the Armenian Question in the Aftermath of the February 
Agreement 
  
By February 1914, the complications about the German mission and the Armenian 
reforms were sorted out. In St. Petersburg, the Russian ministers convened again to 
discuss the strategy on the Straits and the general course of action regarding the Ottoman 
Empire on 8 February. Having witnessed the critical situation the Liman affair created, 
the participants discussed various scenarios about the Russian capabilities of capturing 
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the Straits with a landing operation if a similar situation arose. It was agreed that such an 
operation could only succeed in the event of a general (European) war provided that the 
Russian Black Sea fleet and other military preparations were ready. The participants 
concluded that neither was Russia ready for a general war, nor its Black Sea fleet for a 
landing operation to capture the Straits and this would be the case for the near future. 
Thus, at the end of the conference, it was decided to take necessary measures to 
overcome these weaknesses in case another crisis broke out, particularly regarding the 
strengthening the Black Sea fleet.
957 
This policy went on until the outbreak of the Great 
War as the following meetings and the reports of the relevant agencies attested.
958
 
Another Tsarist concern for a possible Ottoman complication was about Eastern Anatolia. 
Already beset by chronic unrest, the region would now receive a new set of railway lines 
to be built by the European capital. Against this threat which was directly related with the 
Russian security concerns in the South Caucasus, Russia got the concessions to build the 
lines close to its border. Moreover, as proposed by Sazonov in late 1913, the 
insufficiencies in the Caucasian railway network would be sorted out. Once these 
preparations were made, Russia would be ready for any sudden incidents in the region.
959
 
Therefore, the basic tenets of the Russian policy on the Ottoman Empire remained intact 
even after a major crisis. The Liman crisis reminded that a major crisis in the Ottoman 
Empire, which could trigger its collapse and eventually a general war, was not unlikely. It 
also reminded of the Russian military and naval deficiencies and the difficulty of a 
Russian backing off in a major crisis because of the matters of power perception and 
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prestige. The Russian course to avert the inevitable was to prepare as soon as possible 
and see what they could do to forestall a premature Ottoman collapse.
960
  
A part of this policy was to establish better relations with the Ottoman Empire, which 
would also counter German influence.
961
 An important aspect of this was about 
promoting better commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, for which a Russian-
Ottoman Friendship Society was founded.
962
 In May 1914, an Ottoman delegation led by 
Talat Pasha visited Livadia. Talat asked Sazonov about a possible alliance, on which he 
also exchanged ideas with Girs. The ambassador was aware of the difficult situation Talat 
Pasha was in: neither the Triple Alliance nor the Entente wanted the Ottoman Empire as 
allies because ‘nobody wanted a weak and a dependent country’ as an ally. Although 
Talat Pasha’s proposal did not produce any results, both Sazonov and Girs expressed that 
Russia wanted better relations with the Ottoman Empire.
963
 What Russia needed from the 
Ottoman Empire in mid-1914 was not an alliance but to sustain its existence without 
complicating things for Russia and having better relations could help for that.  
The Russian position on the Ottoman Armenians was part of this and basically for the 
same reasons: to consolidate sympathies of the Ottoman and Russian Armenians and to 
make sure that Eastern Anatolia was politically stable, which was in line with the general 
tenets of the Russian foreign policy on the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian 
Foreign Ministry believed that the implementation of Armenian reforms would be helpful 
for these aims. Thus, they were quite observant from February onward whether the 
Ottoman government was fulfilling its obligations about the reforms.
964
  
The Russian position was made absolutely clear to Papadzhanov, who met with Girs and 
Trubetskoi in April. Stating the Russian priority of the Straits over the eastern provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire, Girs stressed the importance of maintaining the status-quo in the 
Ottoman Empire for the moment. Therefore, a possible annexation of the eastern 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire was not in line with Russian interests. What Girs 
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wanted from the Armenians was to avoid any annexation speculation or another 
complication, which could trigger an Ottoman collapse and a European war, something 
Russia did not favour at the moment.
965
  
Girs also expressed the Russian disapproval of Armenian autonomy since this could also 
result in another unfavourable outcome, an increased influence of another Great Power 
(i.e. Germany) in ‘Ottoman Armenia.’ Russia would continue its support for the 
Armenians by monitoring the realization of the Armenian reforms.
966
 In St. Petersburg, 
Trubetskoi expressed similar views to Papadzhanov: ‘At the moment, I would consider 
beautiful slogans about [Armenian] autonomy or annexation dangerous and provocative.’ 
In light of Ottoman and German suspicions about Russian intentions regarding 
annexation, absolute caution was necessary in order to demonstrate that Russia did not 
have such intentions.
967
 
Meanwhile, the Russian diplomatic corps were concerned with the slow progress on 
reforms and the Armenian complaints about it. In March 1914, Sazonov had already 
revealed the Russian position in the aftermath of the reform agreement. He told that ‘the 
Armenians should be convinced that Russia did not have the intentions to annex Turkish 
Armenia or to form a buffer state or an autonomous province.’ What the Russians desired 
were peace and order in region and good treatment of the Armenians. A considerable 
number of Russian Armenians were ‘representing a fully loyal and desirable element’ but 
they were worried about the fate of their brethren across the border. Therefore, Russia 
would not ‘tolerate disorder in Armenia or inside Russian borders.’968 In May and June, 
the Catholicos and Boghos Nubar Pasha, who expressed their concerns to St. Petersburg 
about lack of progress about the reforms, were informed that Russia would continue its 
support for the Ottoman Armenians and make sure that the reforms would be carried out 
properly.
969
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Apart from the sluggish progress on the reforms, the German efforts in Eastern Anatolia 
and South Caucasus had attracted the attention of the Russians. The Germans were trying 
to enhance their influence on the Armenians by setting up a German-Armenian society in 
February 1914 to publicize the German interest in the fate of the Armenians. Soon, 
several prominent members of the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie were sent to Berlin to 
counter the influence of this society.
970
 Vorontsov-Dashkov was wary of the German 
presence and he noted that the Germans were trying to win over the Armenians by 
promising to help them for their aspirations to unification. He added that although 
Russian influence on the Ottoman Armenians was prevailing at the moment, the attitude 
of the Armenian leaders could change and caution was necessary against the German 
threat.
971
 
Another key element for the Russian position in the Armenian question was about the 
Kurds. The proposals of the Kurdish chiefs offering their loyalties to the Russians kept 
coming. However, the Russians restricted their promises to individual relations and 
refrained from supporting the Kurdish chiefs that offered a general rebellion against the 
Ottoman Empire. For instance, in the spring of 1914, the Russians declined the proposal 
by the Khan of Maku to stage a rebellion in the Ottoman Empire with coordination of the 
Armenians.
972
 Although the Russian desire to gain influence among the Kurds was 
obvious, they were aware of the difficulties it created for their relations with the 
Armenians.  
Noting the offers of various Kurdish chiefs, the viceroy also asserted that ‘an exclusive 
influence on the Kurds could be obtained by a sensible policy.’ Despite the annoyance of 
both Ottoman and Russian Armenians, the viceroy believed that Russian foreign policy 
interests required expanding Russian influence on the Kurds against the German efforts 
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in the region.
973
 Concerning this dilemma, he asserted that the attempts of rapprochement 
between the Kurds and Armenians would be welcomed.
974
  
 
 
Relations between the Russian Administration and the Armenian Church, the 
Armenian Bourgeoisie and the Dashnaks after the February Agreement 
 
‘New horizons were opening up before the nation, which had the right to expect a bright 
future. The signing of the agreement, although an important success in itself, was not 
everything.’975As the Patriarch Zaven stated, although the agreement on the Armenian 
reforms did not meet all the demands of the Armenians, it was certainly considered a big 
step and the Ottoman Armenians were hopeful about it. The Armenian Patriarch then 
expressed his gratitude to the Tsar, Sazonov, and Girs for their efforts for the first step ‘to 
save them from the Turkish yoke.’976 Similarly, the Armenian National Assembly in 
Istanbul and the majority of the Armenian political parties also cheered for the Russian 
assistance. Gulkevich was even more hopeful of the potential returns of the Russian 
support for Armenian reforms. In a prophetic manner, Gulkevich noted that ‘when the 
historical fate of Russia brought her to Istanbul, she would rely on 200,000 Armenian 
population of Istanbul in its inevitable war with the Greek element.’977 
A key character in the initiation of the reform process and its aftermath, Kevork V was 
pleased since his efforts produced results with the backing of the Russian government. 
The Catholicos expressed his gratitude to the Tsar on behalf of his people. By the grace 
of his beloved Monarch Sovereign, ‘the Armenian people once again were called into the 
historical arena as the only element, which was able to implement the European religious 
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and material culture in Asiatic Turkey.’978 Boghos Nubar Pasha also thanked the Russian 
government, to which the Armenians owed foremost for the materialization of the 
reforms.
979
 Khatisian and other members of the Armenian bourgeoisie expressed their joy 
to the viceroy in the initial aftermath of the agreement. The next step was about how to 
make the most of these projected reforms both politically and economically. They 
believed that there was a mutually beneficial angle for them and the Russian imperial 
interests to pull this off.  
To close the gap with other Great Powers’ economic influence on the Ottoman Empire, 
the eastern provinces under the reform project was a great opportunity. Thus, the 
Armenians were seen as their potential intermediaries for this sort of enterprise as 
Trubetskoi puts it: ‘The Armenian reforms would be helpful not only in Armenia itself 
but also in Russian economic expansion in the Ottoman realm.’980 To this end, the 
Russian government was discussing the establishment of banks, mainly with Russian 
capital and administration, in the Ottoman Empire with branches in Istanbul and Eastern 
Anatolia, which could be also beneficial for the Russian Armenians. 
The Armenian bourgeoisie was also interested in expanding its influence in Eastern 
Anatolia. The meetings of the representatives of Armenian industrialists and financiers in 
St. Petersburg, Moscow and Tiflis were hopeful about the commercial and agricultural 
opportunities. In the national congress in Tiflis in May 1914, an Armenian bank with 3 
million roubles of capital in Ottoman Armenia was one of the demands of the influential 
Russian Armenian entrepreneurs.
981
 Mantashev’s Commercial Bank had already 
proposed to establish a bank in Eastern Anatolia earlier. In the branches of this bank, the 
Russian Armenians would be employed. However, the Mantashevs demanded the 
protection of the bank by the Russian government and the monopoly in the region. At 
first, Sazonov found this proposal beneficial for Russian economic interests in the area 
since it would attract Russian Armenian entrepreneurs but asked for an overview.
982
 After 
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due consideration, the project was rejected since an exclusively Armenian bank could 
lead to political complications in the Ottoman Empire.
983
 Instead, a Russo-Asiatic Bank 
(with French-Russian capital), to which the Armenian entrepreneurs could also join, 
would be a better fit.
984
 Although, this was not exactly what the Russian Armenian 
financiers wanted, good relations between the Russian administration and the Armenian 
bourgeoisie continued.  
An important reason for this had to do with the Tsarist fears of a continued pan-Islamist 
threat in the South Caucasus, which was assisted by Germany. Anders was reported to 
orchestrate the activities of the Ottoman consuls in the Caucasus (mainly in Tiflis and 
Kars) thorough Ottoman spies. He visited the Caucasus in February 1914 himself, 
arousing the Russian suspicions to new heights. In July 1914, the Tiflis gendarmerie 
reported that he was in the South Caucasus to organize an uprising among the local 
Muslim population.
985
 This fear led to the formulation of an official Russian perception 
that every German in the area had to be a secret agent.
986
 
In 1914, there were reports pointing out that the pan-Islamist movement was failing to 
achieve its aims in Russian Empire and the Caucasus. The Muslim masses, with the 
exception of certain individuals, remained indifferent to the propaganda of the pan-
Islamist emissaries.
987
 Those emissaries believed that the main reason for their failure 
was ‘the uncultured Muslims, ignorance of their clergy and the presence of sects among 
the Muslims.’988 The same failure was noted in a special conference of the Council of 
Ministers on Muslim affairs in 1914. The participants of the conference also stressed that 
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the Muslim question should not be equated with the pan-Islamic threat. Although the 
perception of the pan-Islamist threat began to be put into a more realistic perspective by 
the Tsarist authorities, ‘the spectre of pan-Islamism’ as Vorobeva puts it, was still there 
and the perception of this threat continued to affect the actual policies of the Russian 
government and the viceroyalty until the outbreak of the Great War.
989
 
Compared with the Armenian Church and the Armenian bourgeoisie, the perspective of 
the Dashnaks on the Armenian negotiations was more complicated.  The view of the 
party members on Russia was still divided but the party continued its abstinence from 
revolutionary activity in Russia. Some members were suspicious of the ultimate Russian 
intentions behind their support for Armenian reforms and some like Aknouni went further 
and accused Russia and its ‘untalented diplomats’ of the complications in the Ottoman 
Empire. According to Aknouni, Charykov was not a diplomat and ‘stupid’ Girs was even 
worse and ‘all Europe laughed at Russia.’990 However, the party considered the situation 
of the Ottoman Armenians and the reforms their priority, for which Russian support was 
essential. Thus, despite the sceptics, the party generally was in favour of the Russian 
policy and tried not to antagonize it.
991
 Sazonov believed that Armenian sympathies 
toward Russia grew because of the wise policies of the viceroy and all Armenian parties, 
even extreme groups like the Dashnaks, were putting their hopes on Russia for the fate of 
their people.
992
 
Meanwhile, the bottleneck in the negotiations bought the CUP time to ask Dashnaks for 
collaboration. The main demand of the CUP from the Dashnaks was about the European 
supervision of Armenian reforms. In return, they would meet their political demands 
regarding civil rights, the number of Armenian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament and 
the protection from the Kurds. Blaming Russia for its expansionist designs on Turkish 
Armenia, Said Halim Pasha asked the Dashnaks to repudiate the reform project. 
However, the offer of the CUP was not accepted. The CUP continued to try to convince 
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the Dashnaks in late 1913 and early 1914 by holding informal meetings with them. In 
various ways, the CUP participants asked the Armenian participants to handle this 
together without including foreign powers. Russia was particularly seen as the main 
instigator behind the scenes and the CUP delegates were warning the Armenians not to be 
part of expansionary policies of Russia.
993 
There was a lack of confidence on both sides 
and given their political priorities and the surrounding international situation, these 
meetings did not produce any tangible results.  
Meanwhile in this uncertain atmosphere, the Dashnaks continued to transfer arms and 
personnel to Eastern Anatolia, noted by not only the Russians but also the Ottoman and 
German authorities.
994  
According to a secret police report, the Ottoman Armenians were 
armed enough to resist a Kurdish onslaught.’995  The demands of the Russian Armenians 
from the Russian authorities to allow low levels of transportation of arms into the 
Ottoman border were finally granted by Sazonov. This would alleviate some of the 
dissatisfaction of the Russian Armenians but they were strictly ordered by the viceroy 
that they should avoid any activities which could disrupt stability in the Caucasus.
996
  
Shortly after the agreement, Gulkevich believed that this ‘diplomatic triumph’ would 
strengthen the relations of the Russian Armenians with Russia and ‘prevent them from 
falling into the ranks of their [Russian] extreme parties.’997 Gulkevich proved to be right 
as improved relations, in turn, ameliorated the Dashnak view of Tsarist policy. In the 
deliberations of the Dashnak party council, which met in Berlin in March 1914, it was 
stated that the anti-Armenian drive of the Russian government had stopped at the end of 
1911 and the Dashnaktsutiun was not persecuted as a matter of Russian policy. Russian 
rule was ‘incomparably better’ than the Turkish arbitrariness, and although it was not 
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ideal, it did not require the use of terror.
998
 Indeed, the Dashnak threat in the South 
Caucasus was minimized, for which Vorontsov-Dashkov was pleased as he wrote to the 
Tsar that political parties in the region were either liquidated or lost their significance 
since active members of those had been sentenced by courts or dealt with other 
administrative measures.
999
 The friction between the Dashnaks and Russia was fading as 
the Dashnaks were channelling their energies for the Ottoman Armenians.  
Soon, the improvement of the relations between the Dashnaks and the Russian 
government was reinforced as the Catholicos wrote to the viceroy in May about a 
possible imperial pardon for the remaining Dashnak trial convicts. The Catholicos 
downplayed anti-governmental activity of the party, which was primarily against the 
Azeris in 1905-6, and asked the viceroy for help.
1000
 To the joy of the Dashnaks, the Tsar 
granted imperial pardon for the remaining convicts who received the harshest sentences. 
Most of them were released from the prison, and the remaining Dashnaks’ punishments 
were reduced. Hard labour sentences were changed to administrative exile or right to live 
anywhere in the empire excluding the capital and capital provinces for five years.
1001
 
After the pardon, Boghos Nubar Pasha’s letter particularly reminded the Dashnaks that 
‘the reforms were dependent not on the European great powers but on Russia at the 
moment’ and no action against Russia should be taken. Papadzhanian even went further 
and urged the Dashnaks to negotiate with the SRs and proclaim that the party would not 
take any action against Nicholas II.
1002
   
 
Conclusion 
 
When the Great War broke out, the Dashnaks were holding their eighth annual congress 
in Erzurum, where the party’s line in a possible general war was already on the agenda. 
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The congress decided to stay neutral, which meant that in case of a Russian-Ottoman war, 
all of its members would assume their civic obligations. Soon after, a CUP delegation 
arrived in Erzurum and asked their former allies about a daring plan which involved 
undertaking a joint rebellion against Russia. The Dashnak delegation refused the offer 
and the party immediately organized successive meetings in Istanbul to evaluate the 
situation. The situation was very complicated for the Armenia Bureau, the party’s 
responsible body in the Ottoman Armenia, since any decision they would make about 
party’s stance on war could complicate the situation of not only the party but also the 
Ottoman Armenians.
1003
   
When the representatives of the Armenian Bureau came to Tiflis in September 1914 to 
discuss with the party’s Eastern Bureau, they saw none of the prudent line taken by the 
Ottoman Armenian political actors. There was general enthusiasm for a war against the 
Ottoman Empire among the Russian Armenians. It was not only the Eastern Bureau that 
cheered for war. The Armenian National Bureau, led by Khatisian, was the leading 
political actor that was pressing the Russian authorities to declare war on the Ottoman 
Empire. Encouraged by the Armenian National Bureau, the Catholicos asked the Tsar to 
‘take under his benevolent wings the suffering Turkish Armenians, to protect their lives 
and property, and to guarantee the implementation of the reform project.’1004 This overly 
enthusiastic situation alerted even Vorontsov-Dashkov, who asked the Catholicos not to 
take any action which could complicate Tsarist interests without the approval of the 
Russian authorities. 
This scene in August-September 1914 was the manifestation of the gradual improvement 
of the relations between the Russian government and the Russian Armenians. Earlier it 
was the domestic concerns that were decisive in their relationship but from 1912 onward, 
it was the international dynamics, particularly the situation of the Ottoman Armenians 
and the Ottoman Empire. The revival of the question of Armenian reforms in late 1912 
was considered by the Russians to be a useful policy for expanding Russian influence on 
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the Ottoman Armenians, maintaining stability in Eastern Anatolia, and satisfying the 
demands of the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie and the Catholicos. Even the Dashnaks, 
who were decimated in the recent trial, were cautious not to antagonize Russia due to 
their support for the Ottoman Armenians.  
As the defeats in the Balkan Wars made the situation in Eastern Anatolia more critical, 
the Russian Armenians continued to appeal to the Russian authorities for their brethren 
across the border. Both St. Petersburg and Tiflis agreed to render assistance however; it 
had to wait until the end of the conflicts in the Balkans. What the Russian authorities did 
not need was an Armenian unrest, which could lead to complications not only in Eastern 
Anatolia but also in the South Caucasus.   
When negotiations for the Armenian reforms began in the aftermath of the First Balkan 
War, the Russian perspective regarding the Ottoman Armenians and the Ottoman Empire 
remained unchanged. The Russian participation in the negotiations helped Russia counter 
rising German influence, postpone the untimely Ottoman collapse and garner Armenian 
sympathies. The viceroy was aware that the Russian Armenians needed to be given more 
substantial guarantees for help for the Ottoman Armenians. Given the Russian fears of 
growing pan-Islamist movement in the South Caucasus, now orchestrated by the 
Germans, and increased labour unrest in 1913, the support of the Armenian bourgeoisie 
and the Armenian Church could not be risked.  
The Liman affair was considered by the Tsarist Foreign Ministry a direct threat for the 
basic tenets of Russian imperial interests regarding the Ottoman Empire. Worried that the 
mission was a signal for a German take-over, Russia pressured the Ottoman government 
to reduce the responsibilities of the German mission. In the meantime, both Sazonov and 
Girs reiterated their warning of a Russian military intervention into Eastern Anatolia if 
the reforms were not implemented. Soon, the diplomatic crisis ended and the Armenian 
reforms agreement was signed.  
All political layers within the Russian Armenians were thankful for the Russian role in 
this. The Catholicos, who acted as asked by the viceroy during the process, was jubilant. 
His prestige among the Russian and Ottoman Armenians was bolstered as he was one of 
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the initiators of the reform project. This was why Vorontsov-Dashkov and Izvolskii 
opposed Stolypin’s proposal to curtail the privileges of the Catholicos in 1908. With an 
obedient Catholicos, like Kevork V, Echmiadzin could be a useful tool for the Russian 
government in its dealings with the Armenians.  
The members of the Armenian bourgeoisie were thankful to their Sovereign, who assisted 
their coreligionists across the border. Outplacing the decimated Dashnaks, they were now 
the leading political, economic and cultural force among the Russian Armenians and one 
of the key factors in the politics of the South Caucasus. With the signing of the 
agreement, they were considered to be useful for expanding Russian commercial interests 
in Eastern Anatolia, a mutually beneficial deal. As for the Dashnaks, despite the 
opposition of some of its members to Russia, the party avoided active confrontation with 
Russia. Since they lost their powerbase in the Caucasus and prioritized the Ottoman 
Armenians, this was understandable. As they continued their activities on transfer of arms 
and personnel through the Ottoman border, the Dashnaks were not persecuted by the 
Tsarist police as they were used to. The ultimate token regarding the improvement of the 
relations came on the eve of the war. The remaining convicts of the Dashnak trial, on the 
demand of the Catholicos and approval of the viceroy, received an imperial pardon from 
the Tsar in July 1914. Thus by then, all of the convicts of the Dashnak trial were 
pardoned (only those who received hard labour were sent to administrative exile) and the 
prosecutor of their trial, Lyzhin, was declared insane, which was a kind of rehabilitation 
of the party. This was indeed an interesting turn of events considering what Dashnaks had 
experienced in the Russian Empire after 1907. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Hovhannes Tumanian, the national poet of Armenia, was born in 1869 in a village in the 
province of Tiflis. His father was a priest and was of hereditary nobility—two qualities 
typically appreciated by the Tsarist establishment in the South Caucasus since 1828.
1005
 
Tumanian started his education in the local parish school and later went on to Nersesian 
seminary in Tiflis in 1883, both run by the Armenian Church.
1006
 This was the period 
when the Russian government was implementing restrictive measures on the Armenian 
Church as part of its Russification campaign, which Tumanian experienced first-hand. It 
was soon followed by the emergence of the Armenian revolutionary circles in the late 
1880s and the early 1890s, when members of the Armenian intelligentsia, like Tumanian, 
became acquainted with the ideas of the Hnchaks and later the Dashnaks. Although the 
Russian authorities grew more suspicious about the intentions of the Russian Armenians 
and put additional restrictions on the Armenian Church and other Armenian institutions, 
Tumanian and other Armenian revolutionaries still mainly concentrated their efforts on 
the liberation of the Ottoman Armenians. In the meantime, Tumanian was making a name 
for himself with his poems and novels, which touched upon the themes of patriotism and 
Armenian folklore among other subjects.
1007
 
Now a well-known figure among the Armenian intelligentsia in Tiflis, Tumanian 
witnessed the worsening relations between the Russian authorities and the Russian 
Armenians, which culminated in the confiscation of the properties of the Armenian 
Church in 1903. From then on, a total Armenian rebellion against Russia began and soon, 
it intermingled with the revolutionary turmoil in 1905. With the annulment of the 
                                               
1005 Reference of the Tiflis Okhrana, 8 May 1909 [21 May 1909], SSSA, f. 95, o. 1, d. 31, ll. 363-363 ob. 
1006 Agop J. Hacikyan, ed., The Heritage of Armenian Literature: From the Eighteenth Century to Modern 
Times, vol. 3 (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 2005), 619. 
1007 Tumanian’s Sasuntsi Davit (David of Sasun) (1902) and Tmkaberdi arume (The Capture of Fort 
Tmuk)(1902) are such examples. Hacikyan, 621. 
252 
 
confiscation decree in August 1905, the anti-government sentiment among the Armenians 
abated but there was another problem. It was the bloody clashes with the Azeris and as a 
member of the Dashnaktsutiun, Tumanian assumed organizational responsibilities during 
the clashes, for which he mainly blamed the Tsarist authorities.   
The clashes and the general revolutionary unrest in the region ended toward 1907 as a 
general recovery in the empire was taking place. Meanwhile, Stolypin and Vorontsov-
Dashkov were discussing as to how to deal with the Armenians as the most troublesome 
nationality in the region. For both of them, a big part of this had to do with the strength of 
the Dashnaktsutiun in the South Caucasus and soon a mass political trial of the party was 
initiated in 1908, which shook the lives of many Russian Armenians, including 
Tumanian. Charged with being a member of the central committee of the Dashnaktsutiun 
in Tiflis and taking part in the organization of armed operations of the party, Tumanian 
became one of the key targets of the Tsarist raids in late 1908.
1008
 Parts of Tumanian’s 
poem ‘Old Struggle’, which he wrote to depict the miseries of the Ottoman Armenians 
were lost during the Tsarist raids.
1009
 Soon after, Tumanian was arrested and was put into 
Metekhi prison. Although he was released later, it did not take long for the Tsarist 
authorities to arrest him again in 1911 on similar charges. Tumanian was among the 159 
members of the Dashnaktsutiun, who would appear in the final session of the trial in St. 
Petersburg in early 1912 on the charges of committing crimes against the state. 
Although Tumanian and his fellow Dashnaks were complaining about the persecution of 
the party by Russia, the fortunes of the party were not getting any better in the Ottoman 
and Persian empires. By 1912, the party had lost its hopes in the Persian constitutional 
revolution and broke off with the CUP in the Ottoman Empire. At about the same time, 
Tumanian was standing in the final session of the Dashnak trial, which surprisingly ended 
with the forgery scandal and mass acquittals, including Tumanian. Not long after he 
returned to Tiflis, Tumanian was now depicting Russia as the patron of all Armenians 
and supporting an active Russian policy regarding the Ottoman Armenians.  
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As the Russians began to show an active interest in the Ottoman Armenians, Tumanian 
became a member of the Armenian National Bureau, which was formed under the 
auspices of the Catholicos and the approval of the Russian government. For the Russian 
authorities, the Catholicosate was now an obedient institution at home and abroad that 
fervently supported the Tsarist line to the letter—a total contrast from the situation in 
1907 when Stolypin considered it the centre of Armenian sedition against Russia in 1907. 
Similarly, by 1912, the Armenian bourgeoisie was considered not the financiers of the 
Armenian revolutionaries but the natural ally of the Tsarist regime in the South Caucasus, 
where the Russian officials had bigger concerns, like the threat of the pan-Islamist 
movement.  
Tumanian’s life under Russian rule epitomizes how the fortunes of the Russian 
Armenians changed from the 1870s to 1914. The evolution of relations between 1903 and 
1914 was a big part of this change. By late 1912, the Armenian political pillars in the 
South Caucasus made their peace with Russia. In return, the Russian authorities were no 
longer oblivious to the demands of the Russian Armenians for a more active policy 
regarding the Ottoman Armenians. In the 1890s, Russia had serious concerns about the 
Armenian aspirations. Thus, when complications arose in 1894-1896 in the Ottoman 
Empire, with which Russia had an understanding at the time, an active Russian policy of 
interference was out of the question despite the appeals of the Russian and Ottoman 
Armenians. When the Red Cross approached the Russian Dowager Empress for a 
donation to the victims of the Armenian massacres of 1894-1896, the Empress 
refused.
1010
  
However, Russia’s response to the outcries of the Russian Armenians in late 1912 was 
radically different owing to its better relations with its own Armenians and new Russian 
foreign policy concerns about the Ottoman Empire. Led by Sazonov, the Russian 
diplomatic corps increasingly pressured the Ottoman Empire to listen to the demands of 
the Ottoman Armenians, which produced results in February 1914 with the signing of the 
reform agreement. As a result, from late 1912 to the outbreak of the First World War, the 
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relations between the Russian administration and the Russian Armenians further 
solidified. In early August 1914, just after the outbreak of the Great War, the Catholicos 
was assuring the viceroy of the loyalty of both Ottoman and Russian Armenians, who 
‘remained unshakably firm in their loyalty to the great Russian state.’1011 In the 
meantime, led by Khatisian, the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie was cheering for a war 
with the Ottoman Empire.  
This was a far cry from the disastrous relations in 1903, when the Armenians were up in 
arms against the Russian regime after the decision of confiscation of the properties of the 
Armenian Church. This study has accounted for how and why this change took place 
between 1903 and 1914 by looking at the relations between the Russian authorities and 
the main political pillars of the Russian Armenians: the Armenian Church, the Armenian 
bourgeoisie and, the Dashnaktsutiun. It has argued that from 1903 to 1912, the dominant 
factor in the gradual change of the relations was the domestic concerns of the Russian 
administration in the South Caucasus. From 1912 to the outbreak of the war, this was 
replaced with the Russian foreign policy interests regarding the Ottoman Empire. In line 
with the change of relations, from 1903 to 1912, the dominant Armenian image in 
Russian eyes changed from ‘the dissident revolutionary’ to the most suitable ally in the 
region, which could further Russian interests on both sides of the border. What happened 
between late 1912 and August 1914 reinforced this change as the relations between the 
Russian administration and the Russian Armenians further improved in the face of 
changing international dynamics revolving around the fate of the Ottoman Empire and 
the Ottoman Armenians.    
The first chapter has traced the relations between the Russian administration in the 
Caucasus and the Russian Armenians between 1903 and 1907. By focusing on the 
reaction by the Armenian masses, the Armenian clergy, and the Dashnaktsutiun against 
the Tsarist decision of confiscation in 1903, this chapter has put the Armenian unrest that 
erupted in the aftermath of the confiscation decision in the broader context of the 
revolution of 1905 in the South Caucasus. The Armenian unrest was one of the reasons 
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for the weakening of the Tsarist hold in the region during the revolutionary turmoil, 
which produced several tragic memories for the Armenians and Azeris during the bloody 
inter-ethnic conflict in 1905-1906.  
In 1905, Vorontsov-Dashkov had to leave his residence at the English Embankment in 
the capital for the viceroy’s palace in Tiflis upon the request of the Tsar.1012 With his 
arrival in Tiflis as the viceroy of the Caucasus and the annulment of the confiscation 
decree, St. Petersburg signalled a policy change regarding its position vis-à-vis the 
Russian Armenians. As the region stabilized and the Armenian-Azeri clashes abated 
toward 1907, the regime’s relations with the Armenian Church and the Armenian 
bourgeoisie improved from the days of 1903. As demonstrated in the first chapter, in this 
period, the Dashnaktsutiun became stronger in the South Caucasus mainly because of its 
role during the Armenian opposition to the Tsarist authorities in 1903-1905, and during 
the Armenian-Azeri clashes in 1905-1906. More alarmingly, the Dashnaks had now close 
links with the broader Russian revolutionary parties, which ultimately led to their 
inclusion in the Second International in 1907.  
By 1907, both St. Petersburg and Tiflis had serious concerns about the capabilities of the 
Dashnaks. However, there was no complete agreement between Stolypin and Vorontsov-
Dashkov on how to handle this. In the end, Stolypin opted out for a mass political trial of 
the party, which was an extreme measure in the eyes of the viceroy. Until the end of its 
final session in 1912, the trial of the Dashnaktsutiun became a key aspect for the relations 
between Russia with its Armenians. The second chapter has explained how the Dashnak 
organization in the South Caucasus was crushed by the trial and why the party had to 
transfer its forces to the Persian and Ottoman Empires, where they took part in the 
constitutional movements. As the Dashnak presence in the South Caucasus significantly 
faded, so did the Armenian image of ‘dissident revolutionary’ in the eyes of the Russian 
officials.    
Instead of analysing the trial by looking only at its unexpected verdict, the second chapter 
has described the changing Tsarist priorities at different stages of the trial process. By 
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doing so, it has explained the achievements of the trial for the Tsarist regime: the 
liquidation of the Dashnaks and the intimidation of the Armenian clergy and the 
Armenian bourgeoisie, which facilitated their coming to terms with the regime between 
1907 and 1912. Despite the limited number of convictions at the final session and the 
forgery scandal, the trial demonstrated that the entire judiciary process from 1908 to 1912 
played a key role in the reformulation of Russia’s policies regarding its Armenians.  
The differences between the capital and Tiflis were also displayed in the formulation of 
new relations between the Russian administration and the Armenian Church from 1907 to 
1912. The third chapter has delineated how and why the viceroy, with the support of 
Izvolskii and Sazonov, convinced Stolypin not to change the status and the privileges of 
the Catholicosate as well as the procedures of the Armenian Catholicosate elections. 
Considering it a key ally both at home and abroad, the viceroy knew that Stolypin’s 
proposals regarding the Armenian Catholicosate would be interpreted as another wave of 
Tsarist repression by the Armenians. Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs continued 
to express its reservations during the Catholicosate elections in 1908 and 1911, the 
viceroy’s line was mainly followed and only small changes about the governance and the 
privileges of the Armenian Church were made, which was helpful for the improved 
relations between the Armenian Church and the Russian authorities. As noted by 
Vorontsov-Dashkov and the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia’s domestic interests in the 
South Caucasus were closely connected with its foreign policy interests in Ottoman and 
Persian empires considering the Armenian and Muslim populations on both sides of the 
border. 
The third chapter has also argued that the improved relations with the Armenian Church 
were facilitated by the Dashnak trial, which was an excellent excuse to weed out the 
revolutionary elements within the Armenian clergy. In addition to the general weakening 
of the party in the South Caucasus, mainly owing to the trial, the party’s socialist 
character as a member of the Second International also damaged the prestige of the 
Dashnaks among the Armenian clergy. As a result, toward 1912, the Dashnak influence 
on the Armenian clergy weakened. Meanwhile, the election of Surenian—a regime-
friendly Catholicos—further reinforced the new understanding between the Armenian 
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Church and Russia. Once considered the centre of Armenian sedition, the Armenian 
Church became an obedient intermediary for Russia in its dealings with both the Russian 
and the Ottoman Armenians by 1912, when a new course of Russian foreign policy 
regarding the Ottoman Empire was on the agenda. 
Aside from its ecclesiastical dimension, the Armenian Church—the central institution for 
Armenian educational matters—was also part of the nationalities question in the South 
Caucasus. In the same period, the Georgians demanded the restoration of the autocephaly 
of their church, which was rejected by the Tsarist officials on the grounds that it would 
promote separatism. As the Georgians could not reverse their declining economic 
fortunes and were denied more cultural liberties the Georgian national movement 
remained influential and continued to propagate anti-Tsarist sentiment among the 
Georgians. The viceroy noted the difficulties to address the grievances of the Georgians, 
which were deeply entangled in the agrarian question in the region. However, the 
viceroy’s main fear in this period was about the growing influence of the pan-Islamist 
movement in the region.  
The increased politicization of the Russian Muslims during the revolution of 1905 was 
also the case with the Azeris. More alarmingly for the Russian authorities, the Azeris 
were also affected by the constitutional movements in the neighbouring Muslim empires 
in this period. The Tsarist officials were worried about the political developments among 
the Azeris but this reached new heights after 1908 as the CUP became the leading force 
in Ottoman politics. From then on, as the fourth chapter demonstrates, the Tsarist 
authorities increasingly became obsessed with the empire-wide threat of the pan-Islamist 
movement. For the Tsarist authorities, one of the key bases of this threat was the South 
Caucasus. Toward 1912, the Tsarist officials in Tiflis and St. Petersburg, from top to 
bottom, were firmly convinced that the pan-Islamist emissaries were running rampant in 
the South Caucasus. Given the strategic location of the region and Muslim demographic 
superiority, the Azeris were now seen by the Russian authorities as the most potentially 
explosive nationality in the region. The fourth chapter has claimed that the negative 
perceptions of the Georgians and the Azeris in the eyes of the Russian officials between 
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1907 and 1912 were instrumental in the replacement of the troublemaker image of the 
Armenians with that of a useful ally in this period. 
This was particularly the case with the Armenian bourgeoisie, which made its peace with 
the Tsarist regime between 1907 and 1912 as the region stabilized. Apart from their 
common interests in economic stability and their shared dislike of a strong labour 
movement, there were also political aspects of this rapprochement. Both sides approved 
of the maintenance of Armenian political primacy in local politics. The fourth chapter has 
also explained how the liquidation of the Dashnaktsutiun organization in the region 
facilitated better relations between the viceroyalty and the Russian Armenian 
bourgeoisie, which again became the most influential element in Russian Armenian 
affairs with the weakening of the Dashnaktsutiun. In early 1912, the members of the 
Armenian bourgeoisie could now ask Mayor Khatisian not to attend the final session of 
the Dashnak trial as a witness because they feared that this would risk tarnishing their 
improved relations with the regime.
1013
 
From 1907 to 1912, the gradual change of relations between the Armenian political 
establishment and the Russian administration was mainly conditioned by domestic 
concerns in the South Caucasus. From 1912, changing international dynamics became the 
dominant factor in relations between the Russian administration and its Armenians. The 
revived Russian interest in the reforms for the Ottoman Armenians in late 1912 as part of 
its grander foreign policy interests regarding the Ottoman Empire would be at the centre 
of this new course. As the fifth chapter has argued, aside from Russia’s concerns over the 
fate of the Ottoman Empire after the Ottoman losses against the Italians and the Balkan 
states, its new equilibrium with its own Armenians was also crucial. From late 1912 on, 
the Russian diplomats, particularly Sazonov, emphasized that their close interest in the 
problems of the Ottoman Armenians was aimed at preventing these problems from 
spreading to the South Caucasus. This concern for the Armenian reform process 
remained consistent with the prudent Russian foreign policy-making about the Ottoman 
Empire between 1912 and 1914.   
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The fifth chapter has demonstrated how its improved relations with its Armenian subjects 
enabled Russia to pursue a more active foreign policy regarding the Ottoman Armenians 
from 1912. Moreover, by highlighting the intricate links between Russia’s relations with 
the Russian and Ottoman Armenians, this chapter has argued that such an active policy, 
in turn, reinforced the improved relations of the regime with its own Armenians from 
1912 to 1914. In this period, as a result of Russia’s patronage of the Ottoman Armenians, 
Russia’s relations with its own Armenians became even more cordial considering the 
extent of the Tsarist concerns about the pan-Islamist subversion in the area (now 
coordinated by the German consulates), the increased labour activity and the influence of 
the Georgian national movement.  
As of 1912, the Armenian bourgeoisie and the Armenian Church had amicable relations 
with the regime while the Dashnaktsutiun decided not to antagonize Russia because of its 
support for the Ottoman Armenians. From late 1912 until the outbreak of the war, the 
Dashnaktsutiun remained essentially in the same position, despite the scepticism of some 
of its members about Russia. In return for not complicating Russia’s internal and external 
affairs, the convicted members of the Dashnaktsutiun trial were pardoned and their arms 
and personnel transport from the Caucasus to Eastern Anatolia were allowed to a certain 
extent. Meanwhile, the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie was consolidating its political, 
economic and cultural influence in the South Caucasus. Based on this upward trend in 
their relations with the Tsarist authorities, what it now wanted was a more vigorous 
Russian support for the Ottoman Armenians, for which they often expressed their 
concerns to the viceroy. With the signing of the reform agreement in February 1914, the 
mutual understanding between the viceroyalty and the Russian Armenian bourgeoisie 
was now expected to yield economic benefits in Eastern Anatolia for both sides as Russia 
had new designs for commercial expansion in the Ottoman Empire. 
From 1912 to 1914, the Catholicos not only became the intermediary between the 
Russian Armenians and the viceroyalty but he also ensured that the activities of the 
Armenian National Delegation in Europe for the Armenian reforms were in line with 
Russian priorities. The assurances of the Catholicos to the viceroy in the immediate 
aftermath of the outbreak of the First World War—months before the hostilities between 
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Russia and Ottoman Empires started—attested to a remarkable change of relations 
between 1903 and 1914.  
The evolution of the Armenian question in the South Caucasus between 1903 and 1914 
witnessed wars, revolutions and bloody ethnic conflicts. The findings of this study are 
intended to shed light on various aspects of these events. From August 1914 to the Soviet 
takeover of the South Caucasus, the region witnessed another cycle of wars, revolutions 
and ethnic conflicts, the implications of which are felt even today. Although the scope of 
this thesis does not go beyond August 1914, the thesis aims to provide a better 
understanding of the Russian-Ottoman conflict during the First World War by examining 
the making of the Russian foreign policy regarding the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the 
war, with a particular focus on its relations with the Armenians. 
The nature of relations between the Russian authorities with the Armenian Church, the 
Armenian bourgeoisie, the Dashnaktsutiun, and the Ottoman Armenians from 1903 to 
August 1914 is critical to understand various aspects of the Russian strategy regarding 
the Armenians on both sides of the frontier during the war. The findings of the thesis 
provide a starting point for further research for the students of the First World War who 
investigate the Russian-Ottoman conflict and the place of the Armenians in it. For 
instance, rather than presenting Russia and the Armenians as eternal partners and an 
aggressive Russian foreign policy aiming at an immediate dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire on the eve of the war, this study has emphasized the fluidity of imperial 
priorities and the changing aspirations of the nationalities in the face of big political 
changes brought about by wars and revolutions in the early twentieth century. 
Moreover, the arguments of the thesis about the Russian fears of pan-Islamist subversion 
among the Russian Muslims are relevant for understanding Russia’s relations with its 
Muslim subjects during the First World War. This was particularly crucial for the Russian 
Muslims residing in the bordering regions, like the South Caucasus, especially after the 
Ottoman declaration of jihad in November 1914. Not surprisingly, the Soviet officials 
inherited the fears of their imperial predecessors as they were often alarmed about pan-
Islamist and pan-Turkist movements among the Muslims of the Soviet Union.  
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The evolution of relations between the Russian administration and the Russian 
Armenians between 1903 and 1914—as described in this study—had also implications 
for the aftermath of the First World War. After the February Revolution, the members of 
the Armenian bourgeoisie declared their support for Russia, who saved their compatriots 
from the Turkish yoke. In the midst of the political chaos in the capital, in April 1917, the 
Provisional government appointed a commissar for the administration of Ottoman 
Armenia, whose adviser was Hagop Zavriev, a well-known Dashnak.
1014
 Meanwhile, the 
Catholicos was hoping that the Russian troops would still remain in Eastern Anatolia. 
However, the October revolution changed the entire picture.  
In late 1917, the Tsarist administration in the South Caucasus collapsed and the political 
vacuum in the region was immediately filled by the leading national parties of the three 
main nationalities (the Dashnaktsutiun, Musavat, and the Georgian Mensheviks)—the 
products of the political developments in the South Caucasus in early twentieth century. 
These political parties initially formed the cadres of the Transcaucasian Federative 
Democratic Republic, and later the independent republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. 
This thesis has focused on the animosities between these national movements from 1903 
to 1914 and their role in the formation of national identities in the region. The findings of 
this thesis are part of why the Transcaucasian Federative Democratic Republic could 
survive just more than a month. When it was falling apart in May 1918, the Georgian 
deputy Tsereteli noted that ‘it was impossible to speak of the unity of Transcaucasia as 
this unity had not existed in reality.’1015 He was quite right. From May 1918 to the final 
Soviet take-over of the South Caucasus in 1921, the region witnessed more wars and 
ethnic conflict among these peoples. 
Under Soviet rule, relations between Moscow and the Armenians were redefined and the 
existing political pillars were now undesirable elements. As it happened under Golitsyn 
administration, the Armenian Church was persecuted by the Soviet regime. Now 
considered a reactionary institution, the Armenian Church was deprived of its former 
                                               
1014 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 120-22. 
1015 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920, 128. 
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economic, cultural and educational privileges. A leading force during the independence 
period, the Dashnaktsutiun, was unsurprisingly at loggerheads with the Soviet authorities. 
Targeted as a bourgeois-nationalist party by the Soviet authorities, the Dashnaks went 
through a tumultuous period not unlike they experienced during their infamous trial 
orchestrated by Lyzhin. As it happened between 1908 and 1912, the Dashnaks had to flee 
abroad or go underground as the Soviet regime took root and soon they lost their political 
significance. The situation was similarly ominous for the members of the Armenian 
bourgeoisie, who were now the class enemies of the new regime.  
Some of the concerns of Tsarist statesmen continued to exist under the Soviet regime. For 
instance, the difference of opinion between the viceroyalty and the central government 
regarding the use of national languages and schools between 1903 and 1914 was also 
displayed in the early Soviet policies of korenizatsiia (indigenization) and Stalin’s 
denunciation of local nationalisms in 1934.
1016
 Another imperial legacy, the national 
animosities were still alive despite the demographic homogenization of the union 
republics and the Soviet propaganda of class solidarity. As the former Commissar of 
Nationalities Affairs, Stalin found a way to benefit from this by establishing the Nagorno-
Karabagh autonomous oblast, which has created endless problems for the Armenians and 
the Azeris. 
In 1905, it was agonizing for Maksim Gorky to read the news about the Armenian-Azeri 
clashes. He noted that ‘he was not dispirited by the brutality as much as the stupidity of 
the people, who did not understand that an external evil force played with their dark 
rage.’1017 Gorky was very optimistic as he believed that the nationalities of the South 
Caucasus would soon forget about the conflicts among themselves and fight against their 
common enemy: the Russian autocracy. However, even after the Soviet experiment, they 
did not forget. When the Soviet hold in the South Caucasus was in tatters during the late 
1980s, similar to the revolutionary days in 1905, another cycle of violence between the 
Armenians and the Azeris started, which still plagues the region. 
 
                                               
1016 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 148-55. 
1017 Maksim Gorky, O Kavkazskikh sobytiiakh (Tbilisi: Partizdat, 1936), 14. 
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